A.M. No. MTJ-08-1714 [Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 08-2016-MTJ] - DANIEL G. SEVILLA, COMPLAINANT, VS. JUDGE FRANCISCO S. LINDO, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 55, MALABON CITY.D E C I S I O N - Supreme Court E-Library

Ruling

WHEREFORE, retired Judge Francisco S. Lindo, former Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Malabon City, Branch 55, is found GUILTY of simple misconduct and undue delay in rendering a decision. He is FINED in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) in accordance with Section 11, Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, to be deducted from the One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000,00.) we ordered withheld from his retirement benefits pursuant to our Resolution dated April 22, 2008. The Chief of the Financial Management Office, Office of the Court Administrator is DIRECTED to immediately release to retired Judge Francisco S. Lindo the remaining Eighty Thousand Pesos (P80,000.00). By resolution dated July 19, 2010, [11] this case was transferred to the Third Division for resolution. Issue The only issue is whether or not retired Judge Lindo was administratively liable for the numerous postponements in Criminal Case No. J-L00-4260. Ruling We agree with and adopt the report and recommendation of the OCA that Judge Lindo be held liable for delay in the disposition of his cases that was tantamount to inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of his official duties, and that he be meted a fine of P21,000.00 to be deducted from his retirement benefits due to his compulsory retirement from the Judiciary effective July 24, 2007. We point out that the findings of the OCA were based on the records of Judge Lindo's Branch that the OCA subjected to a judicial audit in anticipation of his mandatory retirement. Although the postponement of a hearing in a civil or criminal case may at times be unavoidable, the Court disallows undue or unnecessary postponements of court hearings, simply because they cause unreasonable delays in the administration of justice and, thus, undermine the people's faith in the Judiciary, [12] aside from aggravating the financial and emotional burdens of the litigants. For this reason, the Court has enjoined that postponements and resettings should be allowed only upon meritorious grounds, [13] and has consistently reminded all trial judges to adopt a firm policy against improvident postponements. [14] The strict judicial policy on postponements applies with more force and greater reason to prosecutions involving violations of BP 22, whose prompt resolution has been ensured by their being now covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure . The Court has pronounced that the Rule on Summary Procedure was precisely adopted to promote a more expeditious and inexpensive determination of cases, and to enforce the constitutional rights of litigants to the speedy disposition of cases. [15] Yet, Judge Lindo postponed five hearings for lack of material time without bothering to state the specific causes why his court lacked material time. He also reset four hearings supposedly upon the agreement of the parties, which the complainant credibly denied because that was prejudicial to his interest. He even cancelled the h