A.M. NO. MTJ-05-1603 - JAIME R. SEVILLA COMPLAINANT, VS. JUDGE EDISON F. QUINTIN, METC, BRANCH 56, MALABON CITY.D E C I S I O N - Supreme Court E-Library

Ruling

accordingly recommends that for gross ignorance of the law and violation of Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, respondent be fined in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00). As a rule, the grant or denial of a motion for postponement is addressed to the sound discretion of the court which should always be predicated on the consideration that more than the mere convenience of the courts or of the parties, the ends of justice and fairness should be served thereby. [20] However, this discretion must be exercised wisely. [21] To be sure, the discretion of the trial court, "is not absolute nor beyond control." It must be sound, and exercised within reasonable bounds. Judicial discretion, by its very nature, involves the exercise of the judge's individual opinion and the law has wisely provided that its exercise be guided by well-known rules which, while allowing the judge rational latitude for the operation of his own individual views, prevent them from getting out of control. An uncontrolled or uncontrollable discretion on the part of a judge is a misnomer. It is a fallacy. [22] In considering motions for postponements, two things must be borne in mind: (1) the reason for the postponement, and (2) the merits of the movant. [23] A perusal of the records of the cases reveals that the hearings thereon were reset innumerably from August 3, 2001 until April 20, 2004 due to the absence of either the private or public prosecutor and/or the defense counsel. The defense counsel did not thus have a monopoly of contracting absences. The private prosecutor whom complainant hired had had his share of absences. As admitted by complainant, the private prosecutor's last appearance was on September 19, 1999. [24] Instead, however, of dispensing with the services of the private prosecutor early on or as soon as the latter showed lack of dedication to the cases, [25] complainant tolerated his continued absences. And complainant interposed no objection to the consecutive resettings of the hearing of the cases and even expressed his conformity thereto by affixing his signature on the minutes thereof. That complainant did not object to the continued postponement of the hearing of the cases for close to three (3) years does not, however, extenuate respondent. For a judge should at all times remain in full control of the proceedings in his branch and should adopt a firm policy against improvident postponements. [26] Lengthy postponements of court hearings create delay in the administration of justice, thus undermining the people's faith in the judiciary from whom the prompt hearing of their supplications is anticipated and expected, and reinforcing in the mind of the litigants the impression that the wheels of justice grind ever so slowly. [27] And they should always observe utmost diligence and dedication in the performance of their judicial functions and duties, dispose of the court's business promptly [28] and decide cases impartially with reasonable di