G.R. No. 213198 - GENEVIEVE ROSAL ARREZA, A.K.A. "GENEVIEVE ARREZA TOYO,", V. TETSUSHI TOYO, LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, AND THE ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE.

Ruling

Accordingly, the English translation submitted by petitioner is not an official publication exempted from the requirement of authentication. Neither can the English translation be considered as a learned treatise. Under the Rules of Court, "[a] witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his [or her] personal knowledge[.]" [58] The evidence is hearsay when it is "not . . . what the witness knows himself [or herself] but of what he [or she] has heard from others." [59] The rule excluding hearsay evidence is not limited to oral testimony or statements, but also covers written statements. [60] The rule is that hearsay evidence "is devoid of probative value[.]" [61] However, a published treatise may be admitted as tending to prove the truth of its content if: (1) the court takes judicial notice; or (2) an expert witness testifies that the writer is recognized in his or her profession as an expert in the subject. [62] Here, the Regional Trial Court did not take judicial notice of the translator's and advisors' qualifications. Nor was an expert witness presented to testify on this matter. The only evidence of the translator's and advisors' credentials is the inside cover page of the English translation of the Civil Code of Japan. [63] Hence, the Regional Trial Court was correct in not considering the English translation as a learned treatise. Finally, settled is the rule that, generally, this Court only entertains questions of law in a Rule 45 petition. [64] Questions of fact, like the existence of Japan's law on divorce, [65] are not within this Court's ambit to resolve. [66] Nonetheless, in Medina v. Koike , [67] this Court ruled that while the Petition raised questions of fact, "substantial ends of justice warrant that the case be referred to the [Court of Appeals] for further appropriate proceedings": Considering that the validity of the divorce decree between Doreen and Michiyuki, as well as the existence of pertinent laws of Japan on the matter are essentially factual that calls for a re-evaluation of the evidence presented before the RTC, the issue raised in the instant appeal is obviously a question of fact that is beyond the ambit of a Rule 45 petition for review. . . . . Nonetheless, despite the procedural restrictions on Rule 45 appeals as above-adverted, the Court may refer the case to the [Court of Appeals] under paragraph 2, Section 6 of Rule 56 of the Rules of Court, which provides: SEC. 6. Disposition of improper appeal. ... An appeal by certiorari taken to the Supreme Court from the Regional Trial Court submitting issues of fact may be referred to the Court of Appeals for decision or appropriate action. The determination of the Supreme Court on whether or not issues of fact are involved shall be final. This, notwithstanding the express provision under Section 5 (f) thereof that an appeal likewise "may" be dismissed when there is error in the choice or mode of appeal. Since the said Rules denote discretion on the part of