G.R. No. 104386 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, VS. HON. OSCAR L. LEVISTE, PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY, BRANCH 97, AND ARNULFO C. TALISIC.

Ruling

accordingly, it is sound judicial discretion to allow the same to the end that the merits of the case may be fully ventilated. Unless grave abuse of discretion is shown, such discretion will not be interfered with either by mandamus or appeal. [16] While it is true that any motion that does not comply with the requirements of Rule 15 should not be accepted for filing and, if filed, is not entitled to judicial cognizance, [17] this Court has likewise held that where a rigid application of the rule will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice, technicalities may be disregarded in order to resolve the case. Litigations should, as much as possible, be decided on the merits and not on technicalities. [18] As this Court held in Galvez vs. Court of Appeals [19] "an order of the court granting the motion to dismiss despite the absence of a notice of hearing, or proof of service thereof, is merely an irregularity in the proceedings xxx (which) cannot deprive a competent court of jurisdiction over the case." In the case at bench, the postponement of the July 29, 1991 hearing was the very first one ever requested by the private prosecutor. And it was for a valid reason: the principal prosecution witness, a labor lawyer, had to be in Cebu City to attend a concilliation meeting concerning a strike/picket. Such reason is likewise easily verifiable, and as already mentioned, was in fact certified into writing by the National Conciliation and Mediation Boards officer-in-charge in Cebu City. There being no showing that any substantial right of the accused would have been duly prejudiced by the postponement, respondent Judge should have granted the motion to afford the prosecution a fair opportunity to prosecute its case. As it is, his precipitate dismissal of the case is tantamount to denying the State due process. In People vs. Navarro [20] this Court held that: A trial court may not arbitrarily deny a timely and well-founded motion of the prosecution for reconsideration of an order of dismissal or acquittal and that such arbitrary refusal to reopen the case will be set aside to give the State its day in court and an opportunity to prove the offense charged against the accused and to prevent miscarriage of justice, especially when no substantial right of the accused would be prejudiced thereby." The right of an accused to speedy trial is not violated by the mere postponement of scheduled hearings of the case. Unjustified postponements which prolong the trial for an unreasonable length of time are what offend the right of the accused to speedy trial. The right to speedy trial allows reasonable continuance so as not to deprive the prosecution its day in court. [21] As held in Gonzales vs. Sandiganbayan: x x x (T)he right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of trial are asked for an