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JurisprudenceG.R. No. 126232 -

G.R. No. 126232 - THE PROVINCE OF BULACAN, ROBERTO M. PAGDANGANAN, FLORENCE CHAVEZ, AND MANUEL DJ SIAYNGCO IN THEIR CAPACITY AS PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR, PROVINCIAL TREASURER, PROVINCIAL LEGAL ADVISE, RESPECTIVELY, VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (FORMER SPECIAL 12TH DIVISION), PUBLIC CEMENT CORPORATI

Cited Laws

RA 341RA 335RA 408RA 35RA 47RA 292RA 575RA 577
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TL;DR — Ruling

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the Province of Bulacan under its Provincial Ordinance No. 3 entitled "An Ordinance Enacting the Revenue Code of Bulacan Province" to be without legal authority to impose and assess taxes on quarry resources extracted by RCC from private lands, hence the interpretation of Respondent Treasurer of Chapter II, Article D, Section 21 of the Ordinance, and the assessment made by the Province of Bulacan against RCC is null and void.

Decision

Ruling

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the Province of Bulacan under its Provincial Ordinance No. 3 entitled "An Ordinance Enacting the Revenue Code of Bulacan Province" to be without legal authority to impose and assess taxes on quarry resources extracted by RCC from private lands, hence the interpretation of Respondent Treasurer of Chapter II, Article D, Section 21 of the Ordinance, and the assessment made by the Province of Bulacan against RCC is null and void. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration, as well as their supplemental motion for reconsideration, was denied by the appellate court on august 26, 1996, hence this appeal. Petitioner's claim that the Court of Appeals erred in: 1. NOT HAVING OUTRIGHTLY DISMISSED THE SUBJECT PETITION ON THE GROUND THAT THE SAME IS NOT THE APPROPRIATE REMEDY FROM THE TRIAL COURT'S GRANT OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS' (HEREIN PETITIONER) MOTION TO DISMISS; 2. NOT DISMISSING THE SUBJECT PETITION FOR BEING VIOLATIVE OF CIRCULAR 2-90 ISSUED BY THE SUPREME COURT; 3. NOT DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR REVIEW ON THE GROUND THAT THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER OF MAY 13, 1994 HAD LONG BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY; 4. GOING BEYOND THE PARAMETERS OF ITS APPELLATE JURISDICTION IN RENDERING THE SEPTEMBER 27, 1995 DECISION; 5. HOLDING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT (HEREIN PETITIONER) ARE ESTOPPED FROM RAISING THE PROCEDURAL ISSUE IN THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION; 6. THE INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 134 OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE AS STATED IN THE SECOND TO THE LAST PARAGRAPH OF PAGE 5 OF ITS SEPTEMBER 27, 1995 DECISION; 7. SUSTAINING THE ALLEGATIONS OF HEREIN RESPONDENT WHICH UNJUSTLY DEPRIVED PETITIONER THE POWER TO CREATE ITS OWN SOURCES OF REVENUE; 8. DECLARING THAT THE ASSESSMENT MADE BY THE PROVINCE OF BULACAN AGAINST RCC AS NULL AND VOID WHICH IN EFFECT IS A COLLATERAL ATTACK ON PROVINCIAL ORDINANCE NO. 3; AND 9. FAILING TO CONSIDER THE REGALIAN DOCTRINE IN FAVOR OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT. The issues raised by petitioners are devoid of merit. The number and diversity of errors raised by appellants impel us, however, to discuss the points raised seriatim. In their first assignment of error, petitioners contend that instead of filing a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court, Republic Cement should have appealed from the order of the trial court dismissing their petition. Citing Martinez vs. CA, [1] they allege that a motion to dismiss is a final order, the remedy against which is not a petition for certiorari, but an appeal, regardless of the questions sought to be raised on appeal, whether of fact or of law, whether involving jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion of the trial court. Petitioners' argument is misleading. While it is true that the remedy against a final order is an appeal, and not a petition for certiorari, the petition referred to is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. As stated in Martinez, the party aggrieved does not have the option to substitute the special civil action for certiorari under Ru