G.R. No. 128061 - JESUS G. SANTOS, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, REGIONAL, TRIAL COURT OF BULACAN, BRANCH 9 AND OMAR H. YAPCHIONGCO.

Ruling

Accordingly, the certification in the case at bar that the first and second notices addressed to Atty. Narvasa had been "issued" can hardly suffice the requirements of equity and justice. It was incumbent upon the post office to further certify that said notices were reportedly received. When there are several related acts supposed to be performed by a public officer or employee in regard to a particular matter, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions arise and be considered as comprehending all the required acts, if the certification issued by the proper office refers only to some of such acts, particularly in instances wherein proof of whether or not all of them performed is available under the or office regulations to the officer making the certification. In other words, the omission of some of the acts in-the certification may justify the inference that from the proof available to the officer there is no showing that they have also been performed x x x x [19] (underscoring supplied). As between the claim of non-receipt of notices of registered mail by a party and the assertion of an official whose duty is to send notices, which assertion is fortified by the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed, [20] the choice is not difficult to make. But then the contents of the official's certification may spell the difference. For, it was not enough for Postmaster Endaya to have certified that the notices were issued because this is just a prelude to service by registered mail. And definitely, it would not be in consonance with the demands of due process and equity for us to automatically conclude that from the word "issued" alone, the notice was in fact received by the addressee or somebody acting on his behalf and on the same date of the notice, The postmaster should have included in his certification the manner, date and the recipient of the delivery. Hernandez need not overemphasize the point. The finding of respondent court that petitioner and his coappellees were considered to have received a copy of the decision on 20 June 1995 or five (5) days from the date of first notice of the postmaster, in the absence of conclusive proof as it merely relied on the dates of the notices and the notation "Unclaimed: Return to Sender" stamped on the envelope containing its decision, was clearly arrived at arbitrarily. Consequently, certiorari lies. With this conclusion, it is no longer necessary to dwell on the other issue raised. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The resolutions of respondent Court of Appeals dated 29 November 1996 denying petitioner Jesus G. Santos' motion for reconsideration and 30 January 1997 also denying his motion for leave to admit motion for reconsideration, are SET ASIDE. Respondent court is directed to act accordingly on petitioner's motion for reconsideration on the merits and to proceed in the disposition thereof with dispatch. SO ORDERED.