G.R. No. 123340 - LUTGARDA CRUZ, VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE HEIRS OF ESTANISLAWA C. REYES, REPRESENTED BY MIGUEL C. REYES.

Ruling

WHEREFORE, said motion is DENIED. [6] Left with no recourse, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the Court of Appeals to nullify the two assailed orders of the trial court. Petitioner also asked the Court of Appeals to compel the trial court to resolve her motion for reconsideration of the decision dated February 7, 1994. The Ruling of the Court of Appeals On March 31, 1995, the Court of Appeals denied due course to the petition and dismissed the case for being insufficient in substance. The Court of Appeals sustained the trial courts order of April 18, 1994 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals declared in part: Section 10, Rule 13, Rules of Court, provides as follows: SEC. 10. Proof of Service . Proof of personal service shall consist of a written admission of the party served, or the affidavit of the party serving, containing a full statement of the date, place and manner of service. If the service is by ordinary mail, proof thereof shall consist of an affidavit of the person mailing of facts showing compliance with Section 5 of this rule. If service is made by registered mail, proof shall be made by such affidavit and the registry receipt issued by the mailing office. The registry return card shall be filed immediately upon receipt thereof by the sender, or in lieu thereof the letter unclaimed together with the certified or sworn copy of the notice given by the postmaster to the addressee. Patent from the language of the said section is that in case service is made by registered mail, proof of service shall be made by (a) affidavit of the person mailing and (b) the registry receipt issued by the mailing office. Both must concur. In the case at bench, there was no such affidavit or registry receipt when the motion was considered. Thus, respondent Judge cannot be said to have acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in ruling in the manner he did. [7] The Court of Appeals also affirmed the trial courts order of May 6, 1994 denying the subsequent motion for reconsideration, as follows: xxx, while there is merit in petitioners submission that the motion for reconsideration dated April 22, 1994 was not a second motion for reconsideration of a final order or judgment, as contemplated in the Interim Rules because the motion sought to impugn the order dated 18 April 1994 not on the basis of the issues raised in the motion for reconsideration dated 07 February 1994 but on the erroneous legal conclusion of the order dated May 6, 1994, [8] this is already academic. The decision dated January 7, 1994 had long become final when the second motion for reconsideration was filed on 03 May 1994. Hence, the pairing Judge who issued the order on 06 May 1994 had no more legal competence to promulgate the same. [9] Finally, the Court of Appeals upheld the assailed decision of the trial court on the civil aspect of the case, to wit: x x x, the institution of a crimi