Cited Laws
TL;DR — Ruling
WHEREFORE, on the basis of the foregoing discussion, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs against the defendants ordering the latter: To demolish their houses inside lot 1639-D, vacate the premises thereof and deliver the possession of the same to Plaintiffs; To jointly and solidarily pay plaintiffs the sum of P15,000.00 for attorney's fees; To each pay plaintiffs the sum of P100.
WHEREFORE, on the basis of the foregoing discussion, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs against the defendants ordering the latter: To demolish their houses inside lot 1639-D, vacate the premises thereof and deliver the possession of the same to Plaintiffs; To jointly and solidarily pay plaintiffs the sum of P15,000.00 for attorney's fees; To each pay plaintiffs the sum of P100.00 every year from 1993 for actual damages representing the amount of unpaid rentals up to the time they actually vacate the premises in question; Sclaw To pay the costs. [10] On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC. The appellate court ruled that the sketch plan and tax declarations relied upon by petitioners are not conclusive evidence of partition. [11] The CA likewise found that the prescribed procedure under Rule 69 of the Rules of Court was not followed. It thus declared that there was no partition of Lot No. 1639. Petitioners filed this petition for review on certiorari alleging that the CA committed the following reversible errors: I IN VIOLATING THE LAW ON ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION PLAINTIFFS HAVING POSSESSED LOT 1639-D SINCE 1946; II IN VIOLATING THE LAW ON ESTOPPEL; THE FACT OF PAYMENT OF RENTALS AND OFFER TO BUY BY THE DEFENDANTS IS ADMISSION THAT THE AREA IN LOT 1639-D, HAD LONG BEEN ADJUDICATED TO PLAINTIFFS; III IN DECLARING THAT THERE WAS NO PRIOR PARTITION, CONTRARY TO THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT, AND AGAINST THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD, OF WHICH IF PROPERLY CONSIDERED WOULD CHANGE THE OUTCOME OF THE CASE; IV IN DECLARING THAT THERE IS NO LAW OR JURISPRUDENCE APPLICABLE UNDER THE PREMISES; THIS WOULD ONLY SHOW THAT THE RECORD OF THE CASE WAS NOT PROPERLY SCRUTINIZED, AND THE LAW WAS NOT PROPERLY STUDIED; ESPECIALLY IN THE CASE AT BENCH THAT THE ORAL AND MUTUAL PARTITION HAPPENED DURING THE REGIME OF THE OLD RULES OF PROCEDURE; [12] Petitioners maintain that Lot No. 1639 was mutually partitioned and physically subdivided among the co-owners and that majority of them participated in the actual execution of the subdivision. Further, the co-owners accepted their designated shares in 1946 as averred by Tomas Maglucot in his petition for partition. [13] Petitioners opine that in 1952, Tomas Maglucot himself initiated a court proceeding for a formal subdivision of Lot No. 1639. In said petition, he averred that only Hermogenes Olis and the heirs of Pascual Olis were not agreeable to the partition. [14] Petitioners further contend that respondents admitted in their tax declarations covering their respective houses that they are "constructed on the land of Roberto Maglucot." [15] Simply put, petitioners vigorously assert that respondents are estopped from claiming to be co-owners of the subject lot in view of the mutual agreement in 1946, judicial confirmation in 1952, and respondents' acquiescence because they themselves exclusively exercised ownership over Lot No. 1639-A beginning 1952 up to the present. [16] For their part, responden