G.R. No. 137191 - BEN B. RICO, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES.

Ruling

Accordingly, procedural due process clearly enjoins that a notice of dishonor be actually served on petitioner . Petitioner has a right to demand - and the basic postulates of fairness require - that the notice of dishonor be actually sent to and received by her to afford her the opportunity to avert prosecution under BP Blg. 22. (Italics supplied.) In other words, if such notice of non-payment by the drawee bank is not sent to the maker or drawer of the bum check, or if there is no proof as to when such notice was received by the drawer, then the presumption of knowledge as provided in Section 2 of B.P. 22 cannot arise, since there would simply be no way of reckoning the crucial five-day period . [25] As stated earlier, the prosecution not only failed to prove the receipt by petitioner of any notice of dishonor, the records are also bereft of any indication that written formal demand letters or notice of dishonor were actually sent to petitioner. In recent cases, we had the occasion to emphasize that not only must there be a written notice of dishonor or demand letters actually received by the drawer of a dishonored check, but there must also be proof of receipt thereof that is properly authenticated, and not mere registered receipt and/or return receipt. Thus, as held in Domagsang vs. Court of Appeals , [26] while Section 2 of B.P. 22 indeed does not state that the notice of dishonor be in writing, this must be taken in conjunction with Section 3 of the law, i.e. , that where there are no sufficient funds in or credit with such drawee bank, such fact shall always be explicitly stated in the notice of dishonor or refusal . A mere oral notice or demand to pay would appear to be insufficient for conviction under the law. In our view, both the spirit and the letter of the Bouncing Checks Law require for the act to be punished thereunder not only that the accused issued a check that is dishonored, but also that the accused has actually been notified in writing of the fact of dishonor. The consistent rule is that penal statutes must be construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the accused. In Victor Ting vs. Court of Appeals , [27] we stated that when service of a notice is sought to be made by mail, it should appear that conditions exist on which the validity of such service depends. Otherwise, the evidence is insufficient to establish the fact of service. Receipts for registered letters and return receipts do not by themselves prove receipt; they must be properly authenticated to serve as proof of receipt of the letters. In fine, the failure of the prosecution to prove the existence and receipt by petitioner of the requisite written notice of dishonor and that he was given at least five banking days within which to settle his account constitutes sufficient ground for his acquittal. However, while petitioner is acquitted for violation of B.P. 22, he should be ordered to pay the face value of the five dishonored checks plus leg