G.R. NO. 139292 - JOSEPHINE DOMAGSANG, VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES.D E C I S I O N - Supreme Court E-Library

Ruling

Accordingly, procedural due process clearly enjoins that a notice of dishonor be actually served on petitioner. Petitioner has a right to demand - and the basic postulates of fairness require - that the notice of dishonor be actually sent to and received by her to afford her the opportunity to avert prosecution under B.P. Blg. 22." [9] In the assailed decision, the Court of Appeals predicated the conviction of petitioner on the supposed fact that petitioner was informed of the dishonor of the checks through verbal notice when the complainant had called her up by telephone informing her of the dishonor of the checks and demanding payment therefor. The appellate court said: "The maker's knowledge of the insufficiency of his funds is legally presumed from the dishonor of his check (People vs. Laggui, 171 Phil. 305). The law does not require a written notice of the dishonor of such check. "In the instant case, appellant had knowledge that her checks were dishonored by the bank when complainant Garcia made several oral demands upon her to pay the value of the checks in the amount of P573,800.00. Despite said demands, appellant failed and refused to pay the same. Moreover, complaining witness further testified that his lawyer made a written demand upon appellant but the latter ignored said demand (tsn., May 27, 1993, pp. 13-14). In this connection, appellant waived her right to present evidence or rebut complainant's testimony that he made oral demands upon appellant to make good the dishonored checks and his lawyer wrote her a demand letter. "Likewise, appellant did not object to the admission of the complainant's testimony with regard to the written demand by moving that it be stricken off the record for being hearsay, hence, the same is admissible evidence. In the case of People vs. Garcia , 89 SCRA 440, the Supreme court ruled: "`x x x (It) must be noted that neither the defendant nor his counsel below objected to the admission of the testimonies which are now being assailed as hearsay. This is fatal to defendant-appellant's present posture since the failure to object to hearsay evidence constitutes a waiver of the x x right to cross-examine the actual witness to the occurrence, rendering the evidence admissible.'" [10] Petitioner counters that the lack of a written notice of dishonor is fatal. The Court agrees. While, indeed, Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 does not state that the notice of dishonor be in writing, taken in conjunction, however, with Section 3 of the law, i.e ., "that where there are no sufficient funds in or credit with such drawee bank, such fact shall always be explicitly stated in the notice of dishonor or refusal ," [11] a mere oral notice or demand to pay would appear to be insufficient for conviction under the law. The Court is convinced that both the spirit and letter of the Bouncing Checks Law would require for the act to be punished thereunder not only that the accused issued a check that is dishonored, but that likewise the ac