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JurisprudenceG.R. No. 132805 -

G.R. No. 132805 - PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, LABOR ARBITER ROMULUS PROTACIO AND DR. HERMINIO A. FABROS. D E C I S I O N - Supreme Court E-Library

Cited Laws

RA 338RA 352RA 320RA 671
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TL;DR — Ruling

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the suspension of complainant as illegal, and ordering the respondents the restitution to the complainant of all employment benefits equivalent to his period of suspension, and the payment to the complainant of P500,000.00 by way of moral damages. [2] Petitioner appealed to the NLRC.

Decision

Ruling

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the suspension of complainant as illegal, and ordering the respondents the restitution to the complainant of all employment benefits equivalent to his period of suspension, and the payment to the complainant of P500,000.00 by way of moral damages. [2] Petitioner appealed to the NLRC. The NLRC, however, dismissed the appeal after finding that the decision of the Labor Arbiter is supported by the facts on record and the law on the matter. [3] The NLRC likewise denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration. [4] Hence, this petition raising the following arguments: The public respondents acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in nullifying the 3-month suspension of private respondent despite the fact that the private respondent has committed an offense that warranted the imposition of disciplinary action. The public respondents acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in holding the petitioner liable for moral damages: (a) Despite the fact that no formal hearing whatsoever was conducted for complainant to substantiate his claim; (b) Despite the absence of proof that the petitioner acted in bad faith in imposing the 3-month suspension; and (c) Despite the fact that the Labor Arbiter's award of moral damages is highly irregular, considering that it was more than what the private respondent prayed for. [5] We find that public respondents did not err in nullifying the three-month suspension of private respondent. They, however, erred in awarding moral damages to private respondent. First, as regards the legality of private respondent's suspension. The facts do not support petitioner's allegation that private respondent abandoned his post on the evening of February 17, 1994. Private respondent left the clinic that night only to have his dinner at his house, which was only a few minutes' drive away from the clinic. His whereabouts were known to the nurse on duty so that he could be easily reached in case of emergency. Upon being informed of Mr. Acosta's condition, private respondent immediately left his home and returned to the clinic. These facts belie petitioner's claim of abandonment. Petitioner argues that being a full-time employee, private respondent is obliged to stay in the company premises for not less than eight (8) hours. Hence, he may not leave the company premises during such time, even to take his meals. We are not impressed. Articles 83 and 85 of the Labor Code read: Art. 83. Normal hours of work .--The normal hours of work of any employee shall not exceed eight (8) hours a day. Health personnel in cities and municipalities with a population of at least one million (1,000,000) or in hospitals and clinics with a bed capacity of at least one hundred (100) shall hold regular office hours for eight (8) hours a day, for five (5) days a week, exclusive of time for meals , except whe