G.R. No. 193443 - JEAN TAN, ROSELLER C. ANACINTO, CARLO LOILO ESPINEDA AND DAISY ALIADO MANAOIS, REPRESENTED IN THIS ACT BY THEIR ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, MA. WILHELMINA E. TOBIAS, VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES.R E S O L U T I O N - Supreme Court E-Library

Ruling

WHEREFORE , in view of the foregoing, this Court confirming its previous Order of general default, decrees and adjudges Lot No. 9972 consisting of 6,920 square meters, Cad. 459-D, Indang Cadastre and its technical description as herein above-described situated in Brgy. Bancod, Indang, Cavite, pursuant to the provisions of Act 496 as amended by P.D. 1529, as it is hereby decreed and adjudged to be confirmed and registered in the names of Jean Tan, of legal age, Filipino, single, with postal address at Room 54 T. Pinpin St., Binondo, Manila; Roseller C. Anaci[n]to, of legal age, Filipino, single, with postal address at Moncario Villag[e], Ampid-1, San Mateo, Rizal; Carlo Loilo Espineda, of legal age, Filipino, with postal address at Cluster F. Cogeo, Antipolo, Rizal and Daisy Aliado Manaois, of legal age, Filipino and resident of Panghulo Road, Malabon, Metro Manila. Once this decision becomes final, let the corresponding decree of registration be issued by the Administrator, Land Registration Authority. SO ORDERE D. [5] The CA gave due course to the appeal filed by the Republic of the Philippines. By way of the assailed Decision, the CA ruled that the petitioners failed to prove that they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the subject property for the requisite period of 30 years. The CA posit: We now determine if appellees have the right to register their title on such land despite the fact that their possession commenced only after 12 June 1945. Records show that the appellees possession over the subject property can be reckoned only from 21 June 1983, the date when according to evidence, the subject property became alienable and disposable. From said date up to the filing of the application for registration of title over the subject property on 14 June 2001, only eighteen (18) years had lapsed. Thus, appellees possession of the subject property fell short of the requirement of open, continuous and exclusive possession of at least 30 years. Moreover, there was no adequate evidence which would show that appellees and their predecessors-in-interest exercised acts of dominion over the subject land as to indicate possession in the concept of owner. The testimonies of appellees witnesses regarding actual possession are belied by the absence of evidence on actual use of or improvements on the subject property. Appellees presented only various tax declarations to prove possession. However, except for the Certification, showing payment of tax due on tax declaration for the year 2003, there are no other evidence showing that all the taxes due corresponding to the rest of the tax declarations were in fact paid by appellees or their predecessors-in-interest. In sum, appellees were unable to prove that they or their predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the subject property for more than 30 years, which possession is characterized as open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious, in the concept of an owner. Appellee