CLARYLYN A. LEGASPI, ROMEO R. DOMONDON, JR., BARTOLOME F. DULATRE, ALEJANDRO J. SISON, NESTOR M. JOVELLANOS, JERRYSON T. ICO, ROEL P. DINONG, FERNANDO D. BAUTISTA, BABYLAINE C. AQUI, GRACE U. DULATRE, OMAR G. VALDEZ, REYNALDO A. SOQUILA, CRESENCIO L BEI.AMIDE, CARLO M. CABAOBAO, CRISTY R. REYNADO, J

G.R. No. 264661, July 30, 2024, ♦ Decision, Gaerlan, [J] ♦ Separate Concurring Opinion, Leonen, [J] ♦ Separate Opinion, Lazaro-Javier, [J] ♦ Concurring Opinion, Singh, [J] Manila EN BANC [ G.R. No. 264661, July 30, 2024 ] CLARYLYN A. LEGASPI, ROMEO R. DOMONDON, JR., BARTOLOME F. DULATRE, ALEJANDRO J. SISON, NESTOR M. JOVELLANOS, JERRYSON T. ICO, ROEL P. DINONG, FERNANDO D. BAUTISTA, BABYLAINE C. AQUI, GRACE U. DULATRE, OMAR G. VALDEZ, REYNALDO A. SOQUILA, CRESENCIO L BEI.AMIDE, CARLO M. CABAOBAO, CRISTY R. REYNADO, JHON PAUL E. CAYABYAB, RUPERTO P. BOTON, THELMA P. VELANO, ADELAIDA V. BOTON, MARIE CYNARA PANAY, ONEIL C. JOVERO, SHEKINAH TOLENTINO, MARIO JIMENEZ, VERGEL T. PEREZ, RACHELLE ANNE PEREZ, CHRISTOPHER R. MILANES, LAUDEMER I. FABIA, IRISH CHERRY T. BUSTO, JANLEE REY F. SABADO, KENNETH B. GOTOC, IMELDA A. CUEVA, AND MARICEL B.GOTOC, PETITIONERS, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RESPONDENT. D E C I S I O N GAERLAN, Before this Court is a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus filed as a class suit in representation of all voters of the Province of Pangasinan who were allegedly denied their rights of suffrage, to petition the government for redress of grievances, and to have access to information on matters of public concern. Petitioners Clarylyn A. Legaspi et al. (Legaspi et al.) assert that said rights of theirs were affected by the supposed inaction of respondent vis-a-vis their requests for a manual recount (at their expense) of the provincial results for all positions contested in the May 9, 2022 National and Local Elections, and said inaction is argued to have effectively amounted to grave abuse of discretion and denial of due process on the part of respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC). Facts of the Case COMELEC, through its Executive Director, received on May 27, 2022 a document entitled "APELA PARA SA MANO-MANONG PAGBILANG MULI NG MGA BOTO SA PROBINSYA NG PANGASINAN' (APELA). Said document was forwarded to respondent's Executive Director from COMELEC's Provincial Election Supervisor in Pangasinan, who in turn received the same from a certain Albert O. Quintinita (Quintinita), a supposed signatory to the document, but who appears not to be a party to the instant petition. The APELA is a signature campaign petition with the following intent as embodied on its first page, viz Kami, bilang mamamayan at botante ng Pangasinan, ay hwnihiling na muling bilangin ang aming mga boto nitong nakaraang eleksyon (May 9, 2022), sa lalawigan ng Pangasinan dahil sa malawalcang dayaan na nangyari. Bilang mga mamamayan at botante na nabigyan ng kapangyarihan na malayang pumili ng mga taong rnamumuno sa aming bayan, alinsunod sa Saligang-Batas, naniniwala kami na nilabag ang aming karapatan sapagkat ang lumabas na resulta sa eleksyon ay taliwas sa binoto ng karamihan sa amin. Kami ngayon ay umaapela na muling bilangin ang mga ito ng wasto, tapat, malinis at alinsunod sa batas upang lumabas ang katotohanan at mahalal ang mga karapat-dapat na maupo sa pwesto. Nakalakip dito ang mga pangalan at lagda na sumusupmta sa pananawagang ito. Ang lahat ng ito ay nagmumula sa karapatang bumoto na isa sa mga pinakasagrado at pinakamahalagang saligan ng demokrasya. As stated in the instant petition, petitioner Atty. Laudemer I. Fabia (Atty. Fabia) was responsible for preparing and circulating the said APELA. Only the first page containing the foregoing paragraphs of intent is attached to the instant petition; the critical signature pages that support the same are notably absent from the record. COMELEC's Law Department replied to Quintinita in a Letter dated May 31, 2022, which contains the following guidance: Dear Mr. Quintinita, This is in response to the APELA PARA SA MANO-MANONG PAGBILANG MULING MGA BOTO SA PROBINSYA NG PANGASINAN which you signed together with other persons who were questioning the results of the 2022 National and Local Elections. The aforesaid document was received by the Office of the Executive Director on May 27, 2022, and was transmitted to this Department on even date. A perusal of the instant document shows that, although it was signed by several persons from different barangays and municipalities of the Province of Pangasinan, it did not specifically state the position involved and other details required for an election protest. Please be reminded that if you are contesting the elections or returns of an elective regional, provincial or city official, the petition should be filed directly with the Commission, through the Electoral Contests and Adjudication Department (ECAD), by any candidate who was voted for in the same office and who received the second or third highest number of votes, among others, as reflected in the Statement of Votes. On the other hand, if the instant election contest involves municipal officials, the verified petition should be directly filed before the proper Regional Trial Court also by a candidate who was voted for the same office and who received the second or third highest number of votes. In which case, the procedure provided in A.M. No. 10-4-1-SC shall be observed. We hope we have guided you accordingly. Thank you very much. Very truly yours, (Sgd.) ATTY. MARIA NORINA S. TANGARO-CASINGAL Director IV (Emphasis in the original) Dissatisfied with the aforementioned response, Atty. Fabia (as spokesperson for the affected voters) sent a Letter dated June 15, 2022 seeking COMELEC's reconsideration of the supposed denial of the APELA, viz On behalf of the more than seventy one thousand (71,000) duly registered Pangasinan voters, whose signatures are all contained in different Folders duly submitted to [the] Comelec Provincial Office in Pangasinan on May 16, 23 & 30, 2022, where initially, Folder Number 1 (297 pages), Folder Number 2 (274 pages), and Folder Number 3 (90 pages) containing a total of twenty one thousand (21,000) signatures were forwarded together with their petition in an Indorsement dated May 18, 2022 to the Commission on Elections by the Region I Comelec Director, and on behalf of many other registered voters in the Philippines, whose numbers are growing by the day, and around the world signing similar Petitions online in change.org, this is to request a reconsideration of the Law Department's above-cited Document DENYING the Pangasinan registered voters' APELA PARA SA MANO- MANONG PAGBILANG MULI NG MGA BOTO SA PROBINSYA NG PANGASINAN (APELA) on the ground that the ruling is contrary to law and the facts. In denying theAPELA, the Commission on [Elections] cited Sections 2 and 3 of Comelec Resolution No. 8804 (March 22, 2010) which refers to an electoral contest filed by a candidate who was voted for in the same office and who received the second or third highest number of votes, among others, as reflected in the Statement of Votes. The reason for the denial is flawed, misplaced and [non-sequitur]. The APELA is not an election protest filed by a losing candidate in the May 9, 2022 elections, but a PEOPLE'S INITIATIVE in the exercise of their sovereign rights as provided for under the Constitution to petition the Comelec for a manual recount of the votes. To be sure, it is not being filed by a losing candidate against any winning candidate, nor are the petitioners seeking to be proclaimed winners in an election, thus, it cannot be treated as an electoral protest and, therefore, it cannot be governed by the procedural rules for an electoral protest. The APELA is an exercise of the people's right to information on matters of public concern. They have a constitutional right to be informed of all transactions, activities and occurrences in government that affect public interest. It is their sovereign right to know if their votes were accurately counted, which is a consequence of their sovereign right of suffrage. It is the sovereign people's direct action to know how their votes as contained in their ballots were counted, therefore, it must not be treated simplistically as an electoral protest filed by a losing candidate. The people's right to know proceeds from their sovereign right to vote because without [sic] knowing how their votes were counted would render their right to vote useless. Once again, the APELA is the people's exercise of their sovereign rights in this democratic nation, with all the acts of the government subject to public examination and available always to public cognizance. This has to be at all times, so much so that our country and the people have always struggled to remain free and democratic, with sovereignty residing in the people and all government authority emanating from them. (awÞhi( Needless to state, the sovereign voter's right to know how exactly their votes were counted, tallied and reported must certainly be granted and given importance for the legitimacy of the government itself and of the legal basis for the exercise of powers so ordained by the sovereign votes to exercise such powers in their behalf are put in question [sic]. As observed by [Information Technology or] IT experts, whose testimony can be presented anytime the Commission would allow, because of the failure to comply with some legally mandated safeguards under the Automated Election System, like, among others, the selection of the precincts to be subjected to Random Manual Audit, the Petitioners feel they were denied complete security, assurance, and guarantee that tl1eir votes as indicated in their ballots were in fact properly read, counted, summed up and reported [in] Pangasinan, and probably all other provinces, were laid wide open to the manipulations of selfish criminal hackers and programmers who have manipulated the outcomes to suit the objectives of their candidates. Given the foregoing, the petitioners respectfully pray for a reconsideration of the denial of their APELA , and that their prayer for a manual recount of their ballots be granted by Comelec, which has the jurisdiction (over the ballots, [vote counting machines or] VCMs, [and] SD cards) and the competence to act on the APELA of the sovereign voters. Respectfully submitted. Dagupan City, this 16th [sic] day of June 2022. Sincerely and respectfully, (Sgd.) ATTY. LAUDEMERI. FABIA Spokesperson (Emphasis in the original) In addition to the aforementioned Letter, Atty. Fabia also submitted an Addendum dated June 20, 2022 containing the following supplemental requests and manifestations: To supplement our request for reconsideration dated June 15, 2022, received by the Pangasinan OPES on June 17, 2022, it is respectfully manifested that the petitioners are ready, willing and able to shoulder all costs arid expenses necessary to fully carry out the proper Order or command of the Commission on Elections in bringing out the ballots, counting them and making the necessary reports, etc. The call for the manual counting of the ballots under the auspices of the Commission on Elections is gaining momentum nationwide and this is so because our leaders must be determined by our ballots and not by VCMs. In the interest of truth, even the proclaimed winners on the basis of VCMs should welcome a validation of their winning through the ballots themselves if indeed that was so after a manual recount. It is respectfully requested, therefore, that this ADDENDUM be admitted inasmuch as it is not prohibited by any rule, [and that] it will not result in any injury to anyone and it will result in finding the truth that transpired in the May 9, 2022 elections. Finally, we hereby reiterate our prayer for the opening of the ballot boxes to be witnessed by the people, count the ballots manually, allow the SD cards to be audited by independent I.T. professionals and the tambiolo system be employed in the selection of the precincts to be subjected to Random Manual Audit all at the expense of the petitioners. Dagupan City, this 29th day of June 2022. Very truly yours, (Sgd.) ATTY. LAUDEMER I. (awÞhi( FABIA Spokesperson Finally, Atty. Fabia submitted a Manifestation with Urgent Request dated June 30, 2022, which requested the opportunity and appropriate forum from the COMELEC for the presentation of video presentations, along with accompanying documentary and testimonial evidence, relative to the supposed scientific and factual bases of the APELA. COMELEC's Law Department replied anew via its Letter dated July 7, 2022, viz Dear Mr. Quintinita [sic], This is in response to your letter and Addendum dated June 15, 2022 and June 20, 2022, respectively, which were electronically mailed to this Department by the Office of the Regional Election Director, Region I on July 1, 2022, seeking reconsideration on the alleged denial by this Department of the "APELA PARA SA MANO-MANONG PAGBJLANG MULI NG MGA BOTO SA PROBINSYA NG PANGASINAN," which was filed by Albert P. Quintinita. You claim that [the] APELA is not an election protest filed by a losing candidate in the May 9, 2022 elections, but a PEOPLE'S INITIATIVE in the exercise of their right to information on matters of public concern as provided for under the Constitution. It is allegedly an exercise of the people's right to be informed if their votes were accurately counted and how their votes as contained in their ballots were counted. It should therefore not be treated as an election protest since it was not being filed by a losing candidate against any winning candidate. Please be reminded that this Department sent the assailed May 31, 2022 letter respectfully informing Mr. Quintinita that it has no jurisdiction to act on your request. The reply was intended as guidance on the requirements for filing of cases before the Commission. Nonetheless, considering your manifestation that the filed document was actually a People's Initiative, allow us to invite your attention to Article III of COMELEC Resolution No. 10650, promulgated on 31 January 2020, pertinent portions in relation to the requirements for filing of the [People's Initiative] Petition are hereinafter quoted, viz In relation thereto, please be guided that the guidelines on electronic filing of pleadings is provided in Comelec Resolution No. 10673 provides [sic]. It reads: You are encouraged to visit the COMELEC website (www.comelec.gov.ph) for a copy of the afore-mentioned resolutions. Meanwhile, for more details on filing of petitions, you may contact the Office of the Clerk of the Commission at: We hope we have guided you accordingly. Thank you very much. Very truly yours, (Sgd.) ATTY. MARIA NORINA S. TANGARO-CASINGAL Director IV Having considered the aforementioned response from COMELEC's Law Department as the final denial of their requests for a manual recount and for access to relevant information pertaining to the supposed truth behind what really happened during the National and Local Elections on May 9, 2022 in the Province of Pangasinan, and having no further response from COMELEC vis a-vis the Manifestation with Urgent Request dated June 30, 2022, Legaspi, et al., thus, filed the instant original action directly with the Court. Arguments of the Parties Legaspi, et al. present the following arguments in support of their plea to have their constitutional rights vindicated and affirmed, to wit: 1) The instant petition is not an electoral protest seeking to unseat any elected public officer or to proclaim any winner vis-a-vis the May 9, 2022 National and Local Elections, but is instead an election controversy cognizable by COMELEC that would vindicate Legaspi, et al.'s rights of suffrage, to information, and to petition the government for redress of grievances-fundamental rights inherent in petitioners as part of the collective popular sovereign. 2) Legaspi, et al. assert that COMELEC, in confusing Legaspi, et al.'s request for a recount of the provincial results in Pangasinan as either an electoral protest or as a petition for recall/initiative, failed to recognize that these remedies were not exclusive in vindicating Legaspi, et al.'s rights. 3) Legaspi, et al. further assert that COMELEC had no compelling state interest in denying the requested recount (which Legaspi, et al. assert as incumbent upon COMELEC to prove), and consequently, said denial violated Legaspi, et al.'s rights here. 4) The instant petition is in the nature of a class suit of transcendental importance relative to the rights invoked here, with Legaspi, et al. being representative of all the voters in the Province of Pangasinan who are too numerous to be joined at present. 5) In essence, Legaspi, et al. doubt the manner in which their votes and ballots were counted by COMELEC's vote-counting machines (VCMs) after the close of polls on May 9, 2022, mainly due to the supposedly unusual speed by which the election results were picked up and broadcasted in the news, along with other "red flags" such as the supposedly high voter turn-out in Pangasinan, and how the actual election results supposedly differed from pre-election surveys conducted in Pangasinan. 6) Legaspi, et al. were alarmed upon reading various opinions, observations, and postings online from a number of identified experts that all point to the statistical improbability (if not impossibility) of the election results, as summarized in the attached excerpts of an unsigned and unverified "Summary of Viral Social Media Postings." 7) With their conclusion that the voting on May 9, 2022 was not transparent, the actual results of the May 9, 2022 National and Local Elections need to be verified by a manual counting crosschecked with the actual results transmitted to the various canvassing boards. The random manual audit conducted by COMELEC is inconclusive for purposes of reassuring Legaspi, et al., since there is no indication of any polling precincts or VCMs from Pangasinan were subjected to said audit. 8) Legaspi, et al.'s request for the manual recount in Pangasinan is ultimately grounded upon their sovereign right of suffrage, which to them, includes the right to know how their votes were counted, tallied, and reported, as well as the corresponding obligation of COMELEC to accommodate their request to present their testimonial, documentary, and video evidence of the supposed improbability (if not impossibility) of the May 9, 2022 election results. If their right to be sufficiently informed of how their votes were counted is denied, then ultimately their fundamental right of suffrage is negated. 9) The declaration of policy for COMELEC's automated election system, as spelled out in Section 1 of Republic Act No. 8436 (as amended by Section 1 of Republic Act No. 9369 ), is enough to require and enable it to do all necessary and proper actions relative to the requested manual recount- all in the interest of transparency, accuracy, and truthfulness of the electoral process. 10) Crucially, Legaspi, et al. assert that the Court had already upheld COMELEC's authority to revert to manual recounts when the automated election system is shown to have failed to read ballots correctly (as discussed in Loong v. Commission on Elections and to correct manifest errors in the certificates of canvass and election returns (as discussed inSandoval v. Commission on Elections 11) Finally, Legaspi, et al. have no more plain, speedy, and adequate remedies in the ordinary course of law vis-a-vis COMELEC's inaction, which allegedly amounts to grave abuse of discretion. In support of the instant petition, Legaspi, et al. attached their respective Judicial Affidavits that narrate the following common assertions: 1) That each of them was aware of the existence of the APELA and had voluntarily signed the same; 2) That each of them was aware that the COMELEC had either dismissed or denied the APELA , that each knew of the instant petition being prepared for filing before the Court; 3) That each of them had read the instant petition and had signed its verification and certification against forum shopping portions with full understanding of, and agreement with, the instant petition's contents; 4) That each of them doubts the results of the May 9, 2022 National and Local Elections due to the highly suspicious, statistically improbably, and nearly impossible swiftness of the tallying, and that each were monitoring the election results on COMELEC's website, on social media and on various television news programs; 5) That each of them was surprised at the supposedly high voter turnout in the Province of Pangasinan, and that the results for the province differed substantially from pre-election surveys; and 6) That each of them came to know of the opinions of some election experts that doubted the speed, conduct, and overall transparency of the May 9, 2022 National and Local Elections, which validated each of their concerns and worries. In its Comment filed by the Office of the Solicitor General, COMELEC for its part submits the following arguments for the dismissal of the instant petition: 1) The instant petition suffers from defective verifications, since it can be seen from a plain reading of the same that petitioners have no personal knowledge of facts recited therein, and that their action is based on their mere assertions that are based on their fears and speculations about how the automated election system was supposedly compromised - fears and speculations which are in tum only based on the hearsay opinions they came across on social media that had no specific mention of the election results in the Province of Pangasinan, the authors of which are not presently joined in the present proceedings, and the authenticity of which have not been sufficiently established. 2) Mandamus cannot lie here, since Legaspi,et al.cannot point to any clear factual or even legal basis for their right to have the election results in Pangasinan subjected to a manual recount. Thus, respondent cannot be said to have reneged on its suffrage-related duties under the law. 3) Legaspi, et al. have nolocus standito file the instant petition, since they have neither sustained any material injury (i.e., they were all able to cast their votes during the May 9, 2022 National and Local Elections). Moreover, the instant petition cannot be considered a class suit since the 32 petitioners from just 9 cities and municipalities in the Province of Pangasinan cannot be said to be representative of the entire class of 2,096,936 registered voters (with 1,828,196 who actually voted on May 9, 2022) coming from all 48 cities and municipalities in the said province. 4) Finally, the instant petition presents no actual case or controversy, since Legaspi,et al.intend to neither nullify the May 9, 2022 National and Local Elections nor to unseat any incumbent elected official. Moreover, Legaspi, et al. have presented no concrete evidence of any alleged cheating or mass disenfranchisement during the said elections-they only present their bare assertion of their lack of faith in the COMELEC's VCMs utilized on May 9, 2022, which they have based on conjectures and suspicions that they came across online. In their Reply, Legaspi,et al.counter-assert the following: 1) The social media postings they came across online are not hearsay but point to records that could be verified by electronic means, such as an inspection of COMELEC's transparency server for the May 9, 2022 National and Local Elections. Moreover, the opinions they cite are those of experts vis-a-vis automated elections. 2) Legaspi, et al. now allege specific factual issues, such as the supposedly surreptitious change in the source code downloaded to all VCMs, and the alleged manipulation of COMELEC's transparency server to reflect results that would already condition the minds of the public during the first hour after the close of polls on May 9, 2022. 3) COMELEC's non-transparent manner in failing to accommodate Legaspi, et al.'s requests are clearly instances of disregarding and ignoring theirAPELA, which violate their basic right of suffrage as explained above. 4) The Court should adopt a more liberal policy here vis-a-vis locus standi,since the issues presented by the instant petition are of transcendental importance due to the fundamental rights involved. 5) Finally, the instant petition constitutes a class suit since Legaspi, et al. represent the interests of fairly 72,000 voters in Pangasinan who signed the APELA demanding for the manual recount. Moreover, there is a case and controversy present here, since COMELEC (in Legaspi, et al.'s eyes) had effectively denied the said APELA. Issues before the Court 1) Whether the verifications vis-a-vis the instant petition are defective; 2) Whether Legaspi, et al. have locus standi; 3) Whether the instant petition can be classified as a class suit; 4) Whether there is an actual case or controversy here; 5) Whether Legaspi, et al. exhausted all administrative remedies before resorting to the instant petition; and 6) Ultimately, whether certiorari or mandamus can lie. Ruling of the Court The instant petition must be dismissed. In dealing with the six identified issues inseriatim,the Court now first discusses the sufficiency (or lack thereof) of the verification made by Legaspi, et al. Verification under the extant 2019 Rules of Court is defined under Rule 7, Section 4, viz Section 4. Verification .Except when otherwise specifically required by law or rule, pleadings need not be under oath or verified. A pleading is verified by an affidavit of an affiant duly authorized to sign said verification. The authorization of the affiant to act on behalf of a party, whether in the form of a secretary's certificate or a special power of attorney, should be attached to the pleading, and shall allege the following attestations: (a) The allegations in the pleading are true and correct based on [their] personal knowledge, or based on authentic documents; (b) The pleading is not filed to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation; and (c) The factual allegations therein have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, will likewise have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for discovery. The signature of the affiant shall further serve as a certification of the truthfulness of the allegations in the pleading. A pleading required to be verified that contains a verification based on "information and belief," or upon "knowledge, information and belief," or lacks a proper verification, shall be treated as an unsigned pleading. Indeed, petitions for certiorari and mandamus are required to be properly verified under Rule 65, Sections 1 and 3. Poring over the verifications done and accomplished by Legaspi, et al., they all jndeed contain phrases basically stating under oath that they individually attest that the instant petition contains true and correct statements based on their personal knowledge and existing authentic documents. However, the Court is at pains to determine how they were able to have personal knowledge of the following facts: 1) The alleged unusual speed of the transmission of the electoral results from the VCMs to COMELEC's transparency server on May 9, 2022, since they evidently were not present during the VCMs' transmission and had only monitored the election results on social media, on television, and on COMELEC's website (i.e., they were not present nearby any VCM or at respondent's headquarters housing the transparency server during the said transmission of results); 2) The observations of technical experts and international observers vis-a-vis the May 9, 2022 National and Local Elections, which they only came to know of via social media or sources online that are unauthenticated for evidentiary purposes; and 3) Their actual participation in the signing of the APELA , since again, the signature pages were not submitted as part of the records of the instant petition. Florenz D. Regalado (Regalado), an eminent commentator and former member of the Court, wrote the following with regard to the rule on verification (i.e., Rule 7, Section 4): The second paragraph of this section has been further amended so that the pleader's affirmation of the truth and correctness of the allegations in his pleading shall be based not only on his "knowledge and belief' but specifically on his "personal knowledge or based on authentic records." In the 1964 Rules of Court, Sec. 6 of Rule 7 required personal knowledge of the facts averred, which was considered too strict since a person can reasonably affirm a fact based on his belief in its truth when there is or has been no other fact or reason contrary thereto. However, that liberalized version is better regulated by the present amended provisions that facts should be attested to on the basis of one's personal knowledge or, especially with regard to old or vintage facts or events, by the recitals thereof in authentic records. Verification is intended to forestall allegations which are perjured or hearsay , and this purpose is reasonably subserved by the requirement for authentic documents such as official records which are exceptions to the hearsay evidence rule. For the same reason, a verification cannot be made on facts obtaining or arising in whole or in part from mere information and belief (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Regalado also emphasized that "[v]erification may be made by the party, his representative, lawyer or any person who personally knows the truth of the facts alleged in the pleading." The crux of the instant petition's first issue, however, is if Legaspi, et al. did in fact have personal knowledge sufficient to establish their capacity to verify the instant petition in the first place, or failing that, if the instant petition is based on authenticated documents in conformity with Rule 7, Section 4. Put differently, the Court must resolve the question of what happens to a seemingly valid and compliant verification portion that is based on a pleading containing no reasonable indication that the party pleading his or her case has any personal knowledge of the facts, or has attached any authentic documents in support of the said pleading. In this regard, the Court finds that Legaspi, et al. did not have sufficient personal knowledge that capacitated them to verify the instant petition. The third guideline on verification and certification against non-forum shopping, as laid down by the Court in Altres v. Empleo is instructive: 3) Verification is deemed substantially complied with when one who has ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition signs the verification, and when matters alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct. The Court cited its reasoning in Rombe Eximtrade (Phils.), Inc. v. Asiatrust Dev't., Bank for the aforementioned guideline, viz On the matter of verification, the purpose of the verification requirement is to assure that the allegations in a petition were made in good faith or are true and correct, not merely speculative. The verification requirement is deemed substantially complied with when one who has ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the petition signed the verification attached to it, and when matters alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct. In this case, we find that the position, knowledge, and experience of Ferrer as Manager and head of the Acquired Assets Unit of Asiatrust, and his good faith, are sufficient compliance with the verification and certification requirements. This is in line with our ruling in Iglesia ni Cristo v. Ponferrada ,where we said that it is deemed substantial compliance when one with sufficient knowledge swears to the truth of the allegations in the complaint. (Citations omitted) Here, Legaspi,et al.clearly do not have personal knowledge of the circumstances that prompted their fears and speculations regarding the results on the May 9, 2022 National and Local Elections. There is no indication that any of them were intimately connected or concerned with the actual transmission of the tallies of the VCMs in their respective polling precincts all the way to COMELEC's servers, and it is clear from the records that their knowledge comes from mere information and belief based on news, social media, and opinionated sources found on the Internet that are unauthenticated in accordance with the Revised Rules on Evidence. Jurisprudence and the rules commonly state that mere information and belief as basis of a pleader's knowledge is clearly insufficient for purposes of verification. Thus, even if the verification portion of a pleading, just like Legaspi, et al here, is compliant word-for-word with the requirements of Rule 7, Section 4, said compliance will not save the fact that a pleader's personal knowledge is actually not based on personal knowledge or even on any authenticated documents. This is all the more so due to the fact that the instant petition is actually based on Legaspi, et al.'s collective belief that something (or many things) were amiss with regard to the conduct of the May 9, 2022National and Local Elections. In Negros Oriental Planters Assn., Inc. v. Hon. Presiding Judge of RTC-Negros OCC., Br. 52, Bacolod City, the Court held that the requirement verification implies that a "party cannot now merely state under oath that he believes the statements made in the pleading. He cannot even merely state under oath that he has knowledge that such statements are true and correct. His knowledge must be specifically alleged under oath to be either personal knowledge or at least based onauthentic records." Thus, "[a] pleading, therefore, wherein the Verification is merely based on the party's knowledge and belief produces no legal effect, subject to the discretion of the court to allow the deficiency to be remedied." With no showing here of how Legaspi, et al. came to have personal knowledge of the ultimate facts alleged in the instant petition, and with no other authenticated documents that can be utilized as basis for their verification (i.e., not even the communications from COMELEC's Law Department [which are mere unauthenticated photocopies], Legaspi, et al.'s Judicial Affidavits [which are merely self-serving and without any other evidentiary attachments], and especially not the 'Summary of Viral Social Media Postings' [which is unsigned and merely an aggrupation of excerpts of another document] and the APELA [which is also merely an unauthenticated photocopy of the first page and without the critical signature pages indicating their actual participation therein]), the Court can already treat the instant petition as a dismissible unsigned pleading. Going now to the second issue, the Court is reminded of its definition of locus standi in Integrated Bar of the Phils. v. Hon. Zamora, viz "Legal standing" or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The term "interest" means a material interest, an interest in issue affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges "such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions." (Citations omitted) In the same case, the Court clarified that a mere general interest in a controversy that is actually shared by the whole citizenry is not specific enough to constitute locus standi ,especially if the injury is not specified, viz In the case at bar, the IBP primarily anchors its standing on its alleged responsibility to uphold the rule of law and the Constitution. Apart from this declaration, however, the IBP asserts no other basis in support of its locus standi. The mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in this case. This is too general an interest which is shared by other groups and the whole citizenry. Based on the standards above-stated, the IBP has failed to present a specific and substantial interest in the resolution of the case. Its fundamental purpose which, under Section 2, Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court, is to elevate the standards of the law profession and to improve the administration of justice is alien to, and cannot be affected by, the deployment of the Marines. It should also be noted that the interest of the National President of the IBP who signed the petition, is his alone, absent a formal board resolution authorizing him to file the present action. To be sure, members of the BAR, those in the judiciary included, have varying opinions on the issue. Moreover, the IBP, assuming that it has duly authorized the National President to file the petition, has not shown any specific injury which it has suffered or may suffer by virtue of the questioned governmental act. Indeed, none of its members, whom the IBP purportedly represents, has sustained any form of injury as a result of the operation of the joint visibility patrols. Neither is it alleged that any of its members has been arrested or that their civil liberties have been violated by the deployment of the Marines. What the IBP projects as injurious is the supposed "militarization" of law enforcement which might threaten Philippine democratic institutions and may cause more harm than good in the long run. Not only is the presumed "injury" nor personal in character, it is likewise too vague, highly speculative and uncertain to satisfy the requirement of standing. Since petitioner has not successfully established a direct and personal injury as a consequence of the questioned act, it does not possess the personality to assail the validity of the deployment of the Marines. This Court, however, does not categorically rule that the IBP has absolutely no standing to raise constitutional issues now or in the future. The IBP must, by way of allegations and proof, satisfy this Court that it has sufficient stake to obtain judicial resolution of the controversy. (Emphasis supplied) Here again, the Court is at pains to determine what gives Legaspi,et al.their legal standing to sue the COMELEC at present. They have specifically stated in the instant petition that they do not intend to unseat any elected official, and that they do not intend to have any winner proclaimed. They simply pray that they be given an opportunity to have some closure with regard to what they see as an automated election riddled with anomalies by a full manual audit of all VCMs utilized in the Province of Pangasinan on May 9, 2022. While their collective status as members of the sovereign electorate is not in doubt, this is again similar to the situation in Zamora , which is merely a general interest shared by the entire voting population with regard to the outcome and conduct of the past national and local elections. There is no concrete injury that the Court can detect here, since Legaspi, et al. admitted to have participated in the electoral process by voting on May 9, 2022 without any governmental act barring them from the polls. Their fears and speculations relative to the automated election system being compromised are too vague and uncertain to constitute material interest here, since they did not substantiate the instant petition with specific allegations based on personal knowledge of the ultimate facts, or with authenticated documents and proof that would belie any counter-allegation of hearsay. Instead, Legaspi, et al. have harped upon their insistence that the issues presented by the instant petition have overriding transcendental importance that necessitates the Court's intervention and adjudication. Indeed, even Zamora affirmed the Court's discretion in relaxing the requirements of locus standi in view of a suit's transcendental importance, viz Having stated the foregoing, it must be emphasized that this Court has the discretion to take cognizance of a suit which does not satisfy the requirement of legal standing when paramount interest is involved. In not a few cases, the Court has adopted a liberal attitude on thelocus standiof a petitioner where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the people. Thus, when the issues raised are of paramount importance to the public, the Court may brush aside technicalities of procedure. In this case, a reading of the petition shows that the IBP has advanced constitutional issues which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. Moreover, because peace and order are under constant threat and lawless violence occurs in increasing tempo, undoubtedly aggravated by the Mindanao insurgency problem, the legal controversy raised in the petition almost certainly will not go away. It will stare us in the face again. It, therefore, behooves the Court to relax the rules on standing and to resolve the issue now, rather than later. (Citations omitted) While the Court is aware of instances in the past such as Chavez v. Public Estates Authority (PEA), wherein direct resort to the Court's jurisdiction through a Rule 65 petition "brought by a citizen" and that "involves the enforcement of constitutional rights-to information and the equitable diffusion of natural resources" was recognized as having locus standi due to the transcendental importance of the issues presented, said precedents cannot be applicable here. This is because cases like Chavez v. PEA involved matters that required the Court's immediate resolution on issues having direct and immediate bearing on constitutional rights and issues--e.g., when the renegotiations of the joint venture agreement between PEA and Amari Coastal Bay Development Corporation were close to be concluded. Here, Legaspi, et al. point to no immediate danger to their constitutional rights posed by COMELEC' s failure to undertake the requested full manual recount--other than their fear and speculation of enduring a number of years being led and governed by persons who may or may not be entitled to their elective positions. This goes into Legaspi, et al.'s very capacity to sue as citizens. In Francisco, Jr. v. The House of Representatives, the Court said as much: When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner assailing the constitutionality of a statute must be direct and personal. He must be able to show, not only that the law or any government act is invalid, but also that he sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must appear that the person complaining has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of. (Citations omitted) Verily, the Court held in Prof David v. Pres. Macapagal-Arroyo, that in suits brought forward by concerned citizens, "there must be a showing that the issues raised are of transcendental importance which must be settled early." However, here, the Court fails to detect any immediate urgency that would merit the instant petition's elevation to a case impressed with transcendental importance-precisely because Legaspi, et al. have failed to show that any injury is either present or imminent to anyone. As the Court held in In the Matter of Save theSC Judicial Independence & Fiscal Autonomy Movement v. Abolition of JDF & Reduction of Fiscal Autonomy, "[a] mere invocation of transcendental importance in the pleading is not enough for this Court to set aside procedural rules," and that moreover, "it must be also shown that there is a clear and imminent threat to fundamental rights." Thus, the Court remains unconvinced with regard to Legaspi, et al.'s plea for leniency as to their legal standing. The Court cannot recognize the same based on their mere supposition that something (or many things) had gone awry vis-a-vis the results and conduct of the May 9, 2022 National and Local Elections - even if they invoke the supposed transcendental importance of the requested full manual recount. Without anything to substantiate the supposed material injury to anyone caused by COMELEC's alleged denial of their request for the said recount (which will be discussed below as actually not constituting any denial at all of Legaspi, et al.'s rights), or even the urgent need for the same, the Court cannot see how Legaspi, et al. stand to gain or lose as a result of the resolution of the instant petition. Put simply, whether the Court grants the instant petition or not, Legaspi, et al. remain unscathed and unperturbed in terms of their constitutional rights for now, as will be explained below. Their anxieties with regard to what they may have read and heard about the results and conduct of the last elections may indeed remain - as it is their constitutional right to harbor such anxieties as involved citizens who care about democracy and the rule of law - but for obvious reasons the Court is presently not the proper forum for the resolution of such concerns. Anent the third issue, the unamended and intact Rule 3, Section 12 of the 2019 Rules of Court defines a class suit as follows: Section 12. Class suit. - When the subject matter of the controversy is one of common or general interest to many persons so numerous that it is impracticable to join all as parties, a number of them which the court finds to be sufficiently numerous as to fully protect the interests of all concerned may sue or defend for the benefit of all. Any party in interest shall have the right to intervene to protect his individual interest. Here, Legaspi, et al. allege that they are representing more than 71,000 voters from the Province of Pangasinan who signed the APELA and had the same filed before COMELEC for appropriate action. The problem with this assertion is that Legaspi, et al. failed to attach the APELA 'ssignature pages for the Court's verification. The Court, thus, cannot make an adequate determination as to whether the parties_affected are so numerous that it is impracticable to join them all to the present proceedings, or even as to whether Legaspi, et al. are sufficiently numerous or representative of the supposed class they represent, or that they can fully protect the interests of all concerned. Moreover, participation in the APELA 's signature campaign does not automatically equate to any signatory's participation in the present proceedings without sufficient authorization for their supposed representatives to do so. The Court cannot speculate as to how many of the supposed 71,000 or more voters from Pangasinan actually desire to have the instant petition litigated on their behalf. With no sufficient basis for the Court's consideration, the instant petition cannot be designated as a class suit vis-a-vis the signatories to the APELA Anent the fourth issue, the Court is reminded of its ruling in Kilusang Mayo Uno v. Hon. Aquino with regard to the requirement of an actual case or controversy for the exercise of the Court's power of judicial review, viz Most important in this list of requisites is the existence of an actual case or controversy. In every exercise of judicial power, whether in the traditional or expanded sense, this is an absolute necessity. There is an actual case or controversy if there is a "conflict of legal right, an opposite legal [claim] susceptible of judicial resolution." A petitioner bringing a case before this Court must establish that there is a legally demandable and enforceable right under the Constitution. There must be a real and substantial controversy, with definite and concrete issues involving the legal relations of the parties, and admitting of specific relief that courts can grant. This requirement goes into the nature of the judiciary as a co-equal branch of government. It is bound by the doctrine of separation of powers, and will not rule on any matter or cause the invalidation of any act, law, or regulation, if there is no actual or sufficiently imminent breach of or injury to a right. The courts interpret laws, but the ambiguities may only he clarified in the existence of an actual simation. (Citations omitted) The Court had previously elucidated on the nature of an actual case or controversy in Information Technology Foundation of thePhilippines v. Commission on Elections, viz The controversy must be justiciable - definite and concrete, touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. In other words, the pleadings must show an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right, on the one hand, and a denial thereof on the other; that is, it must concern a real and not a merely theoretical question or issue. There ought to be an actual and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts. Thus, for an actual case or controversy to exist, the aggrieved party's rights must be fully established to be extant, due, and demandable vis-a-vis the other party's actions, which either violate or deny the said rights. This is the crux of the instant petition and the Court's discussion: whether Legaspi, et al' s constitutional rights of suffrage, to petition the government for redress of grievances, and to have access to information on matters of public concern were affected in any way by COMELEC's supposed denial of the APELA and its imperative request for a full manual recount of the election results in the Province of Pangasinan. Beginning with regard to Legaspi, et al.'s right of suffrage, the Court harkens back to the case of People v. San Juan which outlined the conceptual core of the constitutional right of suffrage, viz Indeed, each time the enfranchised citizen goes to the polls to assert this sovereign will, that abiding credo of republicanism is translated into living reality. If that will must remain undefiled at the starting level of its expression and application, every assumption must be indulged in and every guarantee adopted to assure the unmolested exercise of the citizen's free choice. For to impede, without authority valid in law, the free and orderly exercise of the right of suffrage is to inflict the ultimate indignity on the democratic process. As numerous as they are insidious are long-standing techniques of terror and intimidation that have been conceived by man---in derogation of the right of suffrage--which we have repeatedly and unqualifiedly condemned. When ,he legislature provided in section 133 of the Revised Election Code an explicit m1li w1equivocal guarantee of a voter's free access to the polling place, it could have intended no purpose other than to maintain inviolate the right to vote by safeguarding the voter against all manner of unauthorized interference and travesty that surveyors of fear can devise. Every unlawful obstacle, by whatever means or method, interposed to the free entry of a voter into the polling place to cast his vote, strikes at the very heart of the right of suffrage. Indeed, the common understanding of violations to the right of suffrage would be any impediment erected by the State or private persons and entities that would prevent legal and physical access to the polling precincts. However, here, the Court fails to see any violation thereof. Legaspi,et al.have admitted to participating in the electoral process by casting their votes on May 9, 2022. It is their submission, however, that corollary to the constitutional right of suffrage is the right to be fully informed of all steps and aspects of the vote counting process, lest the right of suffrage be ultimately frustrated and denied by the supposed manipulation of COMELEC's automated election system, and to have the results fully and manually recounted should there be any whiff of electoral anomalies. However, it is too much of a stretch for the Court to hold that the constitutional right of suffrage encompasses the supposed right of the sovereign electorate in a locality to have an entire election conducted thereat fully and manually recounted based on unsubstantiated surmises and unfounded conjectures that supposedly shadow the said election's conduct and results. This supposed right exists neither in the statute books nor in jurisprudence, and for the Court to recognize such right here would be a dangerous tread into the forbidden waters of judicial legislation. Not even the case of Loong ,which Legaspi, et al. cite as the authoritative precedent for the Court's power to recognize the suspension of the automated counting of ballots and the reversion to manual counting in the event of supervening circumstances, can be properly invoked here. Said case involved the VCMs utilized in certain municipalities in the Province of Sulu during the May 11, 1998 Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao Elections, which could not read the printed ballots due to an error in printing. The Comt indeed noted that Republic Act No. 8436 failed to anticipate such technical issues, but that respondent was not powerless to address the same, viz ... In enacting R.A. No. 8436, Congress obviously failed to provide a remedy where the error in counting is not machine--related for human foresight is not all-seeing. We hold however, that the vacuum in the law cannot prevent the COMELEC from revitating above the problem. Section 2(J) of Article IX(C) of the Constitution gives the COMELEC the broad power "to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall." Undoubtedly, the text and intent of this provision is to give the COMELEC all the necessary and incidental powers for it to achieve the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections. Congruent to this intent, the Court has not been niggardly in defining the parameters of powers of COMELEC in the conduct of our elections... In the case at bar, the COMELEC order for a manual recount was not only reasonable. It was the only way to count the decisive local votes in the six (6) municipalities of Pata, Talipao, Siasi, Tudanan, Tapul and Jolo. The bottom line is that by means of the manual count, the will of the voters of Sulu was honestly determined. We cannot kick away the will of the people by giving a literal interpretation to R.A. 8436. R.A. 8436 did not prohibit manual counting when machine [count] does not work. Counting is part and parcel of the conduct of an election which is under the control and supervision of the COMELEC. It ought to be self-evident that the Constitution did not envision a COMELEC that cannot count the result of an election. Here, however, the situation is patently different. There is no allegation here that a great number of VCMs rejected or failed to read and count the ballots fed into them, or that an entire group of clustered polling precincts failed to transmit their results, or that an entirebarangay,municipality, or city was not included in the provincial results of the May 9, 2022 National and Local Elections. There is not even an allegation here of a failure of elections in any part of Pangasinan. For COMELEC to exercise extraordinary powers here for a full manual count of the entire province would in turn require such extraordinary circumstances that would basically equate to an overall failure of the counting and transmission of the results of the May 9, 2022 National and Local Elections in Pangasinan-circumstances which are not present, alleged, or even proven in the instant petition. Also, therein lies the rub: the scenario in Loong would only work to be the jurisprudential basis for a manual count, NOT a recount. On a minor note, the Court here also rejects Legaspi, et al.'s assertion that they can properly petition here for the correction of manifest errors in either the certificates of canvass or the election returns emanating from the Province of Pangasinan relative to the May 9, 2022 National and Local Elections. This old pre-proclamation procedure, as embodied in Section 15 of Republic Act No. 7166, was only cognizable before the appropriate canvassing body or COMELEC, and the Court notes that this provision has been rendered defunct due to the advent of automated elections in the Philippines. Properly speaking, then, without any proof of the manipulations and anomalies complained of that would have prevented their votes from being counted, Legaspi, et al. had no legal justification to present to the COMELEC in order for the requested full manual count in Pangasinan to happen--to say nothing of a recount. Again, there is also no statutory basis for said recount---indeed, Legaspi,et al.could not even invoke the random manual audit provided for in Section 29 of Republic Act No. 8436 (as amended by Section 24 of Republic Act No. 9369), which only has a limited scope (i.e., one polling precinct per congressional district). Given the foregoing, the Court, thus, fails to see how the constitutional right of suffrage will suffer because of the COMELEC' s supposed denial of the requested recount-the latter having no legal and factual basis. As things stand, Legaspi, et al.'s right of suffrage essentially and actually remains intact, unscathed, and unperturbed here. Moreover, the Court fails to see how the COMELEC's communications amounted to a denial and violation of Legaspi, et al.'s constitutional right of suffrage. This is because of the sheer confusion caused by the language and terminologies employed in Atty. Fabia's Letters, especially the one dated June 15, 2022, which designates the APELA as a "people's initiative." While clearly the intended purpose of the APELA is nowhere near what is contemplated in the provisions Republic Act No. 6735, otherwise known as the "Initiative and Referendum Act," the COMELEC cannot be blamed for its puzzlement at the said designation. Indeed, the COMELEC had no choice in the language of its last response, which had to directly address the explicit request for a people's initiative by merely calling Atty. Fabia's attention to the statutory and other formal requirements for a people's initiative. This is the same situation with the COMELEC's initial response to the APELA , because the COMELEC, well aware that no right to a recount of an entire province exists outside the realm of electoral protests filed by losing provincial or national candidates, could only respond with what is in the law for it to administer. Surely, the COMELEC cannot be faulted for its initial response after proverbially trying its best to squeeze water out of a stone. Verily, the Court here cannot rightly and fairly consider the COMELEC's supposed denial as such, since obviously, there was no explicit language of such a denial in COMELEC's communications, and crucially, Legaspi, et al. are at fault and mostly to blame for the miscommunication as to what they were really demanding from the COMELEC. Not only did they demand for a recount without any legal i:lnd factual basis; they also caused a legal bemusement at COMELEC's expense with their poor choice of words that far from clarified the situation, and which they used as a springboard for their direct resort to this Court. With no real and actual denial of anything related to Legaspi, et al.'s constitutional right of suffrage here, the Court consequently fails to detect any actual case or controversy relative to the same. On a related note, the Court sees merit in affinning that the right of suffrage should indeed cover the accompanying right to have one's votes properly and rightly counted vis-a-vis an election. However, with no justiciable controversy here relative to Legaspi, et al.'s right of suffrage to begin with, such a ruling cannot be made at this time. The Court will, however, hold at present that for actual cases and controversies to be considered as extant and properly the basis for cases that invoke judicial review, concrete proof of an initiating party's rights and violations (existing or impending) thereof must be attendant. In other words, mere speculations and surmises relative to future and past violations of a party's rights are insufficient for purposes of determining whether a case constitutes a justiciable controversy. As for Legaspi, et al.'s right to petition the government for redress of grievances, the Court simply and summarily notes that nothing here has prevented them from being heard before the COMELEC, and indeed before the Court. Their right to express their apprehensions and doubts with regard to the conduct and results of the May 9, 2022 National and Local Elections is constitutionally guaranteed and recognized, and the Court sees no indication here at all of the said right being violated or stymied. Going now to Legaspi, et al.'s right to be informed on matters of public concern, the Court must point out at this stage that this should have been the anchor and lodestar of the instant petition. This is because it is fittingly the most appropriate constitutional right that Legaspi, et al. can invoke in order for their minds to be put at ease relative to the truth behind the results and conduct of the May 9, 2022 National and Local Elections. A cursory discussion of this critical constitutional right is in order. Article III, Section 7 of the Constitution guarantees that "[t]he right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law." This has been acc.ordeclthe designation in recent common parlance as the people's freedom of information (FOI) ,which was first mentioned in Philippine jurisprudence in the case of Subido v. Ozaeta albeit at the time as a corollary ad,iunct of the freedom of the press. Subido has been subsequently cited numerous times relative to FOI cases before the Court. In Baldoza v. Judge Dimaano the Court noted that the 1973 Constitution expressly recognized FOI as part of the State's overall recognition of the importance of such right to citizens in a democracy, viz The access to public records predicated [is] on the right of the people to acquire information on matters of public concern. Undoubtedly in a democracy, the public has a legitimate interest in matters of social and political significance. In an earlier case, this Comt held that mandamus would lie to compel the Secretary of Justice and the Register of Deeds to examine the records of the latter office. predicating the right to examine the records on statutory provisions, and to a certain degree by general principles of democratic institutions, this Court stated that while the Register of Deeds has discretion to exercise as to the manner in which persons desiring to inspect, examine or copy the records in his office may exercise their rights, such power does not carry with its authority to prohibit. The New [1973] Constitution now expressly recognizes that the people are entitled to information on matters of public concern and thus are expressly granted access to official records, as well as docrnnents of official acts, or transactions, or decisions, subject to such limitations imposed by law. The incorporation of this right in the Constitution is a recognition of the fundamental role of free exchange of infonnation in a democracy. There can be no realistic perception by the public of the nation's problems, nor a meaningful democratic decision-making if they are denied access to information of general interest. Information is needed to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of the times. As has been aptly observed: "Maintaining the flow of such information depends on protection for both its acquisition and its dissemination since, if either process is interrupted, the flow inevitably ceases." However, restrictions on access to certain records may be imposed by law. Thus, access restrictions imposed to control civil insurrection have been permitted upon a showing of inunediate and impending danger that renders ordinmy means of control inadequate to maintain order. (Citations omitted) FOI was also invoked as basis for the Court's rulings in Taada v. Hon. Tuvera where the printing of unpublished presidential issuances in the Official Gazette was ordered lest the said issuances be deemed to have no binding force and effect. The Court said as much about POI-which was adopted in toto from the 1973 Constitution for inclusion by reference in the 1986 Freedom Constitution in relation to the requirement of publication for laws and issuances of general application, viz We note at this point the conclusive presumption that every person knows the law, which of course presupposes that the law has been published if the presumption is to have any legal justification at all. It is no less important to remember that Section 6 of the Bill of Rights recognizes "the right of the people to information on matters of public concern," and this certainly applies to, among others, and indeed especially, the legislative enactments of the government. The first FOI case decided by the Court under the 1987 Constitution was the seminal and landmark decision in Legaspi v. Civil Service Cornmission, where the Court upheld a citizen's access to records pertaining to the civil service eligibility of certain persons employed in the Cebu City Health Department. The Court noted that "it is the legitimate concern of citizens to ensure that government positions requiring civil service eligibility are occupied only by persons who are eligible." In reasoning that such information was covered by FOI, and thus, petitioner therein was entitled to the Court's order for mandamus , the absence of any limitation in law that restricted access to said information was discussed, viz In the instant case, while refusing to confirm or deny the claims of eligibility, the respondent has failed to cite any provision in the Civil Service Law which would limit the petitioner's right to know who are, and who are not, civil service eligible. We take judicial notice of the fact that the names of those who pass the civil service examinations, as in bar examinations and licensure examinations for various professions, are released to the public. Hence, there is nothing secret about one's civil service eligibility, if actually possessed. Petitioner's request is, therefore, neither unusual nor unreasonable. And when, as in this case, the government employees concerned claim to be civil service eligible, the public, through any citizen, has a right to verify their professed eligibilities from the Civil Service Commission. The civil service eligibility of a sanitarian being of public concern, and in the absence of express limitations under the law upon access to the register of civil service eligible for said position, the duty of the respondent Commission to corrfom or deny the civil service eligibility of any person occupying the position becomes imperative.Mandamustherefore lies. Legaspi also made the following important pronouncements: (1) the constitutional provision recognizing FOI is "self-executing" and can be invoked "without need for any ancillary act of the Legislature;" (2) the "government agency having custody of the desired information" has the "burden of showing that the information requested is not of public concern, or if it is of public concern, that the same has been exempted by law from the operation of the guarantee;" and (3) "[i]n determining whether or not a particular information is of public concern, there is no rigid test which can be applied." Relative to this last pronouncement, the Court explained thus: "Public concern" like "public interest" is a term that eludes exact definition. Both terms embrace a broad spectrwn of subjects which the public may want to know, either because these directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine in a case by case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the public. Verily, Legaspi has set the standard for the Court's subsequent rulings relating to FOI cases. In Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr. the Court ruled that while information and documents on Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) loans granted to members of the fonner Batasang Pambansa were indeed matters of public interest and concern that were not covered by any exceptions to FOi, the GSIS could not be compelled to "prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like in [Legaspi, et al.'s] desire to acquire information on public concem." Speaking through the late former Associate Justice Irene R. Cortes, who also penned the ruling in Legaspi, the Court granted the mandamus petition by only allowing access to the said information and documents "subject to reasonable regulations as to the time and manner of inspection" to be determined and deemed necessary by GSIS. In Aquino-Sarmiento v. Morato, the Court granted access to the decisions and individual members' voting slips of the Movie & Television Review and Classification Board, since the said governmental actions and documents were made pursuant to official public functions and are public in character. In addition, the Court noted the following: The Court is not unaware of RA 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees) which provides, among others, certain exceptions as regards the availability of official records or documents to the requesting public, e.g., closed-door Cabinet sessions and deliberations of this Court. Suffice it to state, however, that the exceptions therein enumerated find no application in the case at bar. Petitioner['s] request is not concerned with the deliberations of respondent Board but with its documents or records made after a decision or order has been rendered. Neither will the examination involve disclosure of trade secrets or matters pertaining to national security which would otherwise limit the right of access to official records[.] In Chavez v. PCGG, the Court expressly recognized four limitations on the right to FOI: "(l) national security matters and intelligence information, (2) trade secrets and banking transactions, (3) criminal matters, and (4) other confidential information." Said confidential information includes information relating to ongoing negotiations and/or proposals relative to the PCGG's discussions with putative owners and holders of ill-gotten wealth, viz Considering the intent of the Constitution, we believe that it is incumbent upon the PCGG and its officers, as well as other government representatives, to disclose sufficient public information on any proposed settlement they have decided to take up with the ostensible owners and holders of ill-gotten wealth. Such information, though, must pe1tain to definite propositions of the government, not necessarily to intra-agency or inter-agency recommendations or communications during the stage when common assertions are still in the process of being formulated or are in the "exploratory" stage. There is a need, of course, to observe the same restrictions on disclosure of information in general, as discussed earlier such as on matters involving national security, diplomatic or foreign relations, intelligence and other classified information. In Gonzales v. Hon. Narvasa, relative to a mandamus petition for the disclosure of the names of officials holding multiple positions in government and a list of the recipients of luxury vehicles that had recently been seized by the Bureau of Customs and turned over to the Office of the President, the Court ordered the Executive Secretary to answer therein petitioner's letter requesting the said information. Said the Court: Thus, we agree with petitioner that respondent Zamora, in his official capacity as Executive Secretary, has a constitutional and statutory duty to answer petitioner's letter dealing with matters which are unquestionably of public concern-that is, appointments made to public offices and the utilization of public property. With regard to petitioner's request for copies of the appointment papers of certain officials, respondent Zamora is obliged to allow the inspection and copying of the same subject to the reasonable limitations required for the orderly conduct of official business. (Citation omitted) In Chavez v. PEA, the Court clarified that POI could be invoked in order to gain access to official infonnation on on-going negotiations before the signing of a government contract, especially in light of the transparency requirements of public bidding, and subject to the general limitations as discussed above. In Kilusang Mayo Uno v. Director-General of the National Economic & Development Authority, the Court made an offhand note that the people's right to POI did not cover personal matters embodied in strictly confidential personal data collected by the government. In Hidalgo v. Judge Reyes, the Court restated and affirmed the public's right to access court records, which include pleadings and papers filed by private parties, viz In fine, access to court records may be permitted at the discretion and subject to the supervisory and protective powers of the court, after considering the actual use or purpose for which the request for access is based and the obvious prejudice to any of the parties. [n the exercise of such discretion, the following issues may be relevant: "whether [the] parties have interest in privacy, whether [the] information is being sought for legitimate purpose or for improper purpose, whether there is threat of particularly serious embarrassment to [a] party, whether [the] information is important to public health and safety, whether sharing of [the] information among litigants would promote fairness and efficiency, whether [the] party benefitting from [the] confidentiality order is [a] public entity or official, and whether [the] case involves issues important to the public. (Citations omitted) In Bantay Republic Act or Ba-Ra 7941 v. Commission on Elections, the Court affirmed the people's right to POI when it compelled COMELEC to publicly disclose the names of nominees of party-list organizations that were participating in the May 14, 2007 National and Local Elections. In Chavez v. National Housing Authority, the Court actually lamented the fact that there was "still no enabling law that provides the mechanics for the compulsory duty of government agencies to disclose information on government transactions." There is still no law on the statute books to date. In the same case, the Court also made a distinction between a government agency's duty to disclose information from its duty to provide or permit access to information, viz Thus, the duty to disclose infmmation should be differentiated from the duty to permit access to information. There is no need to demand from the government agency disclosure of infomfation as this is mandatory under the Constitution; failing that, legal remedies are available. On the other hand, the interested party must first request or even demand that he be allowed access to documents and papers in the particular agency. A request or demand is required; otherwise. the government office or agency will not know of the desire of the interested party to gain access to such papers and what papers are needed. The duty to disclose covers only transactions involving public interest, while the duty to allow access has a broader scope of information which embraces riot only transactions involving public interest, but any matter contained in official communications and public documents of the government agency. This requirement of a prior demand for access to information is of particular significance to.the instant petition, which will be discussed later below. In the historic case of Province of North Cotabato v. Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain the Court affirmed that the people's right to FOI covered therein Legaspi, et al.'s right to be consulted on the peace agenda vis-a-vis the Govermnent's negotiations with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, as well as information related to the negotiations for the proposed Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain of the Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001. The Government's invocation of executive privilege was crucially not recognized, since the executive order defining the authority of the Government's negotiating panel had already recognized the public's right to be consulted at various levels (both national and local) with regard to the said peace talks. In the more relevant case of Guingona, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, the Court compelled the COMELEC to fully explain to the public its preparations for the May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections-.the first fully automated national elections in the Philippines---on the basis of a catena of statutory provisions that relate to its duties as the country's electoral administrator. Incidentally, one provision cited by the Court therein is Section 1 of Republic Act No. 8436 (as amended by Section 1 of Republic Act No. 9369), or the State's declared policy, among others, to adopt an automated election system with a transparent and credible process of ballot counting and tally transmission. The Court here notes that in Guingona ,it had indeed granted therein petitioners' plea for mandamus even if the petition was anchored on mere news reports of supposed technical and logistical preparations relative to the May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections. However, in that case, the Comi recognized the urgency of the petition, since it was filed on April 23, 2010-i.e., a little over two weeks before polfo1g day. Indeed, the Court's Resolution was promulgated on May 6, 2010, or four days before polling day. The Court deemed it wise to brush aside technicalities and immediately order the COMELEC to inform the public of all election-related preparations even if there was no prior demand by any party due to the fact that time was already of the essence. Indeed, the time factor made that case one of transcendental importance. In Antolin v. Domondon which is a case that will be crucial to the ultimate resolution of the instant petition, the Court balanced interests relating to an POI demand for access to licensure examination papers, viz We are prepared to concede that national board examinations such as the CPA Board Exams are matters of public concern. The populace in general, and the examinees in particular, would understandably be interested in the fair and competent administration of these exams in order to en