A.C. No. 6542 (Formerly CBD Case No. 03-1053) - MARIA CIELO B. SUZUKI, REPRESENTED BY HER SISTER MARIA TERESA B. GABUCO, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. ERWIN L. TIAMSON. R E S O L U T I O N - Supreme Court E-Library

Ruling

Accordingly, disbarment should not be decreed where any punishment less severe such as a reprimand, suspension, or fine would accomplish the end desired. [27] Considering that there is no evidence to prove that respondent misappropriated the sum of P500,000.00 he received from complainant as partial payment for the subject property, as well as the P80,000.00 complainant gave him as her share in the expenses for the registration of the subject deed of sale, we find it fit to reprimand respondent for his acts of unfairly dealing with complainant. Finally, it must be emphasized that the issues of whether or not complainant had indeed made payments amounting to an aggregate sum of P1,352,500.00; if these payments were made, whether they were intended as part of the purchase price for the subject property; and, whether these payments should be properly deducted from the original purchase price of P2,150,000.00, are matters that should be properly resolved in a judicial proceeding separate and distinct from the present case. The settled rule is that criminal and civil cases are altogether different from administrative matters, such that the disposition in the first two will not inevitably govern the third and vice versa. [28] In this light, we refer to this Court's ruling in Berbano vs. Barcelona , [29] citing In re Almacen , [30] where it was held that: Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis . Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but rather investigations by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, [they are] in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. [They] may be initiated by the Court motu propio . Public interest is [their] primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have prove[n] themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. [31] Hence, our only concern in the instant case is the determination of respondent's administrative liability and our findings herein should not in any way be treated as having any material bearing on any other judicial action which the parties may choose to file against each other. WHEREFORE, respondent is hereby REPRIMANDED for violating Rule 19.01, Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, with a WARNING that a commission of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely. SO ORDERED.