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JurisprudenceG.R. NO. 148288 -

G.R. NO. 148288 - ROSEMARIE BALBA, VS. PEAK DEVELOPMENT INC. AND MA. ISABEL VASQUEZ.

Cited Laws

RA 505RA 594RA 686RA 600RA 76RA 307RA 283RA 432RA 564RA 736
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TL;DR — Ruling

WHEREFORE, all the foregoing premises being considered, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the complaint for illegal dismissal for lack of merit, and [on the] money claims, the respondent company is hereby ordered to pay complainant the sum of P7,500.00 as proportionate 13th month pay for 1996. All other money claims are denied for want of merit.

Decision

Ruling

WHEREFORE, all the foregoing premises being considered, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the complaint for illegal dismissal for lack of merit, and [on the] money claims, the respondent company is hereby ordered to pay complainant the sum of P7,500.00 as proportionate 13th month pay for 1996. All other money claims are denied for want of merit." (Pages, 7 and 8, Decision, pages 46 to 47, Rollo) Unconvinced, complainant-private respondent appealed to the NLRC, which then resolved and disposed of the same in this wise, to wit: "WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Appeal is hereby partially GRANTED. Accordingly, the Decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED to the effect that complainant-appellant was illegally discharged; and that respondent-appellee Company is DIRECTED to pay her separation pay in lieu of reinstatement equivalent to one (1) - month pay for every year of service, one (1) - year backwages and attorney's fee equivalent to ten percent (10%) of her total award of labor standards benefits pursuant to Article III of the Labor Code, computed as follows: 1. Separation pay: Jan. 20, 1994 - May 22, 1996 P18,000.00 x 3 yrs. P 54,000.00 2. One year backwages Basic: P18,000.00 x 12 mos. 13th month pay:[1/12] of P216,000 216,000.00 18,000.00 SIL: P18,000 [÷] 30 days = P600.00/day x 5 days 3,000.00 Total due for complainant P291,300.00 3. Attorney's fees: P3,000 x 10% 300.00 GRAND TOTAL P291,300.00 As to all other aspects, the assailed Decision STANDS." (Pages 10 to 11, Resolution, pages 34 to 35, Rollo) Aggrieved, petitioner instituted this petition anchored on the following justifications: I PUBLIC RESPONDENT NLRC THIRD DIVISION ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN PROMULGATING THE DECISION DATED 20 JULY 1999 AND THE RESOLUTION DATED 29 NOVEMBER 1999, THE SAME BEING IN CONTRAVENTION OF THE EXPRESS PROVISIONS OF THE LABOR CODE AND EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE ON THE JUST CAUSES FOR TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT. II THERE IS NO APPEAL, NOR ANY PLAIN, SPEEDY AND ADEQUATE REMEDY IN THE ORDINARY COURSE OF LAW." [4] The Court of Appeals at first dismissed the petition, reasoning as follows: We resolved to dismiss the petition. First of all, it must be stressed that the sole office of a writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction and does not include correction of public respondent's evaluation of the evidence and factual findings thereon ( Building Care Corp. vs. NLRC , 268 SCRA 686). Sadly, petitioner in the case would have Us review the evaluation of the evidence and factual findings of the NLRC, as well as that of the Labor Arbiter. We find no cogent reason to do so. Findings of fact of administrative agencies and quasi-judicial bodies, which has acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are generally accorded not only great respect but even finality ( Naguiat vs. NLRC , 269 SCRA 564). Secondly, in certiorari proceedings, judicial review does not go