G.R. No. 116022 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, VS. JUAN PEÑA, ACCUSED-.

Ruling

Accordingly, the burden of evidence shifted to him, as is the settled rule. He then had to rely on the strength of his evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecutions evidence, for, even if the latter were weak, it could not be disbelieved after his open admission of responsibility for the killing. As such, accused had to prove the essential requisites of self-defense, to wit: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to repel the aggression; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the accused. [17] A thorough examination of the records shows that accused failed to discharge this burden. Accused resolutely maintains that the aggression originated from the victim, and justifies stabbing the victim by asserting that he and the victim were struggling for possession of the knife and accused was just fortunate that he was able to wrest the knife from the victim before stabbing the latter. This, however, is inconsistent with his testimony that when the victim attempted to grab the knife on the table, accused rushed to it and got the knife ahead of the victim. This is likewise contradicted by prosecution witness Wilfredo Midays testimony that accused suddenly pushed the victim and the latter fell, face down, on the pavement, whereupon accused held the victims right arm and stabbed him; and by the testimony of accuseds witness, [18] Dominador Villamer, that accused all of a sudden held a knife and attempted to stab Odiada, who then ran to the kitchen door where he was grabbed by accused, thrown down onto the pavement and subsequently stabbed while in that position. [19] It is then all too apparent that the first requisite of self-defense is absent. The unlawful aggression did not come from the victim; rather, it came from the accused himself. The aggression not having come from the victim, it logically follows that the second requisite is likewise inexistent and any claim of self-defense cannot prosper. Having established that accused was not entitled to the justifying circumstance of self-defense, the next issue was whether the killing was qualified by treachery or evident premeditation. The trial court found the presence of both, but considered the latter a generic aggravating circumstance, which was correct if, indeed, both were present. For treachery to be appreciated against the accused, two conditions must concur, namely: a) the employment of means of execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate; and b) the means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted. [20] Moreover, treachery cannot be presumed; it must be proved by clear and convincing evidence, or as conclusively as the killing itself. [21] We find that treachery was not established in this case. The victim was neither caught completely off guard, nor unaware of accuseds attack, as a heated argument immediately preceded said attack. Secondly, it was disclosed b