G.R. NO. 147738 - PHIL-VILLE DEVELOPMENT AND HOUSING CORPORATION AND GERONINA QUE, VS. MERCEDES JAVIER, IN HER PERSONAL CAPACITY AND AS REPRESENTATIVE OF THE HEIRS OF THE LATE CRISANTO JAVIER.D E C I S I O N - Supreme Court E-Library

Ruling

WHEREFORE, as prayed for, let this be as it is hereby DISMISSED." On December 27, 1991, Mercedes filed a motion for reconsideration of the said Order but it was denied. This prompted her to interpose an appeal to the Court of Appeals. On December 22, 2000, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision reversing the trial court's assailed Orders and remanding the case to the trial court for further proceedings. PHILVILLE filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the Appellate Court in a Resolution dated April 17, 2001. Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari. The sole issue for our resolution is whether the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the challenged Orders of the trial court dismissing the complaint in Civil Case No. 122-M-90. We find no merit in the petition. Section 1, Rule 16 of the Revised Rules of Court then applicable provides: "SEC. 1. Grounds. Within the time for pleading a motion to dismiss the action may be made on any of the following grounds: (a) That the court has no jurisdiction over the person of the defendant or over the subject of the action or suit; (b) That the court has no jurisdiction over the nature of the action or suit; (c) That venue is improperly laid; (d) That the plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue; (e) That there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause; (f) That the cause of action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations; (g) That the complaint states no cause of action; (h) That the claim or demand set forth in the plaintiff's pleading has been paid, waived, abandoned, or otherwise extinguished; (i) That the claim on which the action or suit is founded is unenforceable under the provisions of the statute of frauds; (j) The suit is between members of the same family and no earnest efforts towards a compromise have been made." In J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Rafor, [3] this Court interpreted "within the time for pleading" to mean within the time to answer. Under Section 1, Rule 11, the time to answer is 15 days after service of summons upon the defendant. In the instant case, we note that PHILVILLE's motion to dismiss the complaint in Civil Case No. 122-M-90 was filed after it had filed its answer. In Heirs of Mariano Lagutan v. Icao, [4] this Court held that where a motion to dismiss was filed three months after the defendants had filed their amended answer, the said motion was filed out of time. In Ruiz, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, [5] this Court ruled that where an answer has been filed, the defendant is estopped from filing a motion to dismiss. The only exceptions to the rule, as correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, are: (1) where the ground raised is lack of jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter; (2) where the complaint does not state a cause of action; (3) prescription; and (4) where the evidence that would constitute a ground for the dismissal of the complaint was discovered only during the trial. We find that n