A.M. NO. 01-34-CA-J - ARIEL AVILLA, WILBERT DIVINA, FAITH ELEONOR FABIO, JENNY DELA CRUZ, RANDY MORATALLA, ELISEO V. BERNALES, JOANNE ENRIQUEZ, CRISOSTOMO L. UBAC, AND RICARDO DALMACIA, COMPLAINANTS, VS. JUSTICE ANDRES B. REYES, JR., (ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE COURT OF APPEALS).

Ruling

Accordingly, the issuance of the writ is justified only in a clear case, free from doubt or dispute. [8] The period to study its propriety in the circumstances was, however, interrupted when complainants filed their motion for oral arguments, and by the succeeding incidents where comments were required and filed and by the inhibition of Justice Brawner. Just as complainants claim that the allegations of respondent that a draft decision had been prepared is self-serving, their allegations that such is non-existent is also self-serving as there is nothing on record to show that this is not so. What appears on record as part of the annexes of respondent is a copy of the draft decision and the marginal note of Justice Garcia . This Court is inclined to believe the existence of the document. Thus this Court finds that the period of one and a half month within which to study and prepare a decision does not constitute the delay stated in the Canons of Judicial Conduct. The right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to a speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays. The concept of speedy disposition is a relative term and must necessarily be a flexible concept. [9] Hence, the doctrinal rule is that in the determination of whether or not that right has been violated, the factors that may be considered and balanced are the length of delay, the reasons for such delay, the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused, and the prejudice caused by the delay. [10] This Court does not find that respondent in this case has thus delayed the disposition of the case. Furthermore, what is beneficial speed or delay for one side could be harmful speed or delay for the other, and vice-versa. [11] For in the effort to accord complainants their demands, greater injury may be caused to the responsible officers of the PNPA whose duty it is to maintain the integrity of the school. Some balancing had to be considered. Neither did this Court find indicia of bad faith in the actuations of respondent nor have complainants made any averment to this effect. The semblance alone of inaction is not sufficient to constitute violation of Rule 1.02 of Canon 1 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. WHEREFORE, the complaint is DISMISSED for lack of merit. No costs. SO ORDERED.