G.R. No. 101941 - EDMUNDO QUEBRAL, VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND UNION REFINERY CORPORATION.

Ruling

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the case as against Edmundo Quebral is hereby dismissed. On the other hand, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff and against defendant Higidio Gay-ya, Jr. ordering him to pay plaintiff: 1. The sum of P102,991.54 plus interest at legal rate from October 8, 1984 until the full amount is paid; 2. To pay plaintiff the sum of P20,000.00 by way of attorneys fees; 3. Declaring the writ of preliminary attachment against the property of defendant Higidio Gay-ya, Jr. permanent; and 4. Defendant to pay the costs of suit." Gist of Appellate Courts Decision Private respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which, on July 29, 1991, rendered its Decision finding that, contrary to petitioners allegation in his demurrer to evidence, it was not necessary for private respondent to prove the approval of petitioners credit application because the fact of such approval was alleged in paragraph 3 of the complaint, and petitioner had admitted in paragraph 2 of his answer said paragraph of the complaint. The appellate court ruled that by such judicial ad-mission, petitioner could no longer dispute the fact of the approval of his credit application. On petitioners denials that he was the business partner of Gay-ya and that he had not known about nor consented to Gay-yas transactions with private respondent, the Court of Appeals said: "Defendant Quebral, however, denied in his answer that the other defendant Higidio Gay-ya, Jr. was his business partner. This denial might be true, but in his credit application Exh. "B" or "1", he expressly named Gay-ya together with himself as the PERSONS AU-THORIZED TO RECEIVE GOODS/DELIVERIES from plaintiff-appellant corporation; and in his letter to appellants official Efren Vargas Exh. K, defendant Quebral introduced Gay-ya to Vargas as my representative. Hence, although Gay-ya might not have been defendant Quebrals partner, he (Quebral), however, expressly made known to appellant corporation that Gay-ya was his duly authorized representative in his business, and he could not, therefore, blame appellant for regarding Gay-ya as such. "Defendant Quebral also denied in his answer knowledge of or consent to the transactions represented by the unpaid Sales Invoices Exhs. C and D dated October 8, and 22, 1984, respectively, claiming that it was only his defaulting co-defendant Higidio B. Gay-ya, Jr. who transacted said sales with plaintiff-appellant corporation. And Quebral later claimed in his demurrer, which the lower court sustained, that plain-tiff-appellants evidence had failed to show that he knew of and was equally liable with Gay-ya for the value of the unpaid sales invoices. We are of the opinion, though, that contrary to defendant Quebrals claim and the ruling of the lower court in his favor, plaintiff-appellant corporation had sufficiently established by its evidence defendant Quebrals knowledge of and liability for the unpaid sales invoices in question, and a