G.R. NO. 146707 -

Ruling

Wherefore, [State Prosecutor Velasco's] resolution is hereby reversed and set aside and [he is] directed to cause the withdrawal of the informations for multiple murder against respondents Atty. Franklin V. Tamargo, et al... [5] Later, the new DOJ Secretary, Serafin Cuevas (Nepomuceno's successor), also ordered the withdrawal of said Informations. Hence, a motion to withdraw them were filed in the RTC-Manila, Branch 41 where the cases were transferred and re-docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 00-184244-50. Public respondent Judge Rodolfo Ponferrada, presiding judge of the trial court, granted the motion and dismissed the cases filed against private respondents. The order read: ...[A]fter Its own assessment and evaluation of the evidence of the prosecution, the Court is inclined to grant the motion as [I]t finds...the sworn statements of Mario Gascon and Ernesto Mendoza... to be incredible and tainted with bias and prejudice. Parenthetically, it may be stated that the authority or power to prosecute is lodged with the Secretary of Justice, his prosecutors and assistants and undeniably[,] he has absolute control and supervision over them in the sense that he can reverse, alter or modify their actions and that no complaint or information in cases cognizable by the Regional Trial Court as in these cases shall be filed...without the resolution or decision of which lies with the Secretary of Justice. xxx xxx xxx In fine, the Court believes and so holds that the evidence of the prosecution, as assailed by the prosecution itself, does not constitute probable cause against herein accused. WHEREFORE, the motion is granted and the subject Informations are considered/ordered withdrawn and/or the cases dismissed. (italics supplied) [6] In their bid to reverse Judge Ponferrada's order, petitioners essentially insist in this petition for certiorari that the Secretary of Justice could no longer review the resolution of the public prosecutor after the cases had been filed in court. In support of their position, petitioners cite the case of Crespo v. Mogul. [7] According to them, Crespo enunciated that once a complaint or information has been filed in court, any disposition of the case or dismissal, conviction or acquittal of the accused rests on the sound discretion of the court. The Secretary of Justice should thus by then no longer entertain any petition for review or appeal assailing the action of the public prosecutor. We find no merit in the petition. Petitioners seek to annul the order of Judge Ponferrada approving the withdrawal of the criminal charges against private respondents and/or the dismissal of the cases for want of probable cause to hold them for trial. It is, however, noteworthy that nowhere in their petition do they impugn the validity of said order. Instead, the thrust of their arguments is directed against the Justice Secretary's power to review the findings of the public prosecutor and his directive to withdraw the Informations already filed in