Cited Laws
TL;DR — Ruling
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Jeronico M. Lobino is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of Murder, defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and he is hereby sentenced to DEATH. With costs de oficio.” Now, before the Court on automatic review, appellant contends, by way of assignment of errors, that: I THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE TESTIMONY OF THE ACCUSED JERONICO LOBINO.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Jeronico M. Lobino is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of Murder, defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and he is hereby sentenced to DEATH. With costs de oficio. Now, before the Court on automatic review, appellant contends, by way of assignment of errors, that: I THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE TESTIMONY OF THE ACCUSED JERONICO LOBINO. II THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE KILLING OF PATRICIA ABAJAR IS QUALIFIED BY TREACHERY AND AGGRAVATED BY SUPERIOR STRENGTH. III THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING IN FAVOR OF THE ACCUSED THE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF PASSION AND OBFUSCATION. Appellant theorizes that the trial court erred in not giving credence to his assertion that he killed the victim because she provoked him, and that mere suddenness of the attack did not mean that treachery attended the killing. The fact that the victim was in a stooping position was purely incidental and was not deliberately sought by him; otherwise, the victim would not have been able to run after she was first stabbed. Neither could the prosecution witnesses, Artemio Nisnisan and Julie Lobino, see the victim in the alleged stooping position as they were one fathom away; appellant argued. It is appellants submission that he would not stab his common law wife without any apparent reason. He attacked her because he could no longer stand her going home late at night and her sarcastic remarks whenever her attention was called to what she was doing. The trial court should have credited him with the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation, appellant maintains. Finally, appellant contends that the trial court should not have considered abuse of superior strength as a qualifying circumstance, and should have only found him guilty of homicide and not murder. Anent the issue that the trial court erred in not considering appellants testimony, oft-repeated is the rule that the evaluation by the trial judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the ascribing of the evidentiary weight to their testimony is well-nigh conclusive on an appellate court, barring patent arbitrariness in arriving at his conclusions. This court has consistently, on the basis of reason and experience, sustained the factual findings of the trial court considering that the court was in a better position to assess the evidence before it and to view the witnesses as they gave their testimony. [12] Here, the trial court evidently found the version of the prosecution witnesses more credible. According to appellant, he could not have killed his common law wife without a reason. He asserts that because of her provocation, he lost control of himself, and therefore, the charge should be reduced to homicide only. The Court disagrees. The requisites of passion and obfuscation are: 1. that there be an act, both unlawful and sufficient to produce such a condition of mind; and 2