G.R. No. 242852 - CONSOLACION P. CHAVEZ, CONNIE P. CHAVEZ, CARLA HORTENSIA C. ADELANTAR, CARMELA P. CHAVEZ, CRESENTE P. CHAVEZ, JR., AND CECILIA C. GIBE, HEREIN REPRESENTED BY HER ATTORNEY-IN-FACT CARLA P. CHAVEZ,*, VS. MAYBANK PHILIPPINES, INC..D E C I S I O N - Supreme Court E-Library

Ruling

accordingly, directed it to issue a Writ of Possession in favor of respondent in Cadastral Case No. 15-0608. [35] The CA held that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in not issuing an ex-parte Writ of Possession, the same being the court's ministerial function pursuant to Sections 6 [36] and 7 [37] of Act No. 3135, [38] as amended by Act No. 4118. [39] It further held that while the rules admit of an exception which bars the issuance of a writ of possession, such as when the subject land is held by a third party adversely to the mortgagor-debtor, [40] such a situation does not obtain in this case. Consolacion, one of the original mortgagors, cannot claim to have possessed the subject property adverse to herself, while the children of the other mortgagor, Cresente, Sr., merely substituted him in these proceedings. Further, the CA held that the parties did not intend to extinguish their mortgagor-mortgagee relationship, as extant in paragraph 5 [41] of the Compromise Agreement where respondent reserved its right to immediately possess the subject property should petitioners default in any of their payments. Moreover, the CA held that the consolidation of Cadastral Case No. 15-0608 and Civil Case No. 15-0527 was improper, considering that the former is a non-litigious proceeding which involves the ministerial function of issuing an ex-parte writ of possession in favor of respondent, [42] while the latter involves the annulment of respondent's Deed of Promise to Sell in favor of J.E. TICO Realty which is litigious in nature. Petitioners moved for reconsideration, [43] which was denied in a Resolution [44] dated October 10, 2018; hence, this petition. The Issue Before the Court The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA erred in directing the issuance of an ex-parte Writ of Possession in favor of respondent. The Court's Ruling In their petition, petitioners maintain, [45] among others, that respondent can no longer demand immediate possession of the subject property through an ex-parte motion for the issuance of a writ of possession, in light of the execution of the Compromise Agreement which, they aver, constitutes a "new contract" and a "new legal relationship" between the parties on the thesis that the nature of the transaction embraced therein involves a sale of the subject property. Respondent refutes [46] petitioners' stance, insisting that the Compromise Agreement was simply what it is a compromise entered between the parties designed to put an end to litigation, non-compliance therewith being a ground to rescind the compromise. Moreover, the mortgagor-mortgagee regime between the parties was never extinguished, as respondent never transferred ownership of the subject property to petitioners upon the execution of the Compromise Agreement. [47] The petition lacks merit. The nature of the Compromise Agreement Article 2028 [48] of the Civil Code defines a "compromise agreement" as a contract whereby the parties make recipro