Cited Laws
accordingly refrain from that behavior, even though some of it is protected. [59] A "facial" challenge is likewise different from an "as-applied" challenge . Distinguished from an as-applied challenge which considers only extant facts affecting real litigants, a facial invalidation is an examination of the entire law , pinpointing its flaws and defects, not only on the basis of its actual operation to the parties, but also on the assumption or prediction that its very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or activities. [60] Justice Mendoza accurately phrased the subtitle [61] in his concurring opinion that the vagueness and overbreadth doctrines, as grounds for a facial challenge , are not applicable to penal laws. A litigant cannot thus successfully mount a facial challenge against a criminal statute on either vagueness or overbreadth grounds. The allowance of a facial challenge in free speech cases is justified by the aim to avert the "chilling effect" on protected speech, the exercise of which should not at all times be abridged. [62] As reflected earlier, this rationale is inapplicable to plain penal statutes that generally bear an " in terrorem effect" in deterring socially harmful conduct. In fact, the legislature may even forbid and penalize acts formerly considered innocent and lawful, so long as it refrains from diminishing or dissuading the exercise of constitutionally protected rights. [63] The Court reiterated that there are "critical limitations by which a criminal statute may be challenged" and "underscored that an `on-its-face' invalidation of penal statutes x x x may not be allowed." [64] [T]he rule established in our jurisdiction is, only statutes on free speech, religious freedom, and other fundamental rights may be facially challenged. Under no case may ordinary penal statutes be subjected to a facial challenge . The rationale is obvious. If a facial challenge to a penal statute is permitted, the prosecution of crimes may be hampered. No prosecution would be possible. A strong criticism against employing a facial challenge in the case of penal statutes, if the same is allowed, would effectively go against the grain of the doctrinal requirement of an existing and concrete controversy before judicial power may be appropriately exercised. A facial challenge against a penal statute is, at best, amorphous and speculative. It would, essentially, force the court to consider third parties who are not before it. As I have said in my opposition to the allowance of a facial challenge to attack penal statutes, such a test will impair the State's ability to deal with crime. If warranted, there would be nothing that can hinder an accused from defeating the State's power to prosecute on a mere showing that, as applied to third parties, the penal statute is vague or overbroad, notwithstanding that the law is clear as applied to him. [65] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) It is set