A.C. No. 5151 - PEDRO G. TOLENTINO, ROMEO M. LAYGO, SOLOMON M. LUMALANG, SR., MELITON D. EVANGELISTA, SR., AND NELSON B. MELGAR, COMPLAINANTS, VS. ATTY. NORBERTO M. MENDOZA. R E S O L U T I O N - Supreme Court E-Library

Ruling

Accordingly, it cannot be extended to the acts complained of in this case. The alleged warrantless search made by Roque, a co-employee of appellant at the treasurers office, can hardly fall within the ambit of the constitutional proscription on unwarranted searches and seizures. Consequently, in this case where complainants, as private individuals, obtained the subject birth records as evidence against respondent, the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures does not apply. Since both Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993 and the Revised Rules on Evidence do not provide for the exclusion from evidence of the birth certificates in question, said public documents are, therefore, admissible and should be properly taken into consideration in the resolution of this administrative case against respondent. Verily, the facts stated in the birth certificates of Mara Khrisna Charmina dela Fuente Mendoza and Myrra Khrisna Normina dela Fuente Mendoza and respondents Certificate of Candidacy dated March 9, 1995 wherein respondent himself declared he was married to Felicitas Valderia, were never denied nor rebutted by respondent. Hence, said public documents sufficiently prove that he fathered two children by Marilyn dela Fuente despite the fact that he was still legally married to Felicitas Valderia at that time. In Bar Matter No. 1154, [17] good moral character was defined thus: . . . good moral character is what a person really is, as distinguished from good reputation or from the opinion generally entertained of him, the estimate in which he is held by the public in the place where he is known. Moral character is not a subjective term but one which corresponds to objective reality. The standard of personal and professional integrity is not satisfied by such conduct as it merely enables a person to escape the penalty of criminal law. In Zaguirre vs. Castillo, [18] we reiterated the definition of immoral conduct, to wit: . . . that conduct which is so willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show indifference to theopinion of good and respectable members of the community. Furthermore, such conduct must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. That is, it must be so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency. In the above-quoted case, we pointed out that a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships or the keeping of mistresses but must also behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards and, thus, ruled that siring a child with a woman other than his wife is a conduct way below the standards of morality required of every lawyer. [19] We must rule in the same wise in this case before us. The fact that respondent continues to publicly and openly coh