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JurisprudenceG.R. NO. 151912 -

G.R. NO. 151912 - PHILIPPINE SAVINGS BANK, VS. SPOUSES PEDRITO BERMOY AND GLORIA BERMOY.DECISION - Supreme Court E-Library

Cited Laws

RA 207RA 247RA 48RA 49
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TL;DR — Ruling

WHEREFORE, for insufficiency of evidence, let this case be, as the same is hereby, DISMISSED and accused Pedrito Bermoy and Gloria Visconde [Bermoy] are, as they are hereby, acquitted of the crime charged, with costs de oficio. [9] The prosecution, again through the private prosecutor, sought reconsideration but the trial court denied its motion in the Order of 28 May 1998. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The Solicitor General joined the petition.

Decision

Ruling

WHEREFORE, for insufficiency of evidence, let this case be, as the same is hereby, DISMISSED and accused Pedrito Bermoy and Gloria Visconde [Bermoy] are, as they are hereby, acquitted of the crime charged, with costs de oficio. [9] The prosecution, again through the private prosecutor, sought reconsideration but the trial court denied its motion in the Order of 28 May 1998. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The Solicitor General joined the petition. The Ruling of the Court of Appeals In its Decision dated 14 November 2001, the Court of Appeals, as earlier stated, denied the petition. It held: In support of the demurrer to evidence, the defense counsel argued that neither of the witnesses presented by the prosecution was able to identify the accused as allegedly those who committed the crime they were prosecuted for. xxx Petitioner, however, argues that the testimonies of the two witnesses they presented identified the accused spouses as the perpetrators of the crime. xxx We are not convinced. The xxx testimony proves only one thing: that a couple purporting to be the Bermoy spouses presented themselves to the Bank and obtained the loan. Whether they are the same husband and wife accused in this case for Estafa is a different story. The failure of the prosecution to point in open court to the persons of the accused as the same persons who presented themselves to the Bank is a fatal omission. They could be impostors who, armed with the fake title, presented themselves to the Bank as the persons named in the title. The prosecution goofed. Had the witnesses been asked to point to the two accused as the same couple who appeared before the Bank to obtain the loan, there would have been no doubt on their criminal liability. Petitioner further argued that the law itself does not prescribe the ways to identify the accused, xxx [.] True, there is no standard form provided by law [for] identifying the accused. Jurisprudence and trial practice show that the accused is usually identified by the witnesses, prompted by the counsel, by either pointing at him or stepping down the witness' stand and tapping him on the shoulder, or by means of photographs. The trial court correctly pointed this out. How else can identification be done, it may be asked. The petitioner also argues that "the identities of private [respondents] were clearly established as a result of the stipulation by and between the prosecution (thru the private prosecutor) and the defense." It insists that the Order dated June 11, 1997, is sufficient admission by the accused as to their identities, and [was] allegedly signed by them and their counsel as required under Section 2 of Rule 118 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure. There is no merit to this argument. If ever stipulations were made on June 11, 1997, these must be made in writing, which must be signed by the accused and counsel as their conformity to such stipulations. The records, however, show that the O