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JurisprudenceG.R. No. 168697 -

G.R. No. 168697 - GINA M. TIANGCO AND SALVACION JENNY MANEGO, VS. UNIWIDE SALES WAREHOUSE CLUB, INC. AND JIMMY GOW.R E S O L U T I O N - Supreme Court E-Library

Cited Laws

RA 158,RA 8799RA 29RA 262,RA 584RA 763
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Decision

Ruling

accordingly . (Emphasis supplied) The term "claim," as contemplated in Section 6 (c), refers to debts or demands of a pecuniary nature. [23] It is the assertion of rights for the payment of money. [24] Here, petitioners have pecuniary claimsthe payment of separation pay and moral and exemplary damages. In Rubberworld , we held that a labor claim is a "claim" within the contemplation of PD 902-A, as amended. This is consistent with the Interim Rules of Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation which came out in 2000. [25] Section 1, Rule 2 of the Interim Rules defines "claims" as follows: Sec. 1. Definition of Terms - For purposes of these Rules: xxx xxx xxx "Claim" shall include all claims or demands of whatever nature or character against a debtor or its property, whether for money or otherwise. Thus, labor claims are included among the actions suspended upon the placing under rehabilitation of employer-corporations. We stated in Rubberworld : It is plain from the foregoing provisions of law that "upon the appointment [by the SEC] of a management committee or a rehabilitation receiver," all actions for claims against the corporation pending before any court, tribunal or board shall ipso jure be suspended. The justification for the automatic stay of all pending actions for claims "is to enable the management committee or the rehabilitation receiver to effectively exercise its/his powers free from any judicial or extra-judicial interference that might unduly hinder or prevent the 'rescue' of the debtor company. To allow such other actions to continue would only add to the burden of the management committee or rehabilitation receiver, whose time, effort and resources would be wasted in defending claims against the corporation instead of being directed toward its restructuring and rehabilitation." xxx xxx xxx The law is clear: upon the creation of a management committee or the appointment of a rehabilitation receiver, all claims for actions "shall be suspended accordingly." No exception in favor of labor claims is mentioned in the law. Since the law makes no distinction or exemptions, neither should this Court. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. Allowing labor cases to proceed clearly defeats the purpose of the automatic stay and severely encumbers the management committee's time and resources. The said committee would need to defend against these suits, to the detriment of its primary and urgent duty to work towards rehabilitating the corporation and making it viable again. To rule otherwise would open the floodgates to other similarly situated claimants and forestall if not defeat the rescue efforts. Besides, even if the NLRC awards the claims of private respondents, as it did, its ruling could not be enforced as long as the petitioner is under the management committee. xxx xxx xxx Article 217 of the Labor Code [26] should be construed not in isolation but in harmony with PD 902-A, according to the basic rule in statutory constructio