G.R. No. 102900 - MARCELINO ARCELONA, TOMASA ARCELONA-CHIANG AND RUTH ARCELONA, REPRESENTED BY THEIR ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, ERLINDA PILE VS. COURT OF APPEALS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF DAGUPAN CITY, BRANCH XL, AND MOISES FARNACIO.

Ruling

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, this Court hereby renders judgment as follows; to wit: 1. Declaring and recognizing Moises Farnacio as tenant-caretaker over the fishpond in question located at Lomboy District, Dagupan City; 2. Ordering the defendants to maintain plaintiff in the peaceful possession and cultivation of said fishpond, with all the rights accorded and obligations imposed upon him by law; 3. Ordering the Branch Clerk of Court to withdraw and deliver to the plaintiff all the amounts deposited with this Court; and 4. All others claims of the parties are hereby denied for lack of merit. Olanday, et al. elevated the decision to the then Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC) [8] which affirmed with slight modification the decision of the trial court on May 31, 1985. On appeal, this Court [9] sustained the IAC decision in G.R. No. 71217. On May 25, 1991, after remand of the case to the court of origin, private respondent was placed in possession of the entire property covered by TCT 34341. Petitioners then filed with Respondent Court of Appeals a petition for annulment of the aforesaid judgment against private respondent and the implementing sheriff. [10] The case was docketed as CA GR SP No. 24846. On May 8, 1991, Respondent Court issued a resolution directing petitioners to implead as party defendant the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, Branch 50, Dagupan City. [11] Respondent Court promulgated in due course the assailed Decision and Resolution. Dissatisfied, petitioners lodged this petition for review before us on May 10, 1992. On August 24, 1992, due course was granted to the petition and the parties filed their respective memoranda. The Issues In their Memorandum dated November 7, 1992, petitioners allege that Respondent Court of Appeals has committed the following errors: [12] I. The Respondent Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the sole and only ground for annulment of judgment is extrinsic fraud. II. The Respondent Court of Appeals erred when it failed to consider that lack of due process and jurisdiction over the persons of the petitioners are also valid grounds for annulment of judgment. III. In annulment of judgment the grounds should be based solely on the records of the case. It is then an error for the Respondent Court of Appeals to consider matters extraneous to the records of the case. IV.The Respondent Court of Appeals erred in ruling that petitioners should have intervened in the proceedings for issuance of writ of execution before the lower court. V. The Respondent Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the petitioners are estopped or are guilty of laches in questioning the decision of the lower court. The Court believes that these five assigned errors may be condensed into three issues: (1) May a final judgment be annulled on the ground of lack of jurisdiction (over the subject matter and/or over the person of indispensable parties) and denial of due process, aside from extrinsic fraud? (