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JurisprudenceA.M. No. 00-1529-RTJ

A.M. No. 00-1529-RTJ (formerly A.M. No. OCA-IPI-97-453-RTJ) - ATTY. FRED HENRY V. MARALLAG AND NORMA F. FERI, COMPLAINANTS, VS. JUDGE LORETO CLORIBEL-PURUGGANAN, RTC, BRANCH 3, TUGUEGARAO, CAGAYAN.D E C I S I O N - Supreme Court E-Library

Cited Laws

RA 56RA 206RA 522,
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Decision

Ruling

accordingly set the presentation of evidence for August 12, 1997; (2) that respondent Judge denied complainants due process by considering the application for bail submitted for resolution without conducting a hearing thereon, when it was the prosecution which failed, despite several opportunities granted thereto, to present its witnesses on the scheduled hearing dates; (3) that respondent Judge refused to postpone the hearing on the application for bail on August 12, 1997 despite the pendency in the Court of Appeals of the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus (assailing the order directing the prosecution to present evidence ahead of the defense), even though in truth, complainant had already received a copy of the appellate courts resolution denying said petition even before August 12, 1997. [6] Respondent Judge further accused complainant Marallag of violating Canons 11 [7] and 11.03 [8] of the Code of Professional Responsibility for exhibiting disrespect towards her during the hearing on August 12, 1997, specifically, by using menacing language against her and raising his voice. [9] On November 29, 1999, Office the Court Administrator submitted its memorandum recommending that respondent Judge be held liable for gross ignorance of the law and be fined in the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00). The complaint is meritorious. The rule is that all persons in custody shall, before conviction, be entitled to bail as a matter of right. However, when the accused is charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua, and the evidence of guilt is strong, the grant of bail becomes a matter of discretion. [10] Where the admission to bail of an accused is discretionary, it is mandatory for the trial court to conduct a hearing to afford both the prosecution and the defense a reasonable opportunity to present evidence to establish, in the case of the prosecution, that evidence of the guilt of the accused is strong, and in the case of the defense, that such evidence of guilt is not strong. [11] The criminal case before respondent Judge involved an accused who was charged with murder, a capital offense. [12] Thus, the conduct of a hearing on the accuseds application for bail was necessary before the trial court could grant bail. The records of the case however reveal that although the trial court set several dates for the hearing on the application for bail, the parties were not able to adduce evidence which would enable the trial court to determine whether the evidence of the accuseds guilt was strong, for purposes of resolving the issue of whether the latter is entitled to bail. It was the other issues raised by the prosecution, such as the necessity of Duartes arraignment before the application for bail may be resolved, and the propriety of conducting trial in reverse order, which were taken up during the scheduled hearings. [13] The prosecution was thus deprived of the opportunity to prove that the evi