A.M. NO. RTJ-05-1921 (FORMERLY OCA IPI NO. 04-1973-RTJ) - MA. TERESA H. DE JESUS, COMPLAINANT, VS. JUDGE RENATO J. DILAG, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 73, OLONGAPO CITY. D E C I S I O N - Supreme Court E-Library

Ruling

accordingly meted a FINE in the amount of twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) with a WARNING that future similar infractions shall be dealt with more severely." In our Resolution [6] dated January 24, 2005, we required the parties to manifest whether they are submitting the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings and records filed. Subsequently, both parties submitted their respective Manifestations stating their willingness to submit the case for decision based on the records. On the challenged Order of September 3, 2002, Sections 4, 5 and 6, Rule 15 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, are pertinent, thus: SECTION 4. Hearing of motion. Except for motions which the court may act upon without prejudicing the rights of the adverse party, every written motion shall be set for hearing by the applicant. Every written motion required to be heard and the notice of the hearing thereof shall be served in such a manner as to ensure its receipt by the other party at least three (3) days before the date of hearing, unless the court for good cause sets the hearing on shorter notice. SECTION 5. Notice of hearing. The notice of hearing shall be addressed to all parties concerned, and shall specify the time and date of the hearing which must not be later than ten (10) days after the filing of the motion. SECTION 6. Proof of service necessary. No written motion set for hearing shall be acted upon by the court without proof of service thereof. Obviously, respondent judge blatantly disregarded the above provisions. Instead of denying the motion outright for being manifestly defective, he granted the same. While he set the motion for hearing, still the three-day notice was not observed, thus complainant failed to attend the hearing. Clearly, she was deprived of her right to due process. When a judge fails to consider so basic and elemental a rule, a law, or a principle in the discharge of his duties, he is either too incompetent and undeserving of his position, or is too vicious that the oversight or omission was deliberately done in bad faith and in grave abuse of judicial authority. In both instances, the judge's dismissal is in order. [7] Likewise, respondent's failure to afford complainant the opportunity to be heard as a matter of due process of law deserves administrative sanction. [8] Relative to the challenged Order dated October 4, 2002, respondent judge shows his ignorance of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended. This law confers upon the Commissioner of the BID, to the exclusion of the courts of justice, the power and authority to enforce its provisions, specifically the admission of foreigners to this country. We sustain the observation of the Court of Appeals [9] that the Order of respondent judge directing the BID to allow the entry of Harlinghausen to this country would effectively countermand the order of detention [10] issued by the BID and "constitutes an intrusion into its prerogatives as regards the entr