G.R. No. 112262 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, VS. ARMANDO RODRIGUEZ CAMAT AND WILFREDO TANYAG DEL ROSARIO, ACCUSED-.

Ruling

accordingly be given full credence. It bears repeating that findings of the trial court pertaining to the credibility of witnesses deserve great respect since it had the opportunity to hear and observe their demeanor as they testified on the witness stand and, therefore, it was in a better position to discern if such witnesses were telling the truth or not based on their deportment while testifying. [24] Additionally, there was no evidence of any ulterior or evil motive on the part of Penalver that might have led him to give fabricated testimony against appellants. He, and even appellant Camat, declared in open court that they did not know each other before the gruesome incident happened on September 1, 1985. [25] Having no motive to testify falsely, his positive testimony is sufficient for conviction. When there is no evidence indicating that the principal witness for the prosecution was moved by improper motive, the presumption is that he was not so moved, and his testimony is entitled to full faith and credit. [26] We also take note of the fact that prosecution witness Penalver positively identified appellants as the persons who robbed him and killed Sinoy. He could not have been mistaken in identifying appellants as the scene of the crime was sufficiently illuminated and he even remembers that appellant Del Rosario was wearing faded camouflage clothing at the time of the robbery. [27] Thus, appellants claim that witness Penalver failed to identify them [28] is without merit. His narration of the incident and his identification of the malefactors are direct and definite. Appellants also contend that the failure of the prosecution to present in court the police informer who allegedly pointed to appellant Camat in the police precinct deprived them of their constitutional right of confrontation. [29] The right of confrontation is one of the rights of an accused enumerated in Section 19, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution [30] which provided that: In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proven, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. x x x In a case decided in 1979, [31] the above provision was invoked by an accused in claiming that his extrajudicial confessions made prior to the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution [32] were illegally obtained because his constitutional right to counsel was disregarded. The Court, citing People vs. Jose, et al., [33] clarified that the phrase "criminal prosecutions" in the said constitutional provision shall be interpreted to mean proceedings before the trial court, which in its most expanded concepts is from arraignment up to the rendition of the decision. It will also be observed