G.R. No. 139282 - ROMEO DIEGO Y DE JOYA, VS. THE SANDIGANBAYAN AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES.DECISION - Supreme Court E-Library

Ruling

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby renders judgment finding accused Superintendent Romeo Diego y De Joya GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as principal in the crime of Malversation of Public Property, as defined and penalized under paragraph 4 of Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code; and considering the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, hereby sentences the accused to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from TEN (10) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor, as minimum, to SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal, as maximum; to pay a fine of FIVE MILLION PESOS (P5,000,000.00); to suffer the penalty of perpetual special disqualification from holding any public office; and, to pay the costs. [6] Petitioner now assails the judgment in this appeal, relying on the following grounds: First - WHETHER OR NOT THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY THE PROSECUTION IN THE PRACTICALLY REVERSE PROCEDURE OF PRESENTATION ADOPTED BY IT IS SUFFICIENT TO PROVE THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION; Second - WHETHER OR NOT, ASSUMING THAT THE BURDEN OF EVIDENCE WAS PROPERLY SHIFTED TO PETITIONER, THE EXPLANATION HE RELIED UPON FOR THE LOSS OF THE SUBJECT SHABU IS SUFFICIENT TO EXONERATE HIM FROM LIABILITY FOR THE OFFENSE CHARGED; Third - WHETHER OR NOT, ASSUMING WITHOUT ADMITTING, THAT PETITIONER IS GUILTY AS CHARGED, THE SUPPOSED ESTIMATED STREET VALUE OF THE SUBJECT SHABU IS A PROPER BASIS FOR THE ASSESSMENT OF THE PENALTY IMPOSABLE IN THE PREMISES; and Fourth - WHETHER OR NOT THE GUILT OF PETITIONER OF (sic) THE OFFENSE CHARGED HAS BEEN PROVED BY EVIDENCE BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. [7] The petition has no merit. Petitioner contends that there was a virtual reversal of the normal order of presentation of evidence during the trial when the Sandiganbayan required him, as accused, to put up his defense when the prosecution rested its case relying only on its exhibits and the stipulation of facts. However, the records of this case and the petition itself reveal that the trial in the Sandiganbayan proceeded in the order prescribed by Rule 119, Section 3 of the Rules of Court. [8] The prosecutions reliance on the stipulation of facts and its exhibits, without offering any testimonial evidence, is an exercise of its prosecutorial prerogative. If petitioner truly believed that the evidence of the prosecution was inherently weak such that it failed to establish his culpability for the crime charged, then he should have filed a Demurrer to Evidence to dismiss the case. However, instead of taking this course of action, petitioner entered into another stipulation of facts and presented his evidence. Petitioner cannot now belatedly claim that the Sandiganbayan supposedly caused the onus probandi to shift to him, the accused in a criminal case, when petitioner himself acquiesced to the regular order of the proceedings. Petitioner bewails the prosecutions reliance on the stipulation of facts. It bears st