G.R. Nos. 179307-09 - DINAH C. BARRIGA, VS. SANDIGANBAYAN (4TH DIVISION) AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES.R E S O L U T I O N - Supreme Court E-Library

Ruling

accordingly discharge its constitutional functions. [6] From the foregoing rulings, it is beyond cavil that the denial of petitioner's petition and her subsequent motions for reconsideration were adjudication upon merits. On the applicability of Pajaro v. Sandiganbayan [7] ubiquitously invoked by petitioner, we quote with favor the Sandiganbayan's holding: [3] Accused Barriga's reliance on the case of Pajaro v. Sandiganbayan to bolster her argument that the supposed dismissal of the administrative aspect of these cases by the Court of Appeals has effectively deprived the Sandiganbayan of its jurisdiction to entertain and try these criminal cases is clearly misplaced and fails to take into account relevant legal developments. The ruling in Pajaro v. Sandiganbayan to the effect that the Sandiganbayan, being a court of special and limited jurisdiction, is inferior to the Court of Appeals, and as such, may not review, revise or reverse the findings of the latter, is no longer controlling. Under Section 1, P.D. No. 1606, as amended by R.A. No. 8249, the Sandiganbayan has been declared by law as a "special court of the same level as the Court of Appeals and possessing all the inherent powers of a court of justice." Thus, to turn Pajaro v. Sandiganbayan on its head, the Court of Appeals, being merely of equal rank to the Sandiganbayan. the same may not review, revise, reverse or even control its findings. In fact, decisions and final orders of the Sandiganbayan are reviewable only by the Supreme Court, x x x Neither can the Court of Appeals impose its findings and conclusions upon the Sandiganbayan, as accused Barriga implies, as only the rulings and decisions of the Supreme Court can serve as binding precedents to the determinations to be made by the Sandiganbayan. [8] Lastly, nowhere in the Court of Appeals (CA) resolution, which petitioner harps on, does it state that the administrative aspect of the case against her has been dismissed. The slight modification accorded by the CA of its decision was strictly confined to the Ombudsman's authority to directly dismiss or suspend petitioner. This was explicitly set forth in the dispositive portion of the CA resolution, to wit: WHEREFORE, the Decision in the instant case is MODIFIED in that the Orders of the Office of tlie Ombudsman dated August 10, 2004 and September 3, 2004 in so far as it directed the implementation of the suspension of petitioner is declared null and void having been made beyond its authority and prematurely . Consequently, the letter of the municipal mayor of Carmen, Cebu dated November 2, 2004 implementing said order is also nullified. Petitioner's immediate reinstatement is in order. No pronouncement as to costs. [9] WHEREFORE , petitioner's motion to resolve her motion for reconsideration on the merits, which is in reality a third motion for reconsideration, is DENIED for lack of merit. This third motion for reconsideration is EXPUNGED as an unauthorized pleading. This resolution i