Back to Search
JurisprudenceG.R. No. 166734 -

G.R. No. 166734 - MANDY COMMODITIES CO., INC., VS. THE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL BANK OF CHINA.D E C I S I O N - Supreme Court E-Library

Cited Laws

RA 565,RA 499RA 274RA 759,RA 564,RA 66RA 608RA 495RA 424,RA 304RA 109,
Share:

TL;DR — Ruling

the petition was a mere after-thought in the hope of curing the wrong remedy availed of by petitioner in the first instance, which resulted in the dismissal of its petition in G.

Decision

Ruling

Accordingly, it affirmed the September 7, 1999 Order of the trial court. [28] Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but it was denied. [29] In its bid to once again avert the implementation of the writ of possession, petitioner, in this petition for review under Rule 65, [30] insists on the nullity of the September 7, 1999 Order. It raises two points of argument: first, that nothing in the chattel mortgage agreement states that the same would be enforceable under Act No. 3135; and, second, that no provision relating to possession pending redemption can be found in the chattel mortgage law--not like in the real estate mortgage lawwhich means that a creditor may not, under the former law, have a writ of possession issued in his favor but that he must resort to an action for recovery of possession. Petitioner theorizes that because the foreclosure sale was null and void, the trial court was then devoid of jurisdiction to act on the petition for a writ of possession and, more so, issue the said writ. It concludes that when the Court of Appeals did not annul the said Orders and instead affirmed the same, it likewise abused its discretion which amounted to lack or excess of jurisdiction on its part. [31] Respondent was told to comment, [32] but instead, ROP Investments, Limited - Philippine Branch (ROP Philippines) [33] moved that it be substituted as the respondent in this case, because in September 2003, it had acquired by assignment all the rights, titles and interest of respondent. [34] The Court allowed the substitution. [35] ROP Philippines posits that the filing of the petition was a mere after-thought in the hope of curing the wrong remedy availed of by petitioner in the first instance, which resulted in the dismissal of its petition in G.R. No. 146929 for violation of the rule on hierarchy of courts. It maintains that the Court of Appeals did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the petition which was, to begin with, procedurally infirm as the grounds invoked by petitioner are not apt for a Rule 47 petition. [36] Finally, it asserts that the issuance of the writ of possession is a ministerial duty of the trial court under Act No. 3135, and that since petitioner did not pursue any of the proper remedies against the orders of the trial court, then with more reason that the said writ be issued in the case. [37] Prefatorily, we find no need to delve further and deeper into the facts and issues raised by both petitioner and respondent because at the outset it is clear that the instant petition must be dismissed in any event, first, for being the wrong remedy under the premises, and second, for failure of petitioner to demonstrate grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the Court of Appeals in rendering the assailed Decision and Resolution. We agree with the Court of Appeals that the remedy of annulment was not the proper remedy to set aside the orders of the trial court. To start with, the remedy of p