G.R. No. 131724 - MILLENIUM INDUSTRIAL COMMERCIAL CORPORATION, VS. JACKSON TAN.D E C I S I O N - Supreme Court E-Library

Ruling

Wherefore, Motion to Dismiss is hereby denied for lack of merit. [6] Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but its motion was denied by the trial court in its order, dated January 16, 1996, for failure of petitioner to raise any new ground. Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals, assailing the aforesaid orders of the trial court. On September 18, 1997, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. [7] The appellate court ruled that although petitioner denied Lynverd Cinches' authority to receive summons for it, its actual receipt of the summons could be inferred from its filing of a motion to dismiss, hence, the purpose for issuing summons had been substantially achieved. Moreover, it was held, by including the affirmative defense that it had already paid its obligation and praying for other reliefs in its Motion to Dismiss, petitioner voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. [8] Hence, this petition for review. Petitioner raises the following issues: WHETHER OR NOT SERVICE OF SUMMONS UPON A MERE DRAFTSMAN WHO IS NOT ONE OF THOSE UPON WHOM SUMMONS MAY BE SERVED IN CASE OF A DEFENDANT CORPORATION AS MENTIONED IN THE RULES IS VALID. WHETHER OR NOT THE INCLUSION OF ANOTHER AFFIRMATIVE RELIEF IN A MOTION TO DISMISS ABANDONS AND WAIVES THE GROUND OF LACK OF JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF THE DEFENDANT THEREIN ALSO PLEADED UNDER PREVAILING LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE. WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS A LEGAL GROUND TO GRANT PETITIONERS MOTION TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT BELOW. First . Petitioner objects to the application of the doctrine of substantial compliance in the service of summons for two reasons: (1) the enumeration of persons on whom service of summons on a corporation may be effected in Rule 14 §13, is exclusive and mandatory; and (2) even assuming that substantial compliance is allowed, its alleged actual receipt of the summons is based on an unfounded speculation because there is nothing in the records to show that Lynverd Cinches actually turned over the summons to any of the officers of the corporation. [9] Petitioner contends that it was able to file a motion to dismiss only because of its timely discovery of the foreclosure suit against it when it checked the records of the case in the trial court. The contention is meritorious. Summons is the means by which the defendant in a case is notified of the existence of an action against him and, thereby, the court is conferred jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. [10] If the defendant is corporation, Rule 14, §13 requires that service of summons be made upon the corporations president, manager, secretary, cashier, agent, or any of its directors. [11] The rationale of the rule is that service must be made on a representative so integrated with the corporation sued as to make it a priori presumable that he will realize his responsibilities and know what he should do with any legal papers received by him. [12] Petitioner contends that the enumeration in