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JurisprudenceG.R. NO. 167025 -

G.R. NO. 167025 - HERMINIO C. PRINCIPIO, VS. THE HON. OSCAR BARRIENTOS, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, BRANCH 26, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS, AND HILARIO SORIANO - Supreme Court E-Library

Cited Laws

RA 183,RA 438,RA 3019RA 397RA 680,
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Decision

Ruling

Accordingly, petitioner filed a motion with the trial court praying that the motion for reconsideration filed with the Office of the Ombudsman be given due course and thereafter, to rule that no probable cause exists. [7] On December 3, 2003, the trial court denied petitioner's motions to give due course to his motion for reconsideration and to defer proceedings until resolution of the pending issues. It also suspended petitioner from office for a period of 60 days. [8] His motion for reconsideration was denied on January 27, 2004. [9] Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals praying for the annulment of respondent judge's Orders of December 3, 2003 and January 27, 2004 for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. On July 30, 2004, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and affirmed the assailed orders of the RTC. On February 9, 2005, the appellate court denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration. In dismissing the petition, the appellate court noted that: ... [T]he petition stems from an order denying the petitioner's motion to dismiss. The general rule is that the denial of a motion to dismiss is interlocutory and hence, it cannot be questioned in a special civil action of certiorari .... In effect, petitioner's motion to dismiss is a motion to quash. In the case of Lee vs. People of the Philippines, et al. (393 SCRA 397), it was elucidated that where a motion to quash is denied, the remedy is not certiorari but to go to trial without prejudice to reiterating the special defenses involved in said motion, and if, after trial on the merits an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by law. .... In the case at bench, while petitioner ostensibly alleges grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the record does not show such kind of actuation on the part of respondent Judge. Specifically, petitioner delves on the finding of probable cause of respondent Judge. He avers that respondent Judge did not bother to deliberate on the specific circumstances of his case but merely defined "probable cause." From this, it cannot be said that the respondent Judge did not independently evaluate or assess the merits of the case. While it is true that respondent Judge defined "probable cause" in the assailed order, it may not be amiss to state that he clearly stated that probable cause exists in the case below. Respondent Judge's failure to clearly express the nitty-gritty of his findings of probable cause cannot be characterized as an error of jurisdiction. [10] Hence, the instant petition based on the sole ground that the Court of Appeals erred in ignoring relevant law, jurisprudence, and evidence negating the Ombudsman's finding of probable cause. [11] Petitioner argues that the general rule that certiorari is not the proper remedy to the denial of a motion to quash is subject to the exception laid down in