SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD NG BAGUIO CITY, VS. JADEWELL PARKING SYSTEMS CORPORATION.

Ruling

WHEREFORE , judgment is rendered declaring both Sangguniang Panlungsod Resolution No. 037, Series of 2002 and the April 17, 2002 Resolution overriding the Mayors veto as NULL and VOID. The Writ of Preliminary Injunction earlier issued by this Court is made PERMANENT , with costs against respondents. [106] The RTC did not order the respondents therein to comply with the MOA. An order to perform a contract is not necessarily subsumed in an order not to terminate the same. Contrast this legal point with the fact that the prayer of Jadewell in its original petition asked the RTC, in relevant part: ...that the writ of preliminary injunction be made permanent and the writs applied for be issued against the respondents nullifying and voiding Resolution No. 037, series of 2002 and the resolution over-riding the veto and instead, directing them to perform what the memorandum of agreement requires them to do. (Emphasis supplied) [107] This latter part, which is effectively a prayer for a permanent mandatory injunction against respondents therein to perform the terms of the MOA, are not in the fallo of the RTC decision. We consider therefore that the RTC deliberately withheld granting the specific prayer to order Baguio City to perform the MOA. No motion to correct or clarify the said fallo having been filed by Jadewell, the prayer to order the city officials of Baguio to perform the MOA is hereby deemed abandoned. We further note three things: 1. Jadewell has not questioned - in its Petition, Reply to Comment, and Memorandum before this Court - the implication of the RTC and CA Decisions to the effect that the Sanggunian had the authority to perform acts of contractual rescission on behalf of the City of Baguio when both these courts ignored the issue raised by Jadewell in its Petition before the RTC, and we therefore do not consider this to be a genuine issue in this Petition before us; 2. While the Sangguniang Panlungsod has insinuated that there was fraud and excess of authority on the part of the mayor in the execution [108] of the MOA - because the latter provided for a smaller sharing of 20 % from the gross profit of the operation or 50% of the net profit whichever is higher instead of the intended 20% of gross receipts, [109] - petitioners in G.R. No. 160025 conceded even at the RTC level that they are not assailing the MOA for being defective but for having been breached in the performance. We thus disregard all arguments in G.R. No. 160025 regarding the validity of the execution of the MOA, for being a non-issue in this case; [110] 3. We also immediately set aside claims of Jadewell in its Petition before the RTC that an alternative relief should be provided by the courts in the form of compensation for terminated Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) contracts under the BOT Law (Republic Act No. 6957) as there is not the slightest basis on record that the administration of on-street parking can be classified as an infrastructure contract, a basic