G.R. NO. 159467 - SPOUSES NORA SAGUID AND ROLANDO P. SAGUID, VS. SECURITY FINANCE, INC..D E C I S I O N - Supreme Court E-Library

Ruling

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering plaintiff SECURITY FINANCE, INCORPORATED to pay defendant-spouses ROLANDO and NORA SAGUID: The total amount of the daily earnings of the seized motor vehicle computed from the date of its seizure on October 28, 1998 up to its return to the defendants, at the rate of P750.00 daily; The amount of P500,000 for moral damages; The amount of P1,000,000 for exemplary damages; The amount P200,000 for and as attorney's fees; and The Costs. In reaching its verdict, the RTC ruled that the promissory note and the deed of mortgage were not valid contracts and were not binding on petitioners. It explained that respondent failed to show with convincing evidence that it loaned to petitioners the money used in the purchase of the subject motor vehicle. On the contrary, it found that there was preponderance of evidence showing that the motor vehicle was purchased in cash by petitioners from Toyota Balintawak, Inc. Respondent appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals via a Notice of Appeal. [19] On 31 January 2003, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision. It reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC and ruled in favor of respondent. It disposed of the case as follows: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision of the trial court is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and another one is rendered in favor of the plaintiff-appellant. Costs against the defendants-appellees. [20] The Court of Appeals found the ruling of the trial court that there was no valid contract entered into between the parties on the ground there was no cause or consideration when they executed the same, and that respondent failed to show with convincing evidence that it loaned the money to petitioners which was used to purchase the subject motor vehicle, to be bereft of factual and legal basis. It relied heavily on the admission of petitioner Rolando Saguid during pre-trial and during his direct-examination that he signed the promissory note dated 23 April 1996 and the chattel mortgage dated 03 September 1996. It did not give weight to petitioners' bare denial that they never transacted with respondent for the subject loan and that they never executed the promissory note and the deed of chattel mortgage because it belied the admission made by petitioner Rolando Saguid. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration [21] dated 24 February 2003 while respondent filed a Motion for Clarificatory Judgment [22] dated 17 February 2003. In a resolution dated 10 June 2003, the Court of Appeals denied the Motion for Reconsideration and granted the Motion for Clarificatory Judgment. It amended the dispostive portion of its 31 January 2003 decision as follows: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision of the trial court is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and another one is rendered in favor of the plaintiff-appellant ordering the defendants-appellees: 1) To deliver to the plaintiff-appellant the motor vehicle described as