G.R. No. 132264 - ABRAHAM GEGARE, VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, (FORMER SPECIAL TWELFTH DIVISION), HON. PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC, BR. 217, QUEZON CITY, AND SPS. MELENCIO AND SOTERA C. LAVARES.

Ruling

accordingly made on December 16, 1997. [11] Hence, the instant petition. It is petitioners contention now that respondent Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in dismissing his appeal for failing to pay docket fees and thus gave premium to the technical requirements, rather than resolving the case on substantial merits. Petitioner also maintains that Entry of Judgment could not have been made by the Court of Appeals in the absence of any categorical declaration that his appeal has indeed been abandoned and dismissed. The contention is anchored on the apparent permissive tenor of respondent Court of Appeals resolution dated July 17, 1997 which declared that "x x x, the appeal may be declared abandoned and dismissed for appellants failure to pay the required docket fee x x x". [Italics supplied.] After careful consideration of the petition, the comments of private respondents, and the manifestation in lieu of reply by petitioner, we find the foregoing contentions of petitioner bereft of merit. On the contrary, respondent Court of Appeals was very explicit when it denied petitioners motion for reconsideration with motion for extension to file brief, in its Resolution dated September 24, 1997, in this wise: "Considering the explanations submitted in appellants motion for reconsideration with motion for extension of time to file his brief, and appellees Opposition thereto, appellants motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED." [12] No other conclusion could be deduced from the aforecited pronouncement, in our view, except that petitioners prayer to be allowed to pay the docket fees, file his brief, and proceed with his appeal was being denied by respondent appellate court, categorically. The appeal had obviously been dismissed already as of July 17, 1997 and this dismissal was confirmed by the September 24, 1997 resolution. Thus, respondent court merely noted petitioners subsequent motion for clarification and/or final disposition of his appeal considering that the same is a prohibited pleading under Sec. 3, Rule 9 of the Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals. No doubt respondent Court of Appeals acted justifiably in merely noting said motion. Also without merit, in our view, is petitioners plea for a liberal treatment by the said court, rather than a strict adherence to the technical rules, in order to promote substantial justice. For it has consistently been held that payment in full of docket fees within the prescribed period is mandatory. As this Court has firmly declared in Rodillas vs. Commission on Elections, [13] such payment is an essential requirement before the court could acquire jurisdiction over a case: "The payment of the full amount of the docket fee is an indispensable step for the perfection of an appeal (Dorego v. Perez, 22 SCRA 8 [1968]; Bello v. Fernandez, 4 SCRA 135 [1962]). In both original and appellate cases, the court acquires jurisdiction ove