G.R. No. 176933 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, VS. LUIS PLAZA Y BUCALON.D E C I S I O N - Supreme Court E-Library

Ruling

accordingly granted respondent's Motion and fixed the amount of his bond at P40,000. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration cum prayer for inhibition of Judge Tan was denied for lack of merit. [8] Respondent was subsequently released [9] after he posted a P40,000 bond. Roberto Murcia (Roberto), the victim's brother, impleading the People as co-petitioner, assailed the trial court's orders via petition for certiorari [10] with the Court of Appeals. Roberto faulted Judge Tan for granting bail without an application for bail having been filed by respondent and without conducting the mandatory hearing to determine whether or not the prosecution's evidence is strong. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) adopted Roberto's argument that the grant of bail to respondent without any separate hearing is contrary to prevailing jurisprudence. By Decision of January 31, 2007, the appellate court, observing that the allegations in respondent's Motion to Fix Amount of Bail Bond constituted an application for bail, dismissed Roberto's petition and affirmed Judge Tan's orders. [11] In its present petition, the People contends that THE COURT OF APPEALS DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE CONTRARY TO LAW AND SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT RULED THAT THE HEARING CONDUCTED SATISFIES THE REQUIREMENT OF DUE PROCESS AND THAT RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO BAIL [12] (Underscoring supplied) Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides that "All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong , shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law." Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, thus provides that all persons in custody shall, before conviction by a regional trial court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, be admitted to bail as a matter of right. The exercise by the trial court of its discretionary power to grant bail to an accused charged with a capital offense thus depends on whether the evidence of guilt is strong. Stressing this point, this Court held: . . . [W]hen bail is discretionary, a hearing, whether summary or otherwise in the discretion of the court, should first be conducted to determine the existence of strong evidence or lack of it , against the accused to enable the judge to make an intelligent assessment of the evidence presented by the parties. A summary hearing is defined as "such brief and speedy method of receiving and considering the evidence of guilt as is practicable and consistent with the purpose of hearing which is merely to determine the weight of evidence for the purposes of bail. " On such hearing, the court does not sit to try the merits or to enter into any nice inquiry as to the weight that ought to be allowed to the evidence for or against the accused, nor will it speculate on the outcome of the trial or on what further evidence may b