G.R. No. 117945 - NILO B. CALIGUIA, VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, PEPSI-COLA DISTRIBUTORS OF THE PHILS., INC., AND PEPSI-COLA PRODUCTS PHILS., INC..

Ruling

Accordingly, reinstatement by PCD had become impossible and that the computation of back wages should only be up to 25 July 1989. The petitioner opposed, [9] contending that it was precisely PCPPIs take-over which prompted him to make proper demand upon and seek leave to file an amended complaint impleading the new owner, PCPPI, as a party respondent. More importantly, the Agreement between PCD and PCPPI, as evidenced by two letters from PCD and PCPPI to PCD employees, [10] was that PCPPI would absorb all the employees of PCD; in fact, PCD even paid their employees termination pay. On 7 October 1992, PCD filed a motion to admit supersedeas bond. [11] On 31 August 1994 the NLRC rendered a decision [12] in NLRC NCR CA 003983-92, affirming the finding of the Labor Arbiter of illegal dismissal and declaring that the petitioner was entitled to back wages and reinstatement. However, it agreed with PCD that it had ceased business operations on 25 July 1989, hence the petitioners reinstatement was impossible and that back wages should only be from the date he was allegedly dismissed (30 June 1988 to 25 July 1989). On 30 September 1994, the petitioner filed a motion to reconsider [13] the NLRC decision. He contended that there was no actual cessation of operations of PCD, but merely a transfer of ownership from PCD to PCPPI. In fact, all rank-and-file, staff, and managerial employees of PCD were absorbed and re-employed as regular employees by PCPPI and were likewise paid their corresponding separation benefits; thus, to allow PCPPI to treat the petitioner otherwise would constitute discrimination. Further, PCPPI was duly represented by counsel in the proceedings below. In its resolution of 13 October 1994, [14] the NLRC denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. The petitioner then filed this special civil action for certiorari on 3 January 1995. He alleges that the NLRC erred in: (a) modifying the decision rendered by the Labor Arbiter despite the fact that the said decision is supported by substantial evidence, law, and jurisprudence; (b) not granting full back wages to the petitioner; (c) not granting full back wages from 25 June 1992 up to the present; and (d) in not adjudging the respondents liable for actual, moral, and exemplary damages. In arguing for his reinstatement by PCPPI and payment of separation benefits by PCD, the petitioner contests the NLRCs finding that PCD ceased business operations on 25 July 1989 and reiterates his earlier arguments. Further, the petitioner asserts his right to full back wages (not merely up to 25 July 1989) and then takes the NLRC to task for having failed to act upon his motion for execution pending appeal. Finally, he contends that the NLRC erred in not adjudging PCD liable for actual, moral, and exemplary damages. In their comment, respondents PCD and PCPPI allege that they are two different entities with each having been separately incorporated. PCDs corporate existence was only up to 25 Jul