Accordingly, the CA granted the claims of Briones for payment of total and permanent disability benefits; sickness allowance and attorney's fees, but denied the award of actual and exemplary damages for lack of sufficient factual and legal basis. After their motion for reconsideration was denied by the CA, petitioner filed the present petition raising this lone issue: DID THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMIT SERIOUS, GRAVE AND PATENT ERRORS, AS WELL AS GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE NLRC, THEREBY AWARDING RESPONDENT FULL DISABILITY BENEFITS AND OTHER MONEY CLAIMS DESPITE CLEAR NON-ENTITLEMENT THERETO, CONTRARY TO THE RELEVANT LAW, RULE AND JURISPRUDENCE? [21] Petitioners assert that the CA's decision militates against the provisions of the POEA-SEC and recent jurisprudence on maritime compensation cases. [22] It contends that the failure of Briones to comply with the mandatory provision of the POEA-SEC on third-doctor referral made her claim for total permanent disability premature and rendered the fit-to work findings of Dr. Celino, the company-designated physician, as prevailing and uncontested. The said mandatory procedure under Section 20(A)(3) of the POEA-SEC is supposed to be an extrajudicial measure premised on the timely contest of the company-designated physician's final disability assessment through the presentation of a contrary second medical opinion before the institution of any complaint for disability benefits. It argued that unlike Dr. Magtira's medical certificate, which was only presented during the submission of position papers before the Labor Arbiter, Dr. Celino's final assessment was amply supported by diagnosis and hence, a valid and definite assessment of the fit-to-work condition of Briones Petitioners, thus, conclude that Briones is not entitled to disability benefi1s because she breached her contractual duties under the conflict resolution provision of the POEA-SEC. [23] Sought for comment to the present petition, Briones contends that the CA was correct in reversing the decision of the NLRC. She argued that the medical report of Dr. Celino is vague and not responsive as to her true medical condition, since it failed to categorically state her fitness to resume her duties as seafarer. Briones points out that although she was cleared from the orthopedic standpoint, the report cannot be considered as a final disability rating as she was still required to undergo fifteen (15) sessions of physical therapy and treatment. She insists that the company-designated physician's assessment on the seafarer's fitness to work or permanent disability must be definite. If the company-designated physician failed to issue a definite assessment and the seafarer's medical condition remains unresolved, the latter shall be deemed totally and permanently disabled. In the absence of a definite and accurate assessment by the company-designated physician, Briones claims that the provision in POEA-SEC on the appointment of a th
G.R. No. 229179 - BENHUR SHIPPING CORPORATION/SUN MARINE SHIPPING S.A. AND EDGAR B. BRUSELAS, VS. ALEX PEÑAREDONDA RIEGO.D E C I S I O N - Supreme Court E-Library
G.R. No. 229179 -
CaseG.R. No. 239190 - RAUL D. BITCO, VS. CROSS WORLD MARINE SERVICES, INC., KAPAL (CYPRUS) LTD. AND/OR ELEAZAR G. DIAZ.D E C I S I O N - Supreme Court E-Library
G.R. No. 239190 -
CaseG.R. No. 203539 - FLORENCIO B. DESTRIZA, VS. FAIR SHIPPING CORPORATION, ANGEL C. CACHAPERO, AND/OR BOSELINE S.A..
G.R. No. 203539 -