G.R. No. 192050 - NELSON VALLENO Y LUCITO, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. D E C I S I O N - Supreme Court E-Library

Ruling

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt for illegal possession of methamphetamine Hydrochloride or shabu , a dangerous drug, defined and penalized under Sec. 11(1)(1), Art. II of R.A. 9165, otherwise known as The Comprehensive Drugs Act of 2002, and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of Four Hundred Thousand pesos (P400,000.00). The bail bond posted for the provisional liberty of the accused is hereby CANCELLED. [21] In convicting petitioner, the trial court lent credence to the straightforward testimonies of the police officers over the mere denial of the accused. The trial court ruled that the chain of custody over the illegal drugs seized was properly established. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed petitioners conviction on 29 October 2009 and denied petitioners motion for reconsideration on 13 April 2010. Petitioner now seeks relief before this Court via a petition for review. On 11 August 2010, this Court treated the petition as a notice of appeal and required the parties to file their respective supplemental briefs, if they so desire, within thirty days from notice. [22] The Office of the Solicitor General manifested that it would no longer file a supplemental brief. [23] Petitioner filed his supplemental brief and harped on the inconsistencies of the testimonies of prosecution witnesses. In his petition for review, petitioner ascribes upon the Court of Appeals the following errors: (A) THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE PROSECUTION WAS NOT ABLE TO DISCHARGE ITS BURDEN OF PROVING BY PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT THAT PETITIONER HAS COMMITTED THE CRIME OF VIOLATION OF SECTION 11, ARTICLE II OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165. (B) THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN INTERPRETING THAT THE REQUIREMENTS PROVIDED FOR UNDER SECTION 21 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165 ARE NOT MANDATORY AND THAT NON-COMPLIANCE THEREOF IS NOT FATAL TO THE CAUSE OF THE PROSECUTION. (C) THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE ALLEGED PROHIBITED DRUGS SUBJECT OF THE CASE WERE A PRODUCT OF AN IRREGULAR SEARCH AND SEIZURE. [24] The primordial issue here, as in any criminal case, is whether the guilt of the accused has been established beyond reasonable doubt. It is hornbook doctrine that the factual findings of the appellate court affirming those of the trial court are binding on this Court unless there is a clear showing that such findings are tainted with arbitrariness, capriciousness or palpable error. [25] After an exhaustive review of the records of this case, we see no sufficient reason for resort to the exception to the rule. In order for prosecution for illegal possession of a dangerous drug to prosper, there must be proof that (1) the accused was in possession of an item or an object identified to be a prohibited or regulated drug, (2) such possession is not authorized by law, and (3) the accused was freely and consciously aware of being in possession of