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JurisprudenceG.R. No. 157553 -

G.R. No. 157553 - AUTOCORP GROUP AND AUTOGRAPHICS, INC., VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND KEPPEL MONTE BANK (FORMERLY PROMULGATED: MONTE DE PIEDAD AND SAVINGS BANK).DECISION - Supreme Court E-Library

Cited Laws

RA 250RA 450
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TL;DR — Ruling

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the court hereby grants the preliminary injunction and let a writ issue after the plaintiffs shall have put up a bond of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND ( P 100,000.00) Pesos conditioned that the applicant will pay the adverse party of all damages which it may sustain by reason of the injunction if the court will finally decide that the applicant is not entitled thereto.

Decision

Ruling

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the court hereby grants the preliminary injunction and let a writ issue after the plaintiffs shall have put up a bond of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND ( P 100,000.00) Pesos conditioned that the applicant will pay the adverse party of all damages which it may sustain by reason of the injunction if the court will finally decide that the applicant is not entitled thereto. Consequently, the Office of the Register of Deeds, Cebu City is enjoined not to register the Certificate of Sale, dated January 7, 1999, and likewise defendant Monte de Piedad is directed not to take possession or do any act related thereto on the properties subject of said Certificate of [S]ale until further orders from this court. [25] Respondent banks motion for reconsideration was denied in an Order dated March 9, 1999. [26] On May 29, 2000, respondent bank filed a petition for certiorari [27] under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the Court of Appeals, seeking to annul the orders of the trial court dated February 15, 1999 and March 9, 1999. Respondent bank contended that the entry of the certificate of sale in the primary entry book on January 21, 1999 was equivalent to registration. Hence, the TRO dated January 25, 1999 and the preliminary injunction dated February 15, 1999, were issued with grave abuse of discretion, the registration of the certificate of sale having already become fait accompli at the time. Respondent bank also faulted the part of the order prohibiting petitioner from taking possession of the properties as it has not even filed a petition for a writ of possession at the time as required by Section 7 of Act No. 3135. On August 16, 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered its first assailed decision, [28] annulling and setting aside the trial courts February 15, 1999 Order and April 28, 2000 Resolution. It held that the entry of the certificate of sale in the primary entry book was equivalent to registration, citing Section 56 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529, also known as the Property Registration Decree, and the case of DBP vs. Acting Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija. [29] The Court of Appeals held that the failure of respondent bank to pay the entry and registration fees, on the same day that the sheriffs certificate of sale was presented and entered in the primary entry book, was not respondents fault but due to the absence of the cashier. In any case, it ruled that the payment by respondent bank the following day cured the defect. The Court of Appeals also found as premature the injunction to stop respondent bank from taking possession of the properties. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated March 17, 2003. [30] Hence, this petition where petitioners raise the following issues: I ARE THE QUESTIONED DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS AND ITS RESOLUTION DATED AUGUST 16, 2002 AND MARCH 17, 2003 IN CA-G.R. SP. NO. 59004 IN ACCORD WITH THE LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE THER