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JurisprudenceG.R. No. 110226 -

G.R. No. 110226 -

Cited Laws

RA 56RA 6715RA 28RA 513RA 6715,RA 361RA 269RA 651RA 735RA 629RA 129
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Decision

Ruling

Accordingly, violations of a Collective Bargaining Agreement, except those which are gross in character, shall no longer be treated as unfair labor practice and shall be resolved as grievances under the Collective Bargaining Agreement. For purposes of this article, gross violations of Collective Bargaining Agreement shall mean flagrant and/or malicious refusal to comply with the economic provisions of such agreement. x x x. (Underscoring supplied) ART. 262. Jurisdiction over other labor disputes. - The Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators, upon agreement of the parties, shall also hear and decide all other labor disputes including unfair labor practices and bargaining deadlocks. With the amendments introduced by RA 6715, it can be gleaned that the Labor Arbiter still retains jurisdiction over ULP cases. There is, however, a significant change: The unqualified jurisdiction conferred upon the Labor Arbiter prior to the amendment by RA 6715 has been narrowed down so that violations of a Collective Bargaining Agreement, except those which are gross in character, shall no longer be treated as unfair labor practice but as grievances under the Collective Bargaining Agreement. It is further stated that gross violations of Collective Bargaining Agreement shall mean flagrant and/or malicious refusal to comply with the economic provisions of such agreement. Hence, for a ULP case to be cognizable by the Labor Arbiter, and the NLRC to exercise its appellate jurisdiction, the allegations in the complaint should show prima facie the concurrence of two things, namely: (1) gross violation of the CBA; AND (2) the violation pertains to the economic provisions of the CBA. In several instances prior to the instant case, the Court already made its pronouncement that RA 6715 is in the nature of a curative statute. As such, we declared that it can be applied retroactively to pending cases. Thus, in Briad Agro Development Corporation v. Dela Cerna, [13] we held: Republic Act No. 6715, like its predecessors, Executive Order No. 111 and Article 217, as amended, has retroactive application. Thus, when this new law divested Regional Directors of the power to hear money claims, the divestment affected pending litigations. It also affected this particular case. (Note that under par. 6, where the claim does not exceed P5,000.00, regional directors have jurisdiction). In Garcia v. Martinez, we categorically held that amendments relative to the jurisdiction of labor arbiters (under Presidential Decree No. 1367, divesting the labor arbiter of jurisdiction) partake of the nature of curative statutes, thus: It now appears that at the time this case was decided the lower court had jurisdiction over Velascos complaint although at the time it was filed said court was not clothed with such jurisdiction. The lack of jurisdiction was cured by the issuance of the amendatory decree which is in the nature of a curative statute with retrospective application to a pen