G.R. No. 147723 - PRESIDENTIAL AD HOC FACT- FINDING COMMITTEE ON BEHEST LOANS AND/OR PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG), VS. HON. ANIANO DESIERTO, ALICIA LL. REYES, LOURDES M. MONTENEGRO, SERAFIN M. MONTENEGRO, BASILIO LIRAG AND FELIX LIRAG.D E C I S I O N - Supreme Court E-Library

Ruling

accordingly, the subsequent loans were not really in the nature or character of loans, much less "behest loans," but transactions necessary to infuse fresh capital into the newly acquired Midland Cement already being managed by DBP. [41] Reyes, for her part, defends these findings of the Ombudsman and reiterates her claim that she had joined DBP long after the initial loan was procured and also after the bank had taken over Midland Cement. Additionally, she argues that prescription has already barred the prosecution of the imputed offenses. [42] Our jurisprudence governing the prosecution of behest loan cases reveals two entrenched principles: first, that the prescription of the crime for violation of R.A. No. 3019 is reckoned from not from the time of the commission of the offense but from the time of the discovery of the commission [43] and second, that the Ombudsman has discretion to determine whether a criminal case, given its facts and circumstances, should be filed or not, with the Court adopting a policy of non-interference in the Ombudsman's exercise of his investigating and prosecutory powers absent good and compelling reasons. [44] That first principle is beyond contention in this case, even as Reyes offers a minimal effort to assert that the offense has already prescribed. She concedes that prescription is reckoned from the time of the discovery of the offense, but argues that there was "clear and indubitable proof that discovery of the alleged behest loans was made, at the latest, on February 27, 1987, when the Republic and the [DBP] entered into a Deed of Transfer whereby DBP ceded to the Government its assets," [45] including Midland Cement. Thus, she believes that the ten (10)-year prescriptive period should run from the date of execution of the deed of transfer and that accordingly, the period expired more than a year before the filing of the charges on 11 March 1998. Considering that Midland Cement was merely one of the 283 non-performing accounts transferred by DBP to the Republic through the 1987 Deed of Transfer, it is difficult to elicit that the execution of the said deed ipso facto bears the imputed anomalous history of transactions between the bank and the corporation. Given the facts, the more reasonable conclusion as to when the offense was discovered would be anywhere within the period following the constitution of the Ad Hoc Committee on 8 October 1992 through Administrative Order No. 13. After all, it is this committee that engaged itself in the thorough examination on which the charges are based. Absent any more definitive proof that the alleged anomalous transactions have been uncovered at an earlier date, there is no basis for us to conclude that the discovery was made prior to 8 October 1992. Nonetheless, the question of prescription is ultimately immaterial to the case at bar. The Ombudsman has concluded that the filing of the criminal charges was not warranted, and following the second principle that governs the