Cited Laws
Accordingly, the judicial claim of Aichi , which was simultaneously filed with its administrative claim, was found to be premature. The Court held: In fact, applying the two-year period to judicial claims would render nugatory Section 112(D) [now Section 112 (C)] of the NIRC, which already provides for a specific period within which a taxpayer should appeal the decision or inaction of the CIR. The second paragraph of Section 112(D) [now Section 112 (C)] of the NIRC envisions two scenarios: (1) when a decision is issued by the CIR before the lapse of the 120-day period; and (2) when no decision is made after the 120-day period. In both instances, the taxpayer has 30 days within which to file an appeal with the CTA. As we see it then, the 120-day period is crucial in filing an appeal with the CTA . [35] (Emphasis supplied) The taxpayer will always have 30 days to file the judicial claim even if the Commissioner acts only on the 120 th day, or does not act at all during the 120-day period. With the 30-day period always available to the taxpayer, the taxpayer can no longer file a judicial claim for refund or tax credit of unutilized excess input VAT without waiting for the Commissioner to decide until the expiration of the 120-day period. [36] Failure to comply with the 120-day waiting period violates the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and renders the petition premature and thus without a cause of action, with the effect that the CTA does not acquire jurisdiction over the taxpayers petition. [37] San Roque case provides exception to the strict compliance with the 120-day period While the Court En Banc reiterated in the recent consolidated cases of CIR v. San Roque Power Corporation (San Roque) , [38] promulgated on February 12, 2013, that the 120-day period is mandatory and jurisdictional, however, it categorically held that BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 dated December 10, 2003 provided a valid claim for equitable estoppel under Section 246 [39] of the Tax Code. BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 expressly states that the taxpayer-claimant need not wait for the lapse of the 120-day period before it could seek judicial relief with the CTA by way of Petition for Review. [40] Speaking through Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio, the Court ratiocinated as follows: There is no dispute that the 120-day period is mandatory and jurisdictional, and that the CTA does not acquire jurisdiction over a judicial claim that is filed before the expiration of the 120-day period. There are, however, two exceptions to this rule. The first exception is if the Commissioner, through a specific ruling, misleads a particular taxpayer to prematurely file a judicial claim with the CTA. Such specific ruling is applicable only to such particular taxpayer. The second exception is where the Commissioner, through a general interpretative rule issued under Section 4 of the Tax Code, misleads all taxpayers into filing prematurely judicial claims with the CTA. In these cases, t