A.C. No. 8962 - JILDO A. GUBATON, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. AUGUSTUS SERAFIN D. AMADOR.D E C I S I O N - Supreme Court E-Library

Ruling

Accordingly, the hearsay rule does not apply, and hence, the statements are admissible as evidence. [25] Verily, complainant personally attests that the information about the illicit affair between respondent and his wife have been relayed to him by complainant's house helper and Bernadette's clinic secretary. Clearly, the making of such statements is circumstantially relevant to this case and therefore, may be considered in evidence against respondent. Besides, in Re: Verified Complaint dated July 13, 2015 of Umali, Jr. v. Hernandez: [26] The relaxation of the hearsay rule in disciplinary administrative proceedings against judges and justices where bribery proceedings are involved is not a novel thought in this Court; it has been advocated in the Separate Concurring Opinion of Justice Arturo D. Brion in the administrative case of Justice Ong before this Court. The Opinion essentially maintained that the Court could make a conclusion that bribery had taken place when the circumstances including those derived from hearsay evidence sufficiently prove its occurrence. It was emphasized that [t]o satisfy the substantial evidence requirement for administrative cases, hearsay evidence should necessarily be supplemented and corroborated by other evidence that are not hearsay . [27] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Given that the purported hearsay are supplemented and corroborated by other evidence that are not hearsay, the Court finds no cogent reason not to apply the same pronouncement to this particular case. For his part, respondent only proffered a bare denial of the imputed affair. He insists that he was merely acquainted with Bernadette and that they would only see each other during social gatherings or by pure accident. The thrust of his denial was that, although they would see each other on occasion, such meetings were innocent, as in instances when she gave him a short ride from his office to the trial court, the times when he visited her dental clinic for a procedure and during its anniversary celebration, and when he "bumped" into her at a department store and she apologized to him for her husband's jealousy. [28] Suffice it to say that "[d]enial is an intrinsically weak defense. To merit credibility, it must be buttressed by strong evidence of non-culpability. If unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence [as in this case] it is negative and self-serving, deserving no greater value than the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters." [29] In any event, the Court observes that the alleged "accidental" and "innocent" encounters of respondent and Bernadette are much too many for comfort and coincidence. Such encounters actually buttress the allegations of the witnesses that they carried on an illicit affair. All told, the Court finds that substantial evidence which only entail "evidence to support a conclusion, even if other minds, equally reasonable, might conceivably opine otherwise" exist to prove co