REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, VS. HON. MAMINDIARA P. MANGOTARA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 1, ILIGAN CITY, LANAO DEL NORTE, AND MARIA CRISTINA FERTILIZER CORPORATION, AND THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK

Supreme Court E-Library Information At Your Fingertips HOME PHILIPPINE REPORTS E-BOOKS REPUBLIC ACTS CHIEF JUSTICES NEWS & ADVISORIES SITE MAP ABOUT US The Supreme Court E-Library The E-Library Development Team Toggle posts A A+ CLICK THE IMAGE TO SEARCH CONTACT: Supreme Court of the Philippines Library Services, Padre Faura, Ermita, Manila, Philippines 1000 (632) 8524-2706 libraryservices.sc@judiciary.gov.ph Foreign Supreme Courts Korea, South Malaysia Singapore United States of America View printer friendly version 638 Phil. 353 FIRST DIVISION [ G.R. No. 170375, July 07, 2010 ] REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. HON. MAMINDIARA P. MANGOTARA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 1, ILIGAN CITY, LANAO DEL NORTE, AND MARIA CRISTINA FERTILIZER CORPORATION, AND THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, RESPONDENTS, [G.R. NO. 170505] LAND TRADE REALTY CORPORATION,PETITIONER, VS. NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION AND NATIONAL TRANSMISSION CORPORATION (TRANSCO), RESPONDENTS, [G.R. NOS. 173355-56] NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS (SPECIAL TWENTY-THIRD DIVISION, CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY), AND LAND TRADE REALTY CORPORATION, RESPONDENTS, [G.R. NO. 173401] REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,PETITIONER, VS. DEMETRIA CACHO, REPRESENTED BY ALLEGED HEIRS DEMETRIA CONFESOR VIDAL AND/OR TEOFILO CACHO, AZIMUTH INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION AND LAND TRADE REALTY CORPORATION, RESPONDENTS. [G.R. NOS. 173563-64] NATIONAL TRANSMISSION CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS (SPECIAL TWENTY-THIRD DIVISION, CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY), AND LAND TRADE REALTY CORPORATION AS REPRESENTED BY ATTY. MAX C. TABIMINA, RESPONDENTS, [G.R. NO. 178779] LAND TRADE REALTY CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. DEMETRIA CONFESOR VIDAL AND AZIMUTH INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, RESPONDENTS, [G.R. NO. 178894] TEOFILO CACHO AND/OR ATTY. GODOFREDO CABILDO,PETITIONER, VS. DEMETRIA CONFESOR VIDAL AND AZIMUTH INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, RESPONDENTS. D E C I S I O N LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.: Before the Court are seven consolidated Petitions for Review on Certiorari and a Petition for Certiorari under Rules 45 and 65 of the Rules of Court, respectively, arising from actions for quieting of title, expropriation, ejectment, and reversion, which all involve the same parcels of land. In G.R. No. 170375 , the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), by way of consolidated Petitions for Review on Certiorari and for Certiorari under Rules 45 and 65 of the Rules of Court, respectively, seeks to set aside the issuances of Judge Mamindiara P. Mangotara (Judge Mangotara) of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1 (RTC-Branch 1) of Iligan City, Lanao del Norte, in Civil Case No. 106, particularly, the: (1) Resolution dated July 12, 2005 which, in part, dismissed the Complaint for Expropriation of the Republic for the latter's failure to implead indispensable parties and forum shopping; and (2) Resolution dated October 24, 2005, which denied the Partial Motion for Reconsideration of the Republic. G.R. Nos. 178779 and 178894 are two Petitions for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, where Landtrade Realty Corporation (LANDTRADE), Teofilo Cacho, and/or Atty. Godofredo Cabildo assail the Decision dated January 19, 2007 and Resolution dated July 4, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 00456. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision dated July 17, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3 (RTC-Branch 3) of Iligan City, Lanao del Norte, in Civil Case No. 4452, granting the Petition for Quieting of Title, Injunction and Damages filed by Demetria Vidal and Azimuth International Development Corporation (AZIMUTH) against Teofilo Cacho and Atty. Godofredo Cabildo. G.R. No. 170505 is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court in which LANDTRADE urges the Court to reverse and set aside the Decision dated November 23, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 85714 and 85841. The appellate court annulled several issuances of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 5 (RTC-Branch 5) of Iligan City, Lanao del Norte, and its sheriff, in Civil Case No. 6613, specifically, the: (1) Order dated August 9, 2004 granting the Motion for Execution Pending Appeal of LANDTRADE; (2) Writ of Execution dated August 10, 2004; (3) two Notices of Garnishment both dated August 11, 2004, and (4) Notification [10] dated August 11, 2004. These issuances of the RTC-Branch 5 allowed and/or enabled execution pending appeal of the Decision [11] dated February 17, 2004 of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 2 of Iligan City, Lanao del Norte, favoring LANDTRADE in Civil Case No. 11475-AF, the ejectment case said corporation instituted against the National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) and the National Transmission Corporation (TRANSCO). G.R. Nos. 173355-56 and 173563-64 are two Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with prayer for the immediate issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction filed separately by NAPOCOR and TRANSCO. Both Petitions seek to annul the Resolution [12] dated June 30, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in the consolidated cases of CA-G.R. SP Nos. 00854 and 00889, which (1) granted the Omnibus Motion of LANDTRADE for the issuance of a writ of execution and the designation of a special sheriff for the enforcement of the Decision [13] dated December 12, 2005 of the RTC-Branch 1 in Civil Case No. 6613, and (2) denied the applications of NAPOCOR and TRANSCO for a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the execution of the same RTC Decision. The Decision dated December 12, 2005 of RTC-Branch 1 in Civil Case No. 6613 affirmed the Decision dated February 17, 2004 of the MTCC in Civil Case No. 11475-AF, favoring LANDTRADE. G.R. No. 173401 involves a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by the Republic, which raises pure questions of law and seeks the reversal of the following issuances of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 4 (RTC-Branch 4) of Iligan City, Lanao del Norte, in Civil Case No. 6686, an action for cancellation of titles and reversion: (1) Order [14] dated December 13, 2005 dismissing the Complaint in Civil Case No. 6686; and (2) Order [15] dated May 16, 2006, denying the Motion for Reconsideration of the Republic. I THE PRECEDING CASES The consolidated seven cases have for their common genesis the 1914 case of Cacho v. Government of the United States [16] 1914 Cacho case The 1914 Cacho Case Sometime in the early 1900s, the late Doña Demetria Cacho (Doña Demetria) applied for the registration of two parcels of land : (1) Lot 1 of Plan II-3732, the smaller parcel with an area of 3,635 square meters or 0.36 hectares (Lot 1); and (2) Lot 2 of Plan II-3732, the larger parcel with an area of 378,707 square meters or 37.87 hectares (Lot 2). Both parcels are situated in what was then the Municipality of Iligan, Moro Province, which later became Sitio Nunucan, then Brgy. Suarez, in Iligan City, Lanao del Norte. Doña Demetria's applications for registration were docketed as GLRO Record Nos. 6908 and 6909. The application in GLRO Record No. 6908 covered Lot , the smaller parcel of land. Doña Demetria allegedly acquired Lot 1 by purchase from Gabriel Salzos (Salzos). Salzos, in turn, bought Lot 1 from Datto Darondon and his wife Alanga, evidenced by a deed of sale in favor of Salzos signed solely by Alanga, on behalf of Datto Darondon. The application in GLRO Record No. 6909 involved Lot , the bigger parcel of land. Doña Demetria purportedly purchased Lot 2 from Datto Bunglay. Datto Bunglay claimed to have inherited Lot 2 from his uncle, Datto Anandog, who died without issue. Only the Government opposed Doña Demetria's applications for registration on the ground that the two parcels of land were the property of the United States and formed part of a military reservation, generally known as Camp Overton. On December 10, 1912, the land registration court (LRC) rendered its Decision in GLRO Record Nos. 6908 and 6909. Based on the evidence, the LRC made the following findings in GLRO Record No. 6908 th . The court is convinced from the proofs that the small parcel of land sold by the Moro woman Alanga was the home of herself and her husband, Darondon, and was their conjugal property; and the court so finds. x x x x As we have seen, the deed on which applicant's title to the small parcel rests, is executed only by the Moro woman Alanga, wife of Datto Darondon, which is not permitted either by the Moro laws or the Civil Code of the Philippine Islands. It appears that the husband of Alanga, Datto Darondon, is alive yet, and before admitting this parcel to registration it is ordered that a deed from Datto Darondon, husband of Alanga, be presented, renouncing all his rights in the small parcel of land object of Case No. 6908, in favor of the applicant [17] (Emphases supplied.) In GLRO Record No. 6909 , the LRC observed and concluded that: A tract of land 37 hectares in area, which is the extent of the land under discussion, is larger than is cultivated ordinarily by the Christian Filipinos. In the Zamboanga cadastral case of thousands of parcels now on trial before this court, the average size of the parcels is not above 3 or 4 hectares, and the court doubts very much if a Moro with all his family could cultivate as extensive a parcel of land as the one in question. x x x x x x x The court is also convinced from the proofs that the small portion in the southern part of the larger parcel , where, according to the proofs, Datto Anandog had his house and where there still exist some cocos and fruit trees, was the home of the said Moro Datto Anandog ; and the court so finds. As to the rest of the large parcel the court does not find the title of Datto Bunglay established . According to his own declaration his residence on this land commenced only a few days before the sale. He admitted that the coco trees he is supposed to have planted had not yet begun to bear fruit at the time of the sale, and were very small. Datto Duroc positively denies that Bunglay lived on the land, and it clearly appears that he was not on the land when it was first occupied by the military. Nor does Datto Bunglay claim to have planted the three mango trees by the roadside near point 25 of the plan. The court believes that all the rest of this parcel, not occupied nor cultivated by Datto Anandog, was land claimed by Datto Duroc and also by Datto Anandog and possibly by other dattos as a part of their general jurisdiction, and that it is the class of land that Act No. 718 prohibits the sale of, by the dattos, without the express approval of the Government. It is also found that Datto Bunglay is the nephew of Dato Anandog, and that the Moro woman Alanga, grantor of the small parcel, is the sister of Datto Anandog, and that he died without issue. x x x x It appears also that according to the provisions of the Civil Code as also the provisions of the `Luwaran Code' of the Moros, the Moro woman Alanga has an interest in the portion of land left by her deceased brother, Datto Anandog. By article LXXXV, section 3, of the `Luwaran Code,' it will be seen that the brothers and sisters of a deceased Moro inherit his property to the exclusion of the more distant relatives. Therefore Datto Bunglay had no legal interest whatever in the land to sell to the applicant, Doña Demetria Cacho. But the Moro woman, Alanga, having appeared as a witness for the applicant without having made any claim to the land, the court finds from this fact that she has ratified the sale made by her nephew. The court therefore finds that the applicant Doña Demetria Cacho is owner of the portion of land occupied and planted by the deceased Datto Anandog in the southern part of the large parcel object of expediente No. 6909 only; and her application as to all the rest of the land solicited in said case is denied. And it is ordered that a new survey of the land be made and a corrected plan be presented, excluding all the land not occupied and cultivated by Datto Anandog; that said survey be made and the corrected plan presented on or before the 30 th day of March, 1913, with previous notice to the commanding general of the Division of the Philippines On the 8 th day of December, the court was at Camp Overton and had another ocular inspection of the land for the purpose of fixing the limits of the part cultivated by Datto Anandog, so often mentioned herein, with previous notice to the applicant and her husband and representative, Señor Dionisio Vidal. Having arrived late, Señor Vidal did not assist in the ocular inspection, which was fixed for 3 o'clock, p.m. of the day mentioned. But the court, nevertheless, set stakes marking the N.E., S.E., and S.W. corners of the land found to have been cultivated by the deceased Anandog. The N.E. limit of said land is a brook, and the N.W. corner is the point where the brook intersects the shore line of the sea, the other corners mentioned being marked with pine stakes. And it is ordered that the new survey be made in accordance with the points mentioned, by tracing four straight lines connecting these four points. Between the portion cultivated by Datto Anandog and the mouth of the River Agus there is a high steep hill and the court does not believe it possible to cultivate said hill, it being covered with rocks and forest. [18] (Emphases supplied.) The LRC additionally decreed at the end of its December 10, 1912 Decision: It is further ordered that one-half of the costs of the new survey be paid by the applicant and the other half by the Government of the United States, and that the applicant present the corresponding deed from Datto Darondon on or before the above-mentioned 30 th day of March, 1913. Final decision in these cases is reserved until the presentation of the said deed and the new plan. [19] Apparently dissatisfied with the foregoing LRC judgment, Doña Demetria appealed to this Court. In its Decision dated December 10, 1914, the Court affirmed in toto the LRC Decision of December 10, 1912, well satisfied that the findings of fact of the court below were fully sustained by the evidence adduced during trial. Eighty-three years later, in 1997, the Court was again called upon to settle a matter concerning the registration of Lots 1 and 2 in the case of Cacho v. Court of Appeals [20] 1997 Cacho case The 1997 Cacho Case On June 29, 1978, Teofilo Cacho (Teofilo), claiming to be the late Doña Demetria's son and sole heir, filed before the RTC a petition for reconstitution of two original certificates of title (OCTs), docketed under the original GLRO Record Nos. 6908 and 6909. Teofilo's petition was opposed by the Republic, National Steel Corporation (NSC), and the City of Iligan. Acting on the motion for judgment on demurrer to evidence filed by the Republic and NSC, the RTC initially dismissed Teofilo's petition for reconstitution of titles because there was inadequate evidence to show the prior existence of the titles sought to be restored. According to the RTC, the proper remedy was a petition for the reconstitution of decrees since "it is undisputed that in Cases No. 6908 and 6909, Decrees No. 10364 and 18969, respectively, were issued." Teofilo sought leave of court for the filing and admission of his amended petition, but the RTC refused. When elevated to this Court in Cacho v. Mangotara , docketed as G.R. No. 85495, the Court resolved to remand the case to the RTC, with an order to the said trial court to accept Teofilo's amended petition and to hear it as one for re-issuance of decrees. In opposing Teofilo's petition, the Republic and NSC argued that the same suffered from jurisdictional infirmities; that Teofilo was not the real party-in-interest; that Teofilo was guilty of laches; that Doña Demetria was not the registered owner of the subject parcels of land; that no decrees were ever issued in Doña Demetria's name; and that the issuance of the decrees was dubious and irregular. After trial, on June 9, 1993, the RTC rendered its Decision granting Teofilo's petition and ordering the reconstitution and re-issuance of Decree Nos. 10364 and 18969. The RTC held that the issuance of Decree No. 10364 in GLRO No. 6908 on May 9, 1913 and Decree No. 18969 in GLRO Record No. 6909 on July 8, 1915 was sufficiently established by the certifications and testimonies of concerned officials. The original issuance of these decrees presupposed a prior judgment that had become final. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC Decision dated June 9, 1993 and dismissed the petition for re-issuance of Decree Nos. 10364 and 18969 because: (1) re-issuance of Decree No. 18969 in GLRO Record No. 6909 could not be made in the absence of the new survey ordered by this Court in the 1914 Cacho case ; (2) the heir of a registered owner may lose his right to recover possession of the property and title thereto by laches; and (3) Teofilo failed to establish his identity and existence and that he was a real party-in-interest. Teofilo then sought recourse from this Court in the 1997 Cacho case . The Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstated the decision of the RTC approving the re-issuance of Decree Nos. 10364 and 18969. The Court found that such decrees had in fact been issued and had attained finality, as certified by the Acting Commissioner, Deputy Clerk of Court III, Geodetic Engineer, and Chief of Registration of the then Land Registration Commission, now National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration (NALTDRA). The Court further reasoned that: [T]o sustain the Court of Appeals ruling as regards requiring petitioners to fulfill the conditions set forth in Cacho vs. U.S. would constitute a derogation of the doctrine of res judicata . Significantly, the issuance of the subject decrees presupposes a prior final judgment because the issuance of such decrees is a mere ministerial act on part of the Land Registration Commission (now the NALTDRA), upon presentation of a final judgment. It is also worth noting that the judgment in Cacho vs. U.S. could not have acquired finality without the prior fulfillment of the conditions in GLRO Record No. 6908, the presentation of the corresponding deed of sale from Datto Dorondon on or before March 30, 1913 (upon which Decree No. 10364 was issued on May 9, 1913); and in GLRO Record No. 6909, the presentation of a new survey per decision of Judge Jorge on December 10, 1912 and affirmed by this Court on December 10, 1914 (upon which Decree No. 18969 was issued on July 8, 1915). Requiring the submission of a new plan as a condition for the re-issuance of the decree would render the finality attained by the Cacho vs. U.S. case nugatory, thus, violating the fundamental rule regarding res judicata . It must be stressed that the judgment and the resulting decree are res judicata , and these are binding upon the whole world, the proceedings being in the nature of proceedings in rem . Besides, such a requirement is an impermissible assault upon the integrity and stability of the Torrens System of registration because it also effectively renders the decree inconclusive. [21] As to the issue of laches, the Court referred to the settled doctrine that laches cannot bar the issuance of a decree. A final decision in land registration cases can neither be rendered inefficacious by the statute of limitations nor by laches. Anent the issue of the identity and existence of Teofilo and he being a real party-in-interest, the Court found that these were sufficiently established by the records. The Court relied on Teofilo's Affidavit of Adjudication as Doña Demetria's sole heir, which he executed before the Philippine Consulate General in Chicago, United States of America (U.S.A.); as well as the publication in the Times Journal of the fact of adjudication of Doña Demetria's estate. Teofilo also appeared personally before the Vice Consul of the Philippine Consulate General in Chicago to execute a Special Power of Attorney in favor of Atty. Godofredo Cabildo (Atty. Cabildo) who represented him in this case. The Court stressed that the execution of public documents is entitled to the presumption of regularity and proof is required to assail and controvert the same. In the Resolution dated July 28, 1997, [22] the Court denied the Motions for Reconsideration of the Republic and NSC. As a result of the 1997 Cacho case , the decrees of registration were re-issued bearing new numbers and OCTs were issued for the two parcels of land in Doña Demetria's name. OCT No. 0-1200 (a.f.) was based on re-issued Decree No. N-219464 in GLRO Record No. 6908, while OCT No. 0-1201 (a.f.) was based on re-issued Decree No. N-219465 in GLRO Record No. 6909. II THE ANTECENT FACTS OF THE PETITIONS AT BAR The dispute over Lots 1 and 2 did not end with the termination of the 1997 Cacho case . Another four cases involving the same parcels of land were instituted before the trial courts during and after the pendency of the 1997 Cacho case . These cases are: (1) the Expropriation Case, G.R. No. 170375; (2) the Quieting of Title Case, G.R. Nos. 178779 and 178894; (3) the Ejectment or Unlawful Detainer Case, G.R. No. 170505 (execution pending appeal before the RTC) and G.R. Nos. 173355-56 and 173563-64 (execution pending appeal before the Court of Appeals); and (4) the Cancellation of Titles and Reversion Case, G.R. No. 173401. These cases proceeded independently of each other in the courts a quo until they reached this Court via the present Petitions. In the Resolution [23] dated October 3, 2007, the Court consolidated the seven Petitions considering that they either originated from the same case or involved similar issues. Expropriation Case (G.R. No. 170375) The Complaint for Expropriation was originally filed on August 15, 1983 by the Iron and Steel Authority (ISA), now the NSC, against Maria Cristina Fertilizer Corporation (MCFC), and the latter's mortgagee, the Philippine National Bank (PNB). The Complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 106 and raffled to RTC-Branch 1, presided over by Judge Mangotara. ISA was created pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 2729 [24] dated August 9, 1973, to strengthen, develop, and promote the iron and steel industry in the Philippines. Its existence was extended until October 10, 1988. On November 16, 1982, during the existence of ISA, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Proclamation No. 2239, [25] reserving in favor of ISA a parcel of land in Iligan City, measuring 302,532 square meters or 30.25 hectares, to be devoted to the integrated steel program of the Government. MCFC occupied certain portions of this parcel of land. When negotiations with MCFC failed, ISA was compelled to file a Complaint for Expropriation. When the statutory existence of ISA expired during the pendency of Civil Case No. 106, MCFC filed a Motion to Dismiss the case alleging the lack of capacity to sue of ISA. The RTC-Branch 1 granted the Motion to Dismiss in an Order dated November 9, 1988. ISA moved for reconsideration or, in the alternative, for the substitution of the Republic as plaintiff in Civil Case No. 106, but the motion was denied by RTC-Branch 1. The dismissal of Civil Case No. 106 was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, thus, ISA appealed to this Court. In Iron and Steel Authority v. Court of Appeals [26] (ISA case) , the Court remanded the case to RTC-Branch 1, which was ordered to allow the substitution of the Republic for ISA as plaintiff. Entry of Judgment was made in the ISA case on August 31, 1998. In an Order [27] dated November 16, 2001, the RTC-Branch 1 allowed the substitution of the Republic for ISA as plaintiff in Civil Case No. 106. Alleging that Lots 1 and 2 involved in the 1997 Cacho case encroached and overlapped the parcel of land subject of Civil Case No. 106, the Republic filed with the RTC-Branch 1 a Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Complaint dated October 7, 2004 and to Admit the Attached Supplemental Complaint dated September 28, 2004 [28] seeking to implead in Civil Case No. 106 Teofilo Cacho and Demetria Vidal and their respective successors-in-interest, LANDTRADE and AZIMUTH. MCFC opposed the Motion for leave to file and to admit the Supplemental Complaint on the ground that the Republic was without legal personality to file the same because ISA was the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 106. MCFC argued that the Republic failed to move for the execution of the decision in the ISA case within the prescriptive period of five years, hence, the only remedy left was for the Republic to file an independent action to revive the judgment. MCFC further pointed out that the unreasonable delay of more than six years of the Republic in seeking the substitution and continuation of the action for expropriation effectively barred any further proceedings therein on the ground of estoppel by laches In its Reply, the Republic referred to the Order dated November 16, 2001 of the RTC-Branch 1 allowing the substitution of the Republic for ISA. In an Order dated April 4, 2005, the RTC-Branch 1 denied the Motion of the Republic for leave to file and to admit its Supplemental Complaint. The RTC-Branch 1 agreed with MCFC that the Republic did not file any motion for execution of the judgment of this Court in the ISA case . Since no such motion for execution had been filed, the RTC-Branch 1 ruled that its Order dated November 16, 2001, which effected the substitution of the Republic for ISA as plaintiff in Civil Case No. 106, was an honest mistake. The Republic filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the April 4, 2005 Order of the RTC-Branch 1. MCFC then filed a Motion to Dismiss Civil Case No. 106 for: (1) failure of the Republic to implead indispensable parties because MCFC insisted it was not the owner of the parcels of land sought to be expropriated; and (2) forum shopping considering the institution by the Republic on October 13, 2004 of an action for the reversion of the same parcels subject of the instant case for expropriation. Judge Mangotara of RTC-Branch 1 issued a Resolution [29] on July 12, 2005, denying for lack of merit the Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated April 4, 2005 filed by the Republic, and granting the Motion to Dismiss Civil Case No. 106 filed by MCFC. Judge Mangotara justified the dismissal of the Expropriation Case thus: What the Republic seeks [herein] is the expropriation of the subject parcels of land. Since the exercise of the power of eminent domain involves the taking of private lands intended for public use upon payment of just compensation to the owner x x x, then a complaint for expropriation must, of necessity, be directed against the owner of the land subject thereof. In the case at bar, the decision of the Supreme Court in Cacho v. Government of the United States x x x, decreeing the registration of the subject parcels of land in the name of the late Doña Demetria Cacho has long attained finality and is conclusive as to the question of ownership thereof. Since MCFC, the only defendant left in this case, is not a proper party defendant in this complaint for expropriation, the present case should be dismissed. This Court notes that the Republic [has filed reversion proceedings] dated September 27, 2004, involving the same parcels of land, docketed as Case No. 6686 pending before the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Norte, Iligan City Branch 4. [The Republic], however, did not state such fact in its "Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping" attached to its Supplemental Complaint dated September 28, 2004. [It is therefore] guilty of forum shopping. Moreover, considering that in the Reversion case, [the Republic] asserts ownership over the subject parcels of land, it cannot be allowed to take an inconsistent position in this expropriation case without making a mockery of justice. [30] The Republic filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated July 12, 2005, insofar as it dismissed Civil Case No. 106, but said Motion was denied by Judge Mangatora in a Resolution [31] dated October 24, 2005. On January 16, 2006, the Republic filed with this Court the consolidated Petition for Review on Certiorari and Petition for Certiorari under Rules 45 and 65 of the Rules of Court, respectively, docketed as G.R. No. 170375. The Quieting of Title Case (G.R. Nos. 178779 and 178894) Demetria Vidal (Vidal) and AZIMUTH filed on November 18, 1998, a Petition [32] for Quieting of Title against Teofilo, Atty. Cabildo, and the Register of Deeds of Iligan City, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 4452 and raffled to RTC-Branch 3. In the Petition, Vidal claimed that she, and not Teofilo, was the late Doña Demetria's sole surviving heir, entitled to the parcels of land covered by OCT Nos. 0-1200 (a.f.) and 0-1201 (a.f.). She averred that she is the daughter of Francisco Cacho Vidal (Francisco) and Fidela Arellano Confesor. Francisco was the only child of Don Dionisio Vidal and Doña Demetria. AZIMUTH, for its part, filed the Petition as Vidal's successor-in-interest with respect to a 23-hectare portion of the subject parcels of land pursuant to the Memorandum of Agreement dated April 2, 1998 and Deed of Conditional Conveyance dated August 13, 2004, which Vidal executed in favor of AZIMUTH. Teofilo opposed the Petition contending that it stated no cause of action because there was no title being disturbed or in danger of being lost due to the claim of a third party, and Vidal had neither legal nor beneficial ownership of the parcels of land in question; that the matter and issues raised in the Petition had already been tried, heard, and decided by the RTC of Iligan City and affirmed with finality by this Court in the 1997 Cacho case ; and that the Petition was barred by the Statute of Limitations and laches. LANDTRADE, among other parties, was allowed by the RTC-Branch 3 to intervene in Civil Case No. 4452. LANDTRADE alleged that it is the owner of a portion of the subject parcels of land, measuring 270,255 square meters or about 27.03 hectares, which it purportedly acquired through a Deed of Absolute Sale dated October 1, 1996 from Teofilo, represented by Atty. Cabildo. LANDTRADE essentially argued that Vidal's right as heir should be adjudicated upon in a separate and independent proceeding and not in the instant Quieting of Title Case. During the pre-trial conference, the parties manifested that there was no possibility of any amicable settlement among them. Vidal and AZIMUTH submitted testimonial and documentary evidence during the trial before the RTC-Branch 3. Teofilo and Atty. Cabildo failed to present any evidence as they did not appear at all during the trial, while LANDTRADE was declared by the RTC-Branch 3 to have waived its right to present evidence on its defense and counterclaim. On July 17, 2004, the RTC-Branch 3 rendered its Decision [33] in Civil Case No. 4452 in favor of Vidal and AZIMUTH, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the petitioners and against the respondents and intervenors: 1) DECLARING: a.) Petitioner Demetria C. Vidal the sole surviving heir of the late Doña Demetria Cacho; b.) Petitioner Demetria C. Vidal alone has the hereditary right to and interest in the Subject Property; c.) Petitioner Azimuth International Development Corporation is the successor-in-interest of petitioner Demetria C. Vidal to a portion of the Subject Property to the extent provided in their 2 April 1998 Memorandum of Agreement and 13 August 1998 Deed of Conditional Conveyance; d.) Respondent Teofilo Cacho is not a son or heir of the late Dona Demetria Cacho; and e.) Respondent Teofilo Cacho, Godofredo Cabildo and any of their transferees/assignees have no valid right to or interest in the Subject Property. 2) ORDERING: a.) Respondent Register of Deeds of Iligan City, and any other person acting in his behalf, stop, cease and desist: i) From accepting or registering any affidavit of self- adjudication or any other document executed by respondents Teofilo Cacho, Godofredo Cabildo and/or any other person which in any way transfers the title to the Subject Property from Dona Demetria Cacho to respondent Teofilo Cacho, Godofredo Cabildo and/or any of their transferees/assignees, including the intervenors. ii) From cancelling the OCTs or any certificate of title over the Subject Property in the name of Demetria Cacho or any successor certificate of title, and from issuing new certificates of title in the name of respondents Teofilo Cacho, Godofredo Cabildo their transferees/assignees, including the intervenors. b) Respondents Teofilo Cacho, Godofredo Cabildo, their transferees/assignees, and any other person acting in their behalf, to stop, cease and desist: i) From executing, submitting to any Register of Deeds, or registering or causing to be registered therein, any affidavit of self-adjudication or any other document which in any way transfers title to the Subject Property from Demetria Cacho to respondents Teofilo Cacho, Godofredo Cabildo and/or any of their transferees/assignees, including the intervenors. ii) From canceling or causing the cancellation of OCTs or any certificate of title over the Subject Property in the name of Demetria Cacho or any successor certificate of title, and from issuing new certificates of title in the name of respondent Teofilo Cacho, Godofredo Cabildo and/or any of their transferees/assignees, including the intervenors. iii) From claiming or representing in any manner that respondent Teofilo Cacho is the son or heir of Demetria Cacho or has rights to or interest in the Subject Property. 3) ORDERING respondents Teofilo Cacho and Atty. Godofredo Cabildo to pay petitioners, jointly and severally, the following: a) For temperate damages -  P 80,000.00 b) For nominal damages  -  P 60,000.00 c) For moral damages -  P500,000.00 d) For exemplary damages -  P 500,000.00 e) For attorney's fees (ACCRA Law)-P1,000,000.00 f) For Attorney's fees -  P500,000.00 (Atty. Voltaire Rovira) g) For litigation expenses -  P300,000.00 For lack of factual and legal basis, the counterclaim of Teofilo Cacho and Atty. Godofredo Cabildo is hereby dismissed. Likewise, the counterclaim of intervenor IDD/Investa is dismissed for lack of basis as the petitioners succeeded in proving their cause of action. On the cross-claim of intervenor IDD/Investa, respondents Teofilo Cacho and Atty. Godofredo Cabildo are ORDERED to pay IDD/Investa, jointly and severally, the principal sum of P5,433,036 with 15% interest per annum. For lack of legal basis, the counterclaim of Intervenor Landtrade Realty Development Corporation is dismissed. Likewise, Intervenor Manguera's counterclaim is dismissed for lack of legal basis. [34] The joint appeal filed by LANDTRADE, Teofilo, and Atty. Cabildo with the Court of Appeals was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 00456. The Court of Appeals, in its Decision [35] of January 19, 2007, affirmed in toto the Decision dated July 17, 2004 of the RTC-Branch 3. According to the Court of Appeals, the RTC-Branch 3 did not err in resolving the issue on Vidal's status, filiation, and hereditary rights as it is determinative of the issue on ownership of the subject properties. It was indubitable that the RTC-Branch 3 had jurisdiction over the person of Teofilo and juridical personality of LANDTRADE as they both filed their Answers to the Petition for Quieting of Title thereby voluntarily submitting themselves to the jurisdiction of said trial court. Likewise, the Petition for Quieting of Title is in itself within the jurisdiction of the RTC-Branch 3. Hence, where there is jurisdiction over the person and subject matter, the resolution of all other questions arising in the case is but an exercise by the court of its jurisdiction. Moreover, Teofilo and LANDTRADE were guilty of estoppel by laches for failing to assail the jurisdiction of the RTC-Branch 3 at the first opportunity and even actively participating in the trial of the case and seeking affirmative reliefs. In addition, the Court of Appeals held that the 1997 Cacho case only determined the validity and efficacy of the Affidavit of Adjudication that Teofilo executed before the Philippine Consulate General in the U.S.A. The decision of this Court in the 1997 Cacho case , which had become final and executory, did not vest upon Teofilo ownership of the parcels of land as it merely ordered the re-issuance of a lost duplicate certificate of title in its original form and condition. The Court of Appeals agreed in the finding of the RTC-Branch 3 that the evidence on record preponderantly supports Vidal's claim of being the granddaughter and sole heiress of the late Doña Demetria. The appellate court further adjudged that Vidal did not delay in asserting her rights over the subject parcels of land. The prescriptive period for real actions over immovables is 30 years. Vidal's rights as Doña Demetria's successor-in-interest accrued upon the latter's death in 1974, and only 24 years thereafter, in 1998, Vidal already filed the present Petition for Quieting of Title. Thus, Vidal's cause of action had not yet prescribed. And, where the action was filed within the prescriptive period provided by law, the doctrine of laches was also inapplicable. LANDTRADE, Teofilo, and Atty. Cabildo filed separate Motions for Reconsideration of the January 19, 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals, which were denied in the July 4, 2007 Resolution [36] of the same court. On August 24, 2007, LANDTRADE filed with this Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which was docketed as G.R. No. 178779. On September 6, 2007, Teofilo and Atty. Cabildo filed their own Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which was docketed as G.R. No. 178894. The Ejectment or Unlawful Detainer Case (G.R. Nos. 170505, 173355-56, and 173563-64) Three Petitions before this Court are rooted in the Unlawful Detainer Case instituted by LANDTRADE against NAPOCOR and TRANSCO. On August 9, 1952, NAPOCOR took possession of two parcels of land in Sitio Nunucan, Overton, Fuentes, Iligan City, denominated as Lots 2029 and 2043, consisting of 3,588 square meters (or 0.36 hectares) and 3,177 square meters (or 0.32 hectares), respectively. On Lot 2029, NAPOCOR constructed its power sub-station, known as the Overton Sub-station, while on Lot 2043, it built a warehouse, known as the Agus 7 Warehouse, both for the use of its Agus 7 Hydro-Electric Power Plant. For more than 30 years, NAPOCOR occupied and possessed said parcels of land pursuant to its charter, Republic Act No. 6395. [37] With the enactment in 2001 of Republic Act No. 9136, otherwise known as the Electric Power Industry Reform Act (EPIRA), TRANSCO assumed the functions of NAPOCOR with regard to electrical transmissions and took over possession of the Overton Sub-station. Claiming ownership of the parcels of land where the Overton Sub-station and Agus 7 Warehouse are located, LANDTRADE filed with the MTCC on April 9, 2003 a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer against NAPOCOR and TRANSCO, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 11475-AF. In its Complaint, LANDTRADE alleged that it acquired from Teofilo, through Atty. Cabildo, two parcels of land at Sitio Nunucan, Overton, Fuentes, Brgy. Maria Cristina, Iligan City, with a combined area of 270,255 square meters or around 27.03 hectares, as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale [38] dated October 1, 1996. Certain portions of said parcels of land were being occupied by the Overton Sub-station and Agus 7 Warehouse of NAPOCOR and TRANSCO, through the tolerance of LANDTRADE. Upon failure of NAPOCOR and TRANSCO to pay rentals or to vacate the subject properties after demands to do so, LANDTRADE filed the present Complaint for Unlawful Detainer, plus damages in the amount of P450,000.00 as yearly rental from date of the first extra-judicial demand until NAPOCOR and TRANSCO vacate the subject properties. In their separate Answers, NAPOCOR and TRANSCO denied the material allegations in the Complaint and countered, by way of special and affirmative defenses, that the Complaint was barred by res judicata; that the MTCC has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action; and that LANDTRADE lacked the legal capacity to sue. On February 17, 2004, the MTCC rendered its Decision [39] in favor of LANDTRADE. The MTCC disposed: WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of Plaintiff Land Trade Realty Corporation represented by Atty. Max C. Tabimina and against defendant National Power Corporation represented by its President, Mr. Rogelio M. Murga and co-defendant TRANSCO represented by its President Dr. Allan T. Ortiz and Engr. Lorrymir A. Adaza, Manager, NAPOCOR-Mindanao, Regional Center, Ma. Cristina, Iligan City, ordering: 1. Defendants National Power Corporation and TRANSCO, their agents or representatives or any person/s acting on its behalf or under its authority to vacate the premises; 2. Defendants NAPOCOR and TRANSCO to pay Plaintiff jointly and solidarily: a. Php500,000.00 a month representing fair rental value or compensation since June 29, 1978 until defendant shall have vacated the premises; b. Php20,000.00 for and as attorney's fees and c. Cost of suit. Execution shall issue immediately upon motion, unless an appeal has been perfected and the defendant to stay execution files a sufficient supersedeas bond, approved by this Court and executed in favor of the plaintiff, to pay the rents, damages, and costs accruing down to the time of judgment appealed from, and unless, during the pendency of the appeal, defendants deposit with the appellate court the amount of P500,000.00 per month, as reasonable value of the use and occupancy of the premises for the preceding month or period on or before the tenth day of each succeeding month or period. [40] NAPOCOR and TRANSCO seasonably filed a Joint Notice of Appeal. Their appeal, docketed as Civil Case No. 6613, was initially assigned to the RTC-Branch 5, presided over by Judge Maximino Magno Libre (Judge Libre). LANDTRADE filed on June 24, 2004 a Motion for Execution, asserting that NAPOCOR and TRANSCO had neither filed a supersedeas bond with the MTCC nor periodically deposited with the RTC the monthly rental for the properties in question, so as to stay the immediate execution pending appeal of the MTCC judgment. However, the said Motion failed to comply with the required notice of hearing under Rule 15, Section 5 of the Rules of Court. LANDTRADE then filed a Motion to Withdraw and/or Replace Notice of Hearing. NAPOCOR and TRANSCO filed on July 13, 2004 a Joint Motion to Suspend Proceedings citing Amagan v. Marayag [41] in which the Court ruled that if circumstances should require, the proceedings in an ejectment case may be suspended in whatever stage it may be found. Since LANDTRADE anchors its right to possession of the subject parcels of land on the Deed of Sale executed in its favor by Teofilo on October 1, 1996, the ejectment case should be held in abeyance pending the resolution of other cases in which title over the same properties are in issue, i.e. , (1) Civil Case No. 6600, the action for the annulment of the Deed of Sale dated October 1, 1996 filed by Teofilo against LANDTRADE pending before the RTC-Branch 4; and (2) Civil Case No. 4452, the Quieting of Title Case filed by Vidal and AZIMUTH against Teofilo and Atty. Cabildo pending before the RTC-Branch 3. LANDTRADE filed on July 19, 2004 another Motion for Execution, which was heard together with the Joint Motion to Suspend Proceedings of NAPOCOR and TRANSCO. After said hearing, the RTC-Branch 5 directed the parties to file their memoranda on the two pending Motions. LANDTRADE, in its Memorandum, maintained that the pendency of Civil Case No. 4452, the Quieting of Title Case, should not preclude the execution of the MTCC judgment in the Unlawful Detainer Case because the issue involved in the latter was only the material possession or possession de facto of the parcels of land in question. LANDTRADE also reported that Civil Case No. 6600, the action for annulment of the Deed of Sale dated October 1, 1996 instituted by Teofilo, was already dismissed given that the RTC-Branch 4 had approved the Compromise Agreement executed between LANDTRADE and Teofilo. NAPOCOR and TRANSCO likewise filed their respective Memoranda. Subsequently, NAPOCOR filed a Supplement to its Memorandum to bring to the attention of the RTC-Branch 5 the Decision rendered on July 17, 2004 by the RTC-Branch 3 in Civil Case No. 4452, the Quieting of Title Case, categorically declaring Teofilo, the predecessor-in-interest of LANDTRADE, as having no right at all to the subject parcels of land. Resultantly, the right of LANDTRADE to the two properties, which merely emanated from Teofilo, was effectively declared as non-existent too. On August 4, 2004, the RTC-Branch 5 issued an Order [42] denying the Joint Motion to Suspend Proceedings of NAPOCOR and TRANSCO. The RTC held that the pendency of other actions involving the same parcels of land could not stay execution pending appeal of the MTCC judgment because NAPOCOR and TRANSCO failed to post the required bond and pay the monthly rentals. Five days later, on August 9, 2004, the RTC-Branch 5 issued another Order [43] granting the Motion of LANDTRADE for execution of the MTCC judgment pending appeal. The next day, on August 10, 2004, the Acting Clerk of Court, Atty. Joel M. Macaraya, Jr., issued a Writ of Execution Pending Appeal [44] which directed Sheriff IV Alberto O. Borres (Sheriff Borres) to execute the MTCC Decision dated February 17, 2004. A day later, on August 11, 2004, Sheriff Borres issued two Notices of Garnishment [45] addressed to PNB and Land Bank of the Philippines in Iligan City, garnishing all the goods, effects, stocks, interests in stocks and shares, and any other personal properties belonging to NAPOCOR and TRANSCO which were being held by and under the possession and control of said banks. On even date, Sheriff Borres also issued a Notification [46] to NAPOCOR and TRANSCO for them to vacate the subject parcels of land; and to pay LANDTRADE the sums of (a) P156,000,000.00, representing the total fair rental value for the said properties, computed at P500,000.00 per month, beginning June 29, 1978 until June 29, 2004, or for a period of 26 years, and (b) P20,000.00 as attorney's fees. Thereafter, NAPOCOR and TRANSCO each filed before the Court of Appeals in Cagayan de Oro City a Petition for Certiorari , under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with prayer for the issuance of a TRO and writ of preliminary injunction. The Petitions, docketed as CA-G.R. SP Nos. 85174 and 85841, were eventually consolidated. The Court of Appeals issued on August 18, 2004 a TRO [47] enjoining the enforcement and implementation of the Order of Execution and Writ of Execution Pending Appeal of the RTC-Branch 5 and Notices of Garnishment and Notification of Sheriff Borres. The Court of Appeals, in its Decision [48] dated November 23, 2005, determined that public respondents did commit grave abuse of discretion in allowing and/or effecting the execution of the MTCC judgment pending appeal, since NAPOCOR and TRANSCO were legally excused from complying with the requirements for a stay of execution specified in Rule 70, Section 19 of the Rules of Court, particularly, the posting of a supersedeas bond and periodic deposits of rental payments. The decretal portion of said appellate court Decision states: ACCORDINGLY, the two petitions at bench are GRANTED; the Order dated 9 August 2004, the Writ of Execution Pending Appeal dated 10 August 2004, the two Notices of Garnishment dated 11 August 2004, and the Notification dated 11 August 2004, are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. [49] Displeased, LANDTRADE elevated the case to this Court on January 10, 2006 via a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which was docketed as G.R. No. 170505. In the meantime, with the retirement of Judge Libre and the inhibition [50] of Judge Oscar Badelles, the new presiding judge of RTC-Branch 5, Civil Case No. 6613 was re-raffled to the RTC-Branch 1, presided over by Judge Mangotara. The RTC-Branch 1 promulgated on December 12, 2005 a Decision [51] in Civil Case No. 6613 which affirmed in toto the February 17, 2004 Decision of the MTCC in Civil Case No. 11475-AF favoring LANDTRADE. NAPOCOR and TRANSCO filed with the RTC-Branch 1 twin Motions, namely: (1) Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision dated December 12, 2005; and (2) Motion for Inhibition of Judge Mangotara. The RTC-Branch 1 denied both Motions in a Resolution dated January 30, 2006. NAPOCOR and TRANSCO filed with the Court of Appeals separate Petitions for Review with prayer for TRO and/or a writ of preliminary injunction, which were docketed as CA-G.R. SP Nos. 00854 and 00889, respectively. In a Resolution dated March 24, 2006, the Court of Appeals granted the prayer for TRO of NAPOCOR and TRANSCO. With the impending lapse of the effectivity of the TRO on May 23, 2006, NAPOCOR filed on May 15, 2006 with the Court of Appeals a Manifestation and Motion praying for the resolution of its application for preliminary injunction. On May 23, 2006, the same day the TRO lapsed, the Court of Appeals granted the motions for extension of time to file a consolidated comment of LANDTRADE. Two days later, LANDTRADE filed an Omnibus Motion seeking the issuance of (1) a writ of execution pending appeal, and (2) the designation of a special sheriff in accordance with Rule 70, Section 21 of the Rules of Court. In a Resolution [52] dated June 30, 2006, the Court of Appeals granted the Omnibus Motion of LANDTRADE and denied the applications for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction of NAPOCOR and TRANSCO. In effect, the appellate court authorized the execution pending appeal of the judgment of the MTCC, affirmed by the RTC-Branch 1, thus: IN LIGHT OF THE ABOVE DISQUISITIONS, this Court resolves to grant the [LANDRADE]'s omnibus motion for execution pending appeal of the decision rendered in its favor which is being assailed in these consolidated petitions for review. Accordingly, the [NAPOCOR and TRANSCO's] respective applications for issuance of writ of preliminary injunction are both denied for lack of factual and legal bases. The Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2, Iligan City, which at present has the custody of the records of the case a quo , is hereby ordered to cause the immediate issuance of a writ of execution relative to its decision dated 17 February 2004 in Civil Case No. 11475-AF. [53] On July 20, 2006, NAPOCOR filed with this Court a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with an urgent plea for a TRO, docketed as G.R. No. 173355-56. On August 2, 2006, TRANSCO filed with this Court its own Petition for Certiorari , docketed as G.R. No. 173563-64. On July 21, 2006, NAPOCOR filed an Urgent Motion for the Issuance of a TRO in G.R. No. 173355-56. In a Resolution [54] dated July 26, 2006, the Court granted the Motion of NAPOCOR and issued a TRO, [55] effective immediately, which enjoined public and private respondents from implementing the Resolution dated June 30, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 00854 and 00889 and the Decision dated February 17, 2004 of the MTCC in Civil Case No. 11475-AF. On July 31, 2006, Vidal and AZIMUTH filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Attached Comment-in-Intervention, contending therein that Vidal was the lawful owner of the parcels of land subject of the Unlawful Detainer Case as confirmed in the Decision dated July 17, 2004 of the RTC-Branch 3 in Civil Case No. 4452. In a Resolution dated September 30, 2006, the Court required the parties to comment on the Motion of Vidal and AZIMUTH, and deferred action on the said Motion pending the submission of such comments. The Cancellation of Titles and Reversion Case (G.R. No. 173401) On October 13, 2004, the Republic filed a Complaint for the Cancellation of OCT Nos. 0-1200 (a.f.) and 0-1201 (a.f.) and Reversion against the late Doña Demetria, represented by her alleged heirs, Vidal and/or Teofilo, together with AZIMUTH and LANDTRADE. The Complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 6686, was raffled to the RTC-Branch 4. The Republic sought the cancellation of OCT Nos. 0-1200 (a.f.) and 0-1201 (a.f.) and the reversion of the parcels of land covered thereby to the Government based on the following allegations in its Complaint, under the heading "Cause of Action": 5. On October 15, 1998, Original Certificates of Title (OCTs) Nos. 0-1200 (a.f.) and 0-1201 (a.f.) were issued in the name of "Demetria Cacho, widow, now deceased..." consisting of a total area of Three Hundred Seventy-Eight Thousand Seven Hundred and Seven (378,707) square meters and Three Thousand Seven Hundred Thirty-Five (3,635) square meters, respectively, situated in Iligan City, x x x x x x x 6. The afore-stated titles were issued in implementation of a decision rendered in LRC (GLRO) Record Nos. 6908 and 6909 dated December 10, 1912, as affirmed by the Honorable Supreme Court in Cacho v. Government of the United States, 28 Phil. 616 (December 10, 1914), 7. The decision in LRC (GLRO) Record Nos. 6908 and 6909, upon which the titles were issued, did not grant the entire area applied for therein. x x x x x x x 9. As events turned out, the titles issued in connection with LRC (GLRO) Record Nos. 6908 and 6909 - i.e. OCT Nos. 0-1200 (a.f.) and 0-1201 (a.f.) - cover property MUCH LARGER in area than that granted by the land registration court in its corresponding decision, supra. 10. While the LRC Decision, as affirmed by the Honorable Supreme Court, granted only the southern part of the 37.87 hectare land subject of LRC (GLRO) Record Case No. 6909 , the ENTIRE 37.87 hectares is indicated as the property covered by OCT 0-1200 (a.f.). Worse, OCT No. 0-1200 (a.f.) made reference to Case No. 6908 as basis thereof, yet, the decision in said case is clear: (i) The parcel "object of Case No. 6908 is small " (Cacho vs. Government of the United States, 28 Phil. 616, p. 619) (ii) "The parcel of land claimed by the applicant in Case No. 6909 is the bigger of two parcels and contains 37.87 hectares 11. More significantly, the technical description in Original Certificate of Title No. 0-1200 (a.f.) specifies the date of survey as "August 31 to September 1, 1910," which is EARLIER than the date the Supreme Court, in Cacho supra, resolved LRC (GLRO) Record No. 6909 (involving 37.87 hectares). In resolving the application involving the 37.87 hectares , the Honorable Supreme Court declared that only the southern part of the 37.87 hectare property applied for is granted and that a new survey specifying the "southern part" thereof should be submitted. Accordingly, any survey involving the "granted southern part" should bear a date subsequent to the December 10, 1914 Supreme Court decision. x x x x x x x 12. The Honorable Supreme Court further declared that the Decision in LRC (GLRO) Record No. 6909 was reserved: "Final decision in these case is reserved until the presentation of the ... new plan ." (28 Phil. 616, p. 631; Underscoring supplied) In other words, as of December 10, 1914, when the Honorable Supreme Court rendered its Decision on appeal in LRC (GLRO) Record No. 6909, "final decision" of the case was still reserved until the presentation of a new plan . The metes and bounds of OCT No. 0-1200 (a.f.) could not have been the technical description of the property granted by the court - described as "the southern part of the large parcel object of expediente 6909 only" ( Cacho vs. Government of the United States, 28 Phil. 617, 629 ). As earlier stated, the technical description appearing in said title was the result of a survey conducted in 1910 or before the Supreme Court decision was rendered in 1914 13. In the same vein, Original Certificate of Title No. 0-1201 (a.f.) specifies LRC (GLRO) Record No. 6909 as the basis thereof (see front page of OCT No. 0-1201 (a.f.)). Yet, the technical description makes, as its reference, Lot 1, Plan II-3732, LR Case No. 047, LRC (GLRO) Record No. 6908 (see page 2 of said title). A title issued pursuant to a decision may only cover the property subject of the case. A title cannot properly be issued pursuant to a decision in Case 6909, but whose technical description is based on Case 6908. 14. The decision in LRC (GLRO) Record Nos. 6908 and 6909 has become final and executory, and it cannot be modified, much less result in an increased area of the property decreed therein. x x x x 16. In sum, Original Certificates of Title Nos. 0-1200 (a.f.) and 0-1201 (a.f.), as issued, are null and void since the technical descriptions vis-à-vis the areas of the parcels of land covered therein went beyond the areas granted by the land registration court in LRC (GLRO) Record Nos. 6908 and 6909. [56] Vidal and AZIMUTH filed a Motion to Dismiss dated December 23, 2004 on the grounds that (1) the Republic has no cause of action; (2) assuming arguendo that the Republic has a cause of action, its Complaint failed to state a cause of action; (3) assuming arguendo that the Republic has a cause of action, the same is barred by prior judgment; (4) assuming further that the Republic has a cause of action, the same was extinguished by prescription; and (4) the Republic is guilty of forum shopping. Upon motion of the Republic, the RTC-Branch 4 issued an Order [57] dated October 4, 2005, declaring LANDTRADE and Teofilo, as represented by Atty. Cabildo, in default since they failed to submit their respective answers to the Complaint despite the proper service of summons upon them. LANDTRADE subsequently filed its Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim dated September 28, 2005. It also moved for the setting aside and reconsideration of the Order of Default issued against it by the RTC-Branch 4 on October 20, 2005. On December 13, 2005, the RTC-Branch 4 issued an Order [58] dismissing the Complaint of the Republic in Civil Case No. 6686, completely agreeing with Vidal and AZIMUTH. The RTC-Branch 4 reasoned that the Republic had no cause of action because there was no showing that the late Doña Demetria committed any wrongful act or omission in violation of any right of the Republic. Doña Demetria had sufficiently proven her ownership over the parcels of land as borne in the ruling of the LRC in GLRO Record Nos. 6908 and 6909. On the other hand, the Republic had no more right to the said parcels of land. The Regalian doctrine does not apply in this case because the titles were already issued to Doña Demetria and segregated from the mass of the public domain. The RTC-Branch 4 likewise held that the Republic failed to state a cause of action in its Complaint. The arguments of the Republic - i.e. , the absence of a new survey plan and deed, the titles covered properties with much larger area than that granted by the LRC - had been answered squarely in the 1997 Cacho case . Also, the Complaint failed to allege that fraud had been committed in having the titles registered and that the Director of Lands requested the reversion of the subject parcels of land. The RTC-Branch 4 was convinced that the Complaint was barred by res judicata because the 1914 Cacho case already decreed the registration of the parcels of land in the late Doña Demetria's name and the 1997 Cacho case settled that there was no merit in the argument that the conditions imposed in the first case have not been complied with. The RTC-Branch 4 was likewise persuaded that the cause of action or remedy of the Republic was lost or extinguished by prescription pursuant to Article 1106 of the Civil Code and Section 32 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Land Registration Decree, which prescribes a one-year period within which to file an action for the review of a decree of registration. Finally, the RTC-Branch 4 found the Republic guilty of forum shopping because there is between this case, on one hand, and the 1914 and 1997 Cacho cases , on the other, identity of parties, as well as rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, as the contending parties are claiming rights of ownership over the same parcels of land. The Republic filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the dismissal of its Complaint but the same was denied by the RTC-Branch 4 in its Order [59] dated May 16, 2006. Assailing the Orders dated December 13, 2005 and May 16, 2006 of the RTC-Branch 4, the Republic filed on August 11, 2006 a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which was docketed as G.R. No. 173401. III ISSUES AND DISCUSSIONS Expropriation Case (G.R. No. 170375) The Republic, in its consolidated Petitions challenging the Resolutions dated July 12, 2005 and October 24, 2005 of the RTC-Branch 1 in Civil Case No. 106, made the following assignment of errors: RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ERRED IN ORDERING THE DISMISSAL OF THE EXPROPRIATION COMPLAINT IN CIVIL CASE NO. 106 CONSIDERING THAT: (a) THE NON-JOINDER OF PARTIES IS NOT A GROUND FOR THE DISMISSAL OF AN ACTION PURSUANT TO SECTION 11, RULE 3 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE; (b) AN EXPROPRIATION PROCEEDING IS AN ACTION QUASI IN REM WHEREIN THE FACT THAT THE OWNER OF THE PROPERTY IS MADE A PARTY TO THE ACTION IS NOT ESSENTIALLY INDISPENSABLE; (c) PETITIONER DID NOT COMMIT ANY FORUM SHOPPING WITH THE FILING OF THE REVERSION COMPLAINT DOCKETED AS CIVIL CASE NO. 6686 WHICH IS PENDING BEFORE BRANCH 4 OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ILIGAN CITY. [60] Filing of consolidated petitions under both Rules 45 and 65 At the outset, the Court notes that the Republic filed a pleading with the caption Consolidated Petitions for Review on Certiorari (Under Rule 45) and Certiorari (Under Rule 65) of the Rules of Court . The Republic explains that it filed the Consolidated Petitions pursuant to Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) v. Court of Appeals [61] MWSS case The reliance of the Republic on the MWSS case to justify its mode of appeal is misplaced, taking the pronouncements of this Court in said case out of context. The issue in the MWSS case was whether a possessor in good faith has the right to remove useful improvements, and not whether consolidated petitions under both Rules 45 and 65 of the Rules of Court can be filed. Therein petitioner MWSS simply filed an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, but named the Court of Appeals as a respondent. The Court clarified that the only parties in an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are the appellant as petitioner and the appellee as respondent. The court which rendered the judgment appealed from is not a party in said appeal. It is in the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court where the court or judge is required to be joined as party defendant or respondent. The Court, however, also acknowledged that there may be an instance when in an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45, the petitioner-appellant would also claim that the court that rendered the appealed judgment acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, in which case, such court should be joined as a party-defendant or respondent. While the Court may have stated that in such an instance, "the petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is at the same time a petition for certiorari under Rule 65," the Court did not hold that consolidated petitions under both Rules 45 and 65 could or should be filed. The Court, in more recent cases, had been stricter and clearer on the distinction between these two modes of appeal. In Nunez v. GSIS Family Bank [62] the Court elucidated In Ligon v. Court of Appeals where the therein petitioner described her petition as "an appeal under Rule 45 and at the same time as a special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court," this Court, in frowning over what it described as a " chimera ," reiterated that the remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative nor successive To be sure, the distinctions between Rules 45 and 65 are far and wide. However, the most apparent is that errors of jurisdiction are best reviewed in a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 while errors of judgment can only be corrected by appeal in a petition for review under Rule 45 But in the same case, the Court also held that: This Court, x x x, in accordance with the liberal spirit which pervades the Rules of Court and in the interest of justice may treat a petition for certiorari as having been filed under Rule 45, more so if the same was filed within the reglementary period for filing a petition for review. [63] It is apparent in the case at bar that the Republic availed itself of the wrong mode of appeal by filing Consolidated Petitions for Review under Rule 45 and for Certiorari under Rule 65, when these are two separate remedies that are mutually exclusive and neither alternative nor successive. Nevertheless, the Court shall treat the Consolidated Petitions as a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 and the allegations therein as errors of judgment. As the records show, the Petition was filed on time under Rules 45. Before the lapse of the 15-day reglementary period to appeal under Rule 45, the Republic filed with the Court a motion for extension of time to file its petition. The Court, in a Resolution [64] dated January 23, 2006, granted the Republic a 30-day extension, which was to expire on December 29, 2005. The Republic was able to file its Petition on the last day of the extension period. Hierarchy of courts The direct filing of the instant Petition with this Court did not violate the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. According to Rule 41, Section 2(c) [65] of the Rules of Court, a decision or order of the RTC may be appealed to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, provided that such petition raises only questions of law. [66] A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the correct application of law or jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; or when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted. [67] A question of fact exists when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the query invites calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of the witnesses, the existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances, as well as their relation to each other and to the whole, and the probability of the situation. [68] Here, the Petition of the Republic raises pure questions of law, i.e. , whether Civil Case No. 106 should have been dismissed for failure to implead indispensable parties and for forum shopping. Thus, the direct resort by the Republic to this Court is proper. The Court shall now consider the propriety of the dismissal by the RTC-Branch 1 of the Complaint for Expropriation of the Republic. The proper parties in the expropriation proceedings The right of the Republic to be substituted for ISA as plaintiff in Civil Case No. 106 had long been affirmed by no less than this Court in the ISA case . The dispositive portion of the ISA case reads: WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 8 October 1991 to the extent that it affirmed the trial court's order dismissing the expropriation proceedings, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the case is REMANDED to the court a quo which shall allow the substitution of the Republic of the Philippines for petitioner Iron Steel Authority for further proceedings consistent with this Decision. No pronouncement as to costs. [69] The ISA case had already become final and executory, and entry of judgment was made in said case on August 31, 1998. The RTC-Branch 1, in an Order dated November 16, 2001, effected the substitution of the Republic for ISA. The failure of the Republic to actually file a motion for execution does not render the substitution void. A writ of execution requires the sheriff or other proper officer to whom it is directed to enforce the terms of the writ. [70] The November 16, 2001 Order of the RTC-Branch 1 should be deemed as voluntary compliance with a final and executory judgment of this Court, already rendering a motion for and issuance of a writ of execution superfluous. Besides, no substantive right was violated by the voluntary compliance by the RTC-Branch 1 with the directive in the ISA case even without a motion for execution having been filed. To the contrary, the RTC-Branch 1 merely enforced the judicially determined right of the Republic to the substitution. While it is desirable that the Rules of Court be faithfully and even meticulously observed, courts should not be so strict about procedural lapses that do not really impair the administration of justice. If the rules are intended to insure the orderly conduct of litigation it is because of the higher objective they seek which is the protection of the substantive rights of the parties. [71] The Court also observes that MCFC did not seek any remedy from the Order dated November 16, 2001 of the RTC-Branch 1. Consequently, the said Order already became final, which even the RTC-Branch 1 itself cannot reverse and set aside on the ground of "honest mistake." The RTC-Branch 1 dismissed the Complaint in Civil Case No. 106 on another ground: that MCFC is not a proper party to the expropriation proceedings, not being the owner of the parcels of land sought to be expropriated. The RTC-Branch 1 ratiocinated that since the exercise of the power of eminent domain involves the taking of private land intended for public use upon payment of just compensation to the owner, then a complaint for expropriation must be directed against the owner of the land sought to be expropriated. The Republic insists, however, that MCFC is a real party-in-interest, impleaded as a defendant in the Complaint for Expropriation because of its possessory or occupancy rights over the subject parcels of land, and not by reason of its ownership of the said properties. In addition, the Republic maintains that non-joinder of parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. Rule 67, Section 1 of the then Rules of Court [72] described how expropriation proceedings should be instituted: Section 1. The complaint. - The right of eminent domain shall be exercised by the filing of a complaint which shall state with certainty the right and purpose of condemnation, describe the real or personal property sought to be condemned, and join as defendants all persons owning or claiming to own, or occupying, any part thereof or interest therein, showing, so far as practicable, the interest of each defendant separately. If the title to any property sought to be condemned appears to be in the Republic of the Philippines, although occupied by private individuals, or if the title is otherwise obscure or doubtful so that the plaintiff cannot with accuracy or certainty specify who are the real owners, averment to that effect may be made in the complaint. [73] (Emphases supplied.) For sure, defendants in an expropriation case are not limited to the owners of the property to be expropriated, and just compensation is not due to the property owner alone. As this Court held in De Knecht v. Court of Appeals [74] The defendants in an expropriation case are not limited to the owners of the property condemned. They include all other persons owning, occupying or claiming to own the property. When [property] is taken by eminent domain, the owner x x x is not necessarily the only person who is entitled to compensation . In the American jurisdiction, the term `owner' when employed in statutes relating to eminent domain to designate the persons who are to be made parties to the proceeding, refer, as is the rule in respect of those entitled to compensation, to all those who have lawful interest in the property to be condemned, including a mortgagee, a lessee and a vendee in possession under an executory contract. Every person having an estate or interest at law or in equity in the land taken is entitled to share in the award. If a person claiming an interest in the land sought to be condemned is not made a party, he is given the right to intervene and lay claim to the compensation. (Emphasis supplied.) At the time of the filing of the Complaint for Expropriation in 1983, possessory/occupancy rights of MCFC over the parcels of land sought to be expropriated were undisputed. In fact, Letter of Instructions No. 1277 [75] dated November 16, 1982 expressly recognized that portions of the lands reserved by Presidential Proclamation No. 2239, also dated November 16, 1982, for the use and immediate occupation by the NSC, were then occupied by an idle fertilizer plant/factory and related facilities of MCFC. It was ordered in the same Letter of Instruction that: (1) NSC shall negotiate with the owners of MCFC, for and on behalf of the Government, for the compensation of MCFC's present occupancy rights on the subject lands at an amount of Thirty (P30.00) Pesos per square meter or equivalent to the assessed value thereof (as determined by the City Assessor of Iligan), whichever is higher. NSC shall give MCFC the option to either remove its aforesaid plant, structures, equipment, machinery and other facilities from the lands or to sell or cede ownership thereof to NSC at a price equivalent to the fair market value thereof as appraised by the Asian Appraisal Inc. as may be mutually agreed upon by NSC and MCFC. (2) In the event that NSC and MCFC fail to agree on the foregoing within sixty (60) days from the date hereof, the Iron and Steel Authority (ISA) shall exercise its authority under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 272, as amended, to initiate the expropriation of the aforementioned occupancy rights of MCFC on the subject lands as well as the plant, structures, equipment, machinery and related facilities, for and on behalf of NSC, and thereafter cede the same to NSC. During the pendency of the expropriation proceedings, NSC shall take possession of the properties, subject to bonding and other requirements of P.D. 1533. (Emphasis supplied.) Being the occupant of the parcel of land sought to be expropriated, MCFC could very well be named a defendant in Civil Case No. 106. The RTC-Branch 1 evidently erred in dismissing the Complaint for Expropriation against MCFC for not being a proper party. Also erroneous was the dismissal by the RTC-Branch 1 of the original Complaint for Expropriation for having been filed only against MCFC, the occupant of the subject land, but not the owner/s of the said property. Dismissal is not the remedy for misjoinder or non-joinder of parties. According to Rule 3, Section 11 of the Rules of Court: SEC. 11. Misjoinder and non-joinder of parties. - Neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is ground for dismissal of an action. Parties may be dropped or added by order of the court on motion of any party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and on such terms as are just. Any claim against a misjoined party may be severed and proceeded with separately. (Emphasis supplied.) MCFC contends that the aforequoted rule does not apply in this case where the party not joined, i.e. , the owner of the property to be expropriated, is an indispensable party. An indispensable party is a party-in-interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action. [76] Now, is the owner of the property an indispensable party in an action for expropriation? Not necessarily. Going back to Rule 67, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, expropriation proceedings may be instituted even when "title to the property sought to be condemned appears to be in the Republic of the Philippines, although occupied by private individuals." The same rule provides that a complaint for expropriation shall name as defendants "all persons owning or claiming to own, or occupying , any part thereof or interest" in the property sought to be condemned. Clearly, when the property already appears to belong to the Republic, there is no sense in the Republic instituting expropriation proceedings against itself. It can still, however, file a complaint for expropriation against the private persons occupying the property. In such an expropriation case, the owner of the property is not an indispensable party. To recall, Presidential Proclamation No. 2239 explicitly states that the parcels of land reserved to NSC are part of the public domain, hence, owned by the Republic. Letter of Instructions No. 1277 recognized only the occupancy rights of MCFC and directed NSC to institute expropriation proceedings to determine the just compensation for said occupancy rights. Therefore, the owner of the property is not an indispensable party in the original Complaint for Expropriation in Civil Case No. 106. Assuming for the sake of argument that the owner of the property is an indispensable party in the expropriation proceedings, the non-joinder of said party would still not warrant immediate dismissal of the complaint for expropriation. In Vda. De Manguerra v. Risos [77] the Court applied Rule 3, Section 11 of the Rules of Court even in case of non-joinder of an indispensable party, viz [F]ailure to implead an indispensable party is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. In such a case, the remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable. Parties may be added by order of the court, on motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and/or such times as are just. If the petitioner/plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court, the latter may dismiss the complaint/petition for the petitioner's/plaintiff's failure to comply. (Emphasis supplied.) In this case, the RTC-Branch 1 did not first require the Republic to implead the alleged owner/s of the parcel of land sought to be expropriated. Despite the absence of any order from the Court, the Republic - upon becoming aware that the parcels of land involved in the 1914 Cacho case and 1997 Cacho case , claimed by Teofilo and LANDTRADE, and Vidal and AZIMUTH, encroached into and overlapped with the parcel of land subject of Civil Case No. 106 - sought leave of court to file a Supplemental Complaint to implead these four parties. The RTC-Branch 1 did not take the Supplemental Complaint of the Republic into consideration. Instead, it dismissed outright the original Complaint for Expropriation against MCFC. Forum shopping The RTC-Branch 1 further erred in finding that the Republic committed forum shopping by (1) simultaneously instituting the actions for expropriation (Civil Case No. 106) and reversion (Civil Case No. 6686) for the same parcels of land; and (2) taking inconsistent positions when it conceded lack of ownership over the parcels of land in the expropriation case but asserted ownership of the same properties in the reversion case. There is no dispute that the Republic instituted reversion proceedings (Civil Case No. 6686) for the same parcels of land subject of the instant Expropriation Case (Civil Case No. 106). The Complaint for Cancellation of Titles and Reversion [78] dated September 27, 2004 was filed by the Republic with the RTC on October 13, 2004. The records, however, do not show when the Supplemental Complaint for Expropriation [79] dated September 28,