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440 Phil. 106
EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 154512, November 12, 2002 ]
VICTORINO DENNIS M. SOCRATES, MAYOR OF PUERTO PRINCESA CITY, PETITIONER, VS. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE PREPARATORY RECALL ASSEMBLY (PRA) OF PUERTO PRINCESA CITY, PRA INTERIM CHAIRMAN PUNONG BGY. MARK DAVID HAGEDORN, PRA INTERIM SECRETARY PUNONG BGY. BENJAMIN JARILLA, PRA CHAIRMAN AND PRESIDING OFFICER PUNONG BGY. EARL S. BUENVIAJE AND PRA SECRETARY PUNONG BGY. CARLOS ABALLA, JR. RESPONDENTS.
[G.R. NO. 154683. NOVEMBER 12, 2002]
VICENTE S. SANDOVAL, JR., PETITIONER, VS. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RESPONDENT.
[G.R. NOS. 155083-84. NOVEMBER 12, 2002]
MA. FLORES P. ADOVO, MERCY E. GILO AND BIENVENIDO OLLAVE,
SR., PETITIONERS, VS. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, AND EDWARD S. HAGEDORN, RESPONDENTS.
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO, J.:
Before us are consolidated petitions for certiorari
seeking the reversal of the resolutions issued by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC for brevity) in relation to the recall election for mayor of Puerto Princesa City, Palawan.
The Antecedents
On July 2, 2002, 312 out of 528 members of the then incumbent barangay officials of the Puerto Princesa convened themselves into a Preparatory Recall Assembly (PRA for brevity) at the Gymnasium of Barangay San Jose from 9:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon. The PRA was convened to initiate the recall
of Victorino Dennis M. Socrates (Socrates for brevity) who assumed office as Puerto Princesas mayor on June 30, 2001. The members of the PRA designated Mark David M. Hagedorn, president of the Association of Barangay Captains, as interim chair of the PRA.
On the same date, the PRA passed Resolution No. 01-02 (Recall Resolution for brevity) which declared its loss of confidence in Socrates and called for his recall. The PRA requested the COMELEC to schedule the recall election for mayor within 30 days from receipt of the Recall Resolution.
On July 16, 2002, Socrates filed with the COMELEC a petition, docketed as E.M. No. 02-010 (RC), to nullify and deny due course to the Recall Resolution.
On August 14, 2002, the COMELEC
en banc
promulgated a resolution dismissing for lack of merit Socrates petition. The COMELEC gave due course to the Recall Resolution and scheduled the recall election on September 7, 2002.
On August 21, 2002, the COMELEC
en banc
promulgated Resolution No. 5673 prescribing the calendar of activities and periods of certain prohibited acts in connection with the recall election. The COMELEC fixed the campaign period from August 27, 2002 to September 5, 2002 or a period of 10 days.
On August 23, 2002, Edward M. Hagedorn (Hagedorn for brevity) filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor in the recall election.
On August 17, 2002, Ma. Flores F. Adovo (Adovo for brevity) and Merly E. Gilo (Gilo for brevity) filed a petition before the COMELEC, docketed as SPA No. 02-492, to disqualify Hagedorn from running in the recall election and to cancel his certificate of candidacy. On August 30, 2002, a certain Bienvenido Ollave, Sr. (Ollave for brevity) filed a petition-in-intervention in SPA No. 02-492 also seeking to disqualify Hagedorn. On the same date, a certain Genaro V. Manaay filed another petition, docketed as SPA No. 02-539, against Hagedorn alleging substantially the same facts and involving the same issues. The petitions were all anchored on the ground that Hagedorn is disqualified from running for a fourth consecutive term, having been elected and having served as mayor of the city for three (3) consecutive full terms immediately prior to the instant recall election for the same post. Subsequently, SPA Nos. 02-492 and 02-539 were consolidated.
In a resolution promulgated on September 20, 2002, the COMELECs First Division
dismissed for lack of merit SPA Nos. 02-492 and 02-539. The COMELEC declared Hagedorn qualified to run in the recall election. The COMELEC also reset the recall election from September 7, 2002 to September 24, 2002.
On September 23, 2002, the COMELEC
en banc
promulgated a resolution denying the motion for reconsideration of Adovo and Gilo. The COMELEC affirmed the resolution declaring Hagedorn qualified to run in the recall election.
Hence, the instant consolidated petitions.
G.R. No. 154512
Petitioner Socrates seeks to nullify the COMELEC
en banc
resolution dated August 14, 2002 in E.M. No. 02-010 (RC) which gave due course to the Recall Resolution and scheduled the recall election on September 7, 2002.
Socrates alleges that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in upholding the Recall Resolution. Socrates cites the following circumstances as legal infirmities attending the convening of the PRA and its issuance of the Recall Resolution: (1) not all members of the PRA were notified of the meeting to adopt the resolution; (2) the proof of service of notice was palpably and legally deficient; (3) the members of the PRA were themselves seeking a new electoral mandate from their respective constituents; (4) the adoption of the resolution was exercised with grave abuse of authority; and (5) the PRA proceedings were conducted in a manner that violated his and the publics constitutional right to information.
G.R. No. 154683
Petitioner Vicente S. Sandoval, Jr. seeks to annul COMELEC Resolution No. 5673 dated August 21, 2002 insofar as it fixed the recall election on September 7, 2002, giving the candidates only a ten-day campaign period. He prayed that the COMELEC be enjoined from holding the recall election on September 7, 2002 and that a new date be fixed giving the candidates at least an additional 15 days to campaign.
In a resolution dated September 3, 2002, the Court
en banc
enjoined the COMELEC from implementing Resolution No. 5673 insofar as it fixed the date of the recall election on September 7, 2002. The Court directed the COMELEC to give the candidates an additional fifteen 15 days from September 7, 2002 within which to campaign.
Accordingly, on September 9, 2002, the COMELEC
en banc
issued Resolution No. 5708 giving the candidates an additional 15 days from September 7, 2002 within which to campaign. Thus, the COMELEC reset the recall election to September 24, 2002.
G.R. Nos. 155083-84
Petitioners Adovo, Gilo and Ollave assail the COMELECs resolutions dated September 20, 2002 and September 23, 2002 in SPA Nos. 02-492 and 02-539 declaring Hagedorn qualified to run for mayor in the recall election. They likewise prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to enjoin the proclamation of the winning candidate in the recall election.
Petitioners argue that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in upholding Hagedorns qualification to run for mayor in the recall election despite the constitutional and statutory prohibitions against a fourth consecutive term for elective local officials.
In a resolution dated September 24, 2002, the Court ordered the COMELEC to desist from proclaiming any winning candidate in the recall election until further orders from the Court. Petitioners were required to post a P20,000 bond.
On September 27, 2002, Socrates filed a motion for leave to file an attached petition for intervention seeking the same reliefs as those sought by Adovo, Gilo and Ollave.
In the meantime, Hagedorn garnered the highest number of votes in the recall election with 20,238 votes. Rival candidates Socrates and Sandoval obtained 17,220 votes and 13,241 votes, respectively.
Hagedorn filed motions to lift the order restraining the COMELEC from proclaiming the winning candidate and to allow him to assume office to give effect to the will of the electorate.
On October 1, 2002, the Court granted Socrates motion for leave to file a petition for intervention.
The Issues
The issues for resolution of the Court are:
1. In G.R. No. 154512, whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in giving due course to the Recall Resolution and scheduling the recall election for mayor of Puerto Princesa.
2. In G.R. Nos.155083-84, whether Hagedorn is qualified to run for mayor in the recall election of Puerto Princesa on September 24, 2002.
In G.R. No. 154683, the issue of whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in fixing a campaign period of only 10 days has become moot. Our Resolution of September 3, 2002 and COMELEC Resolution No. 5708 granted an additional 15 days for the campaign period as prayed for by petitioner.
First Issue: Validity of the Recall Resolution.
Petitioner Socrates argues that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in upholding the Recall Resolution despite the absence of notice to 130 PRA members and the defective service of notice to other PRA members. The COMELEC, however, found that
On various dates, in the month of June 2002, the proponents for the Recall of incumbent City Mayor Victorino Dennis M. Socrates sent notices of the convening of the PRA to the members thereof pursuant to Section 70 of the Local Government Code. Copies of the said notice are in Volumes I and II entitled Notices to PRA. Likewise, Proof of Service for each of the said notices were attached to the Petition and marked as Annex G of Volumes II and III of the Petition.
Notices were likewise posted in conspicuous places particularly at the Barangay Hall. Photos establishing the same were attached to the Petition and marked as Annex H. The proponents likewise utilized the broadcast mass media in the dissemination of the convening of the PRA.
Notices of the convening of the Puerto Princesa PRA were also sent to the following: [a list of 25 names of provincial elective officials, print and broadcast media practitioners, PNP officials, COMELEC city, regional and national officials, and DILG officials].
x x x
The City Election Officer of Puerto Princesa City in her Certification dated 10 July 2002 certified that upon a thorough and careful verification of the signatures appearing in PRA Resolution 01-02, x x x the majority of all members of the PRA concerned approved said resolution. She likewise certified that not a single member/signatory of the PRA complained or objected as to the veracity and authenticity of their signatures.
The Provincial Election Supervisor of Palawan, Atty. Urbano Arlando, in his Indorsement dated 10 July 2002, stated, upon proper review, all documents submitted are found in order.
The Acting Director IV, Region IV, in his study dated 30 July 2002 submitted the following recommendations:
This Office, after evaluating the documents filed, finds the instant Petition sufficient in form and substance. That the PRA was validly constituted and that the majority of all members thereof approved Resolution No. 01-02 calling for the recall of Mayor Victorino Dennis M. Socrates.
This Court is bound by the findings of fact of the COMELEC on matters within the competence and expertise of the COMELEC, unless the findings are patently erroneous. In Malonzo v. COMELEC,
which also dealt with alleged defective service of notice to PRA members, we ruled that
Needless to state, the issue of propriety of the notices sent to the PRA members is factual in nature, and the determination of the same is therefore a function of the COMELEC. In the absence of patent error, or serious inconsistencies in the findings, the Court should not disturb the same. The factual findings of the COMELEC, based on its own assessments and duly supported by gathered evidence, are conclusive upon the court, more so, in the absence of a substantiated attack on the validity of the same.
In the instant case, we do not find any valid reason to hold that the COMELECs findings of fact are patently erroneous.
Socrates also claims that the PRA members had no authority to adopt the Recall Resolution on July 2, 2002 because a majority of PRA members were seeking a new electoral mandate in the barangay elections scheduled on July 15, 2002. This argument deserves scant consideration considering that when the PRA members adopted the Recall Resolution their terms of office had not yet expired. They were all
de jure
sangguniang barangay members with no legal disqualification to participate in the recall assembly under Section 70 of the Local Government Code.
Socrates bewails that the manner private respondents conducted the PRA proceedings violated his constitutional right to information on matters of public concern. Socrates, however, admits receiving notice of the PRA meeting and of even sending his representative and counsel who were present during the entire PRA proceedings. Proponents of the recall election submitted to the COMELEC the Recall Resolution, minutes of the PRA proceedings, the journal of the PRA assembly, attendance sheets, notices sent to PRA members, and authenticated master list of barangay officials in Puerto Princesa. Socrates had the right to examine and copy all these public records in the official custody of the COMELEC. Socrates, however, does not claim that the COMELEC denied him this right. There is no legal basis in Socrates claim that respondents violated his constitutional right to information on matters of public concern.
Thus, we rule that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in upholding the validity of the Recall Resolution and in scheduling the recall election on September 24, 2002.
Second Issue: Hagedorns qualification to run for mayor
in the recall election of September 24, 2002.
The three-term limit rule for elective local officials is found in Section 8, Article X of the Constitution, which states:
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.
This three-term limit rule is reiterated in Section 43 (b) of RA No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, which provides:
Section 43. Term of Office. (a) x x x
(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official was elected.
These constitutional and statutory provisions have two parts. The first part provides that an elective local official cannot serve for more than three consecutive terms. The clear intent is that only consecutive terms count in determining the three-term limit rule. The second part states that voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time does not interrupt the continuity of service. The clear intent is that involuntary severance from office for any length of time interrupts continuity of service and prevents the service before and after the interruption from being joined together to form a continuous service or consecutive terms.
After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate reelection for a fourth term. The prohibited election refers to the next regular election for the same office following the end of the third consecutive term. Any subsequent election, like a recall election, is no longer covered by the prohibition for two reasons. First, a subsequent election like a recall election is no longer an immediate reelection after three consecutive terms. Second, the intervening period constitutes an involuntary interruption in the continuity of service.
When the framers of the Constitution debated on the term limit of elective local officials, the question asked was whether there would be no further election after three terms, or whether there would be no immediate reelection after three terms. This is clear from the following deliberations of the Constitutional Commission:
THE PRESIDENT: The Acting Floor Leader is recognized.
MR. ROMULO:
We are now ready to discuss the two issues, as indicated on the blackboard, and these are Alternative No. I where there is no further election after a total of three terms and Alternative No. 2 where there is no immediate reelection after three successive terms.
The Journal of the Constitutional Commission reports the following manifestation on the term of elective local officials:
MANIFESTATION OF MR. ROMULO
Upon resumption of session, Mr. Romulo manifested that the Body would proceed to the consideration of two issues on the term of Representatives and local officials, namely: 1) Alternative No. 1 (no further reelection after a total of three terms), and 2) Alternative No. 2 (no immediate reelection after three successive terms).
The framers of the Constitution used the same no immediate reelection question in voting for the term limits of Senators
and Representatives of the House.
[10]
Clearly, what the Constitution prohibits is an immediate reelection for a fourth term following three consecutive terms. The Constitution, however, does not prohibit a subsequent reelection for a fourth term as long as the reelection is not immediately after the end of the third consecutive term. A recall election mid-way in the term following the third consecutive term is a subsequent election but not an immediate reelection after the third term.
Neither does the Constitution prohibit one barred from seeking immediate reelection to run in any other subsequent election involving the same term of office. What the Constitution prohibits is a consecutive fourth term. The debates in the Constitutional Commission evidently show that the prohibited election referred to by the framers of the Constitution is the immediate reelection after the third term, not any other subsequent election.
If the prohibition on elective local officials is applied to any election within the three-year full term following the three-term limit, then Senators should also be prohibited from running in any election within the six-year full term following their two-term limit. The constitutional provision on the term limit of Senators is worded exactly like the term limit of elective local officials, thus:
No Senator shall serve for more than two consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.
[11]
In the debates on the term limit of Senators, the following exchange in the Constitutional Convention is instructive:
GASCON:
[12]
I would like to ask a question with regard to the issue after the second term. We will allow the Senator to rest for a period of time before he can run again?
DAVIDE:
[13]
That is correct.
GASCON: And the question that we left behind before - if the Gentleman will remember - was: How long will that period of rest be? Will it be one election which is three years or one term which is six years?
DAVIDE: If the Gentleman will remember, Commissioner Rodrigo expressed the view that during the election following the expiration of the first 12 years, whether such election will be on the third or on the sixth year thereafter, this particular member of the Senate can run. So, it is not really a period of hibernation for six years. That was the Committees stand.
GASCON: So, effectively, the period of rest would be three years at the least.
[14]
(Emphasis supplied)
The framers of the Constitution thus clarified that a Senator can run after only three years
[15]
following his completion of two terms. The framers expressly acknowledged that the prohibited election refers only to the immediate reelection, and not to any subsequent election, during the six-year period following the two term limit. The framers of the Constitution did not intend the period of rest of an elective official who has reached his term limit to be the full extent of the succeeding term.
In the case of Hagedorn, his candidacy in the recall election on September 24, 2002 is not an immediate reelection after his third consecutive term which ended on June 30, 2001. The immediate reelection that the Constitution barred Hagedorn from seeking referred to the regular elections in 2001. Hagedorn did not seek reelection in the 2001 elections.
Hagedorn was elected for three consecutive terms in the 1992, 1995 and 1998 elections and served in full his three consecutive terms as mayor of Puerto Princesa. Under the Constitution and the Local Government Code, Hagedorn could no longer run for mayor in the 2001 elections. The Constitution and the Local Government Code disqualified Hagedorn, who had reached the maximum three-term limit, from running for a fourth consecutive term as mayor. Thus, Hagedorn did not run for mayor in the 2001 elections.
[16]
Socrates ran and won as mayor of Puerto Princesa in the 2001 elections. After Hagedorn ceased to be mayor on June 30, 2001, he became a private citizen until the recall election of September 24, 2002 when he won by 3,018 votes over his closest opponent, Socrates.
From June 30, 2001 until the recall election on September 24, 2002, the mayor of Puerto Princesa was Socrates. During the same period, Hagedorn was simply a private citizen. This period is clearly an interruption in the continuity of Hagedorns service as mayor, not because of his voluntary renunciation, but because of a legal prohibition. Hagedorns three consecutive terms ended on June 30, 2001. Hagedorns new recall term from September 24, 2002 to June 30, 2004 is not a seamless continuation of his previous three consecutive terms as mayor. One cannot stitch together Hagedorns previous three-terms with his new recall term to make the recall term a fourth consecutive term because factually it is not. An involuntary interruption occurred from June 30, 2001 to September 24, 2002 which broke the continuity or consecutive character of Hagedorns service as mayor.
In Lonzanida v. Comelec,
[17]
the Court had occasion to explain interruption of continuity of service in this manner:
x x x The second sentence of the constitutional provision under scrutiny states, Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which he was elected. The clear intent of the framers of the constitution to bar any attempt to circumvent the three-term limit by a voluntary renunciation of office and at the same time respect the peoples choice and grant their elected official full service of a term is evident in this provision. Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three-term limit; conversely, involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service. x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
In Hagedorns case, the nearly 15-month period he was out of office, although short of a full term of three years, constituted an interruption in the continuity of his service as mayor. The Constitution does not require the interruption or hiatus to be a full term of three years. The clear intent is that interruption for any length of time, as long as the cause is involuntary, is sufficient to break an elective local officials continuity of service.
In the recent case of
Adormeo v. Comelec and Talaga,
[18]
a unanimous Court reiterated the rule that an interruption consisting of a portion of a term of office breaks the continuity of service of an elective local official. In Adormeo, Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr. had served two consecutive full terms as mayor of Lucena City. In his third bid for election as mayor in 1998, Talaga lost to Bernard G. Tagarao. However, in the recall election of May 12, 2000, Talaga won and served the unexpired term of Tagarao from May 12, 2000 to June 30, 2001. When Talaga ran again for mayor in the 2001 elections, Raymundo Adormeo, the other candidate for mayor, petitioned for Talagas disqualification on the ground that Talaga had already served three consecutive terms as mayor.
Thus, the issue in Adormeo was whether Talagas recall term was a continuation of his previous two terms so that he was deemed to have already served three consecutive terms as mayor. The Court ruled that Talaga was qualified to run in the 2001 elections, stating that the period from June 30, 1998 to May 12, 2000 when Talaga was out of office interrupted the continuity of his service as mayor. Talagas recall term as mayor was not consecutive to his previous two terms because of this interruption, there having been a break of almost two years during which time Tagarao was the mayor.
We held in Adormeo that the period an elective local official is out of office interrupts the continuity of his service and prevents his recall term from being stitched together as a seamless continuation of his previous two consecutive terms. In the instant case, we likewise hold that the nearly 15 months Hagedorn was out of office interrupted his continuity of service and prevents his recall term from being stitched together as a seamless continuation of his previous three consecutive terms. The only difference between Adormeo and the instant case is the time of the interruption. In Adormeo, the interruption occurred after the first two consecutive terms. In the instant case, the interruption happened after the first three consecutive terms. In both cases, the respondents were seeking election for a fourth term.
In Adormeo, the recall term of Talaga began only from the date he assumed office after winning the recall election. Talagas recall term did not retroact to include the tenure in office of his predecessor. If Talagas recall term was made to so retroact, then he would have been disqualified to run in the 2001 elections because he would already have served three consecutive terms prior to the 2001 elections. One who wins and serves a recall term does not serve the full term of his predecessor but only the unexpired term. The period of time prior to the recall term, when another elective official holds office, constitutes an interruption in continuity of service. Clearly, Adormeo established the rule that the winner in the recall election cannot be charged or credited with the full term of three years for purposes of counting the consecutiveness of an elective officials terms in office.
In the same manner, Hagedorns recall term does not retroact to include the tenure in office of Socrates. Hagedorn can only be disqualified to run in the September 24, 2002 recall election if the recall term is made to retroact to June 30, 2001, for only then can the recall term constitute a fourth consecutive term. But to consider Hagedorns recall term as a full term of three years, retroacting to June 30, 2001, despite the fact that he won his recall term only last September 24, 2002, is to ignore reality. This Court cannot declare as consecutive or successive terms of office which historically and factually are not.
Worse, to make Hagedorns recall term retroact to June 30, 2001 creates a legal fiction that unduly curtails the freedom of the people to choose their leaders through popular elections. The concept of term limits is in derogation of the sovereign will of the people to elect the leaders of their own choosing. Term limits must be construed strictly to give the fullest possible effect to the sovereign will of the people. As this Court aptly stated in Borja, Jr. v. Comelec:
Thus, a consideration of the historical background of Art. X, §8 of the Constitution reveals that the members of the Constitutional Commission were as much concerned with preserving the freedom of choice of the people as they were with preventing the monopolization of political power. Indeed, they rejected a proposal put forth by Commissioner Edmundo F. Garcia that after serving three consecutive terms or nine years there should be no further reelection for local and legislative officials. Instead, they adopted the alternative proposal of Commissioner Christian Monsod that such officials be simply barred from running for the same position in the succeeding election following the expiration of the third consecutive term. Monsod warned against prescreening candidates [from] whom the people will choose as a result of the proposed absolute disqualification, considering that the draft constitution contained provisions recognizing people's power.
[19]
(Emphasis supplied)
A necessary consequence of the interruption of continuity of service is the start of a new term following the interruption. An official elected in recall election serves the unexpired term of the recalled official. This unexpired term is in itself one term for purposes of counting the three-term limit. This is clear from the following discussion in the Constitutional Commission:
SUAREZ:
[20]
For example, a special election is called for a Senator, and the Senator newly elected would have to serve the unexpired portion of the term. Would that mean that serving the unexpired portion of the term is already considered one term? So, half a term, which is actually the correct statement, plus one term would disqualify the Senator concerned from running? Is that the meaning of this provision on disqualification, Madam President?
DAVIDE: Yes, because we speak of term, and if there is a special election, he will serve only for the unexpired portion of that particular term plus one more term for the Senator and two more terms for the Members of the Lower House.
[21]
Although the discussion referred to special elections for Senators and Representatives of the House, the same principle applies to a recall election of local officials. Otherwise, an elective local official who serves a recall term can serve for more than nine consecutive years comprising of the recall term plus the regular three full terms. A local official who serves a recall term should know that the recall term is in itself one term although less than three years. This is the inherent limitation he takes by running and winning in the recall election.
In summary, we hold that Hagedorn is qualified to run in the September 24, 2002 recall election for mayor of Puerto Princesa because:
1. Hagedorn is not running for immediate reelection following his three consecutive terms as mayor which ended on June 30, 2001;
2. Hagedorns continuity of service as mayor was involuntarily interrupted from June 30, 2001 to September 24, 2002 during which time he was a private citizen;
3. Hagedorns recall term from September 24, 2002 to June 30, 2004 cannot be made to retroact to June 30, 2001 to make a fourth consecutive term because factually the recall term is not a fourth consecutive term; and
4. Term limits should be construed strictly to give the fullest possible effect to the right of the electorate to choose their leaders.
WHEREFORE,
the petitions in G.R. Nos. 154512, 154683 and 155083-84 are DISMISSED. The temporary restraining order issued by this Court on September 24, 2002 enjoining the proclamation of the winning candidate for mayor of Puerto Princesa in the recall election of September 24, 2002 is lifted. No costs.
SO ORDERED
Bellosillo, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio-Morales
, and
Callejo, Sr., JJ.,
concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J.,
see concurring and dissenting opinion.
Puno, J.,
see concurring opinion.
Vitug, J.,
in the result.
Mendoza, J.,
in the result, without to the filing of separate opinion.
Austria-Martinez,
on leave.
Corona, J.,
no part - prior consultation.
Azcuna, J.,
joins the separate opinion of C.J. Davide.
Filed under Rule 65 in relation to Rule 64 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure with prayers for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining orders.
Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991, Chapter 5, Sections 69 to 75.
Composed of Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr. as Chairman with Commissioners Luzviminda G. Tancangco, Rufino S.B. Javier, Ralph C. Lantion, Mehol K. Sadain, Resurreccion Z. Borra and Florentino A. Tuason, Jr.
With Mehol K. Sadain as Presiding Commissioner and Luzviminda G. Tancangco and Resurreccion Z. Borra as Commissioners.
269 SCRA 380 (1997).
Ricardo J. Romulo, Commissioner of the 1986 Constitutional Convention.
Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 2, p. 236.
Journal of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. I, p. 420.
MR. ROMULO: Madam President, we are now ready to vote on the question of the Senators, and the schemes are as follows: The first scheme is, no further election after two terms; the second scheme is, no immediate reelection after two successive terms. Madam President, inasmuch as the principles applicable here are the same as those for the House of Representatives, I move that we go directly to the voting and forego any further discussions.
THE PRESIDENT: Please distribute the ballots for this particular item for Senators. Are we ready now? The Secretary-General will please count the ballots.
COUNTING OF BALLOTS
THE SECRETARY-GENERAL: We have 43 ballots here, Madam President. We shall now begin to count.
THE PRESIDENT: Please proceed.
THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, reading:
THE PRESIDENT: The results show 12 votes for Scheme No. I and 32 votes for Scheme No. II; Scheme No. II is approved. (Emphasis supplied) Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 2, pp. 244-245.
[10]
MR. GASCON: Is this voting just for Congressmen?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
The Secretary-General will now please proceed to count the votes.
COUNTING OF BALLOTS
THE SECRETARY-GENERAL: Madam President, we have here 43 ballots cast. We will now start the counting.
Alternative No. 1 no further election after a total of three terms: /////-/////-/////-//
Alternative No. 2
no immediate reelection after three successive terms
THE PRESIDENT: The results show 17 votes for Alternative No. I and 26 votes for Alternative No. 2; Alternative No. 2 is approved. (Emphasis supplied) Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 2, pp. 243-244.
[11]
Second paragraph of Section 4, Article VI of the Constitution.
[12]
Jose Luis Martin C. Gascon, Commissioner of the 1986 Constitutional Commission.
[13]
Hilario G. Davide, Jr., Commissioner of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, and now Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.
[14]
Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. II, p. 590.
[15]
Bernas, The Intent of the 1986 Constitution Writers, p. 341 (1995).
[16]
Hagedorn instead ran for Governor of Palawan in the 2001 elections but lost.
[17]
311 SCRA 602 (1999).
[18]
G.R. No. 147927, February 4, 2002.
[19]
295 SCRA 157 (1998).
[20]
Jose E. Suarez, Commissioner of the 1986 Constitutional Commission.
[21]
Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. II, p. 592.
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
I concur with the opinion and conclusion of Mr. Justice Antonio T. Carpio in G.R. No. 154512 and G.R. No. 154683. The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) committed no grave abuse of discretion in giving due course to the Recall Resolution. Dismissal then of G.R. No. 154512 is inevitable. This notwithstanding, I still hold on to my dissenting view in G.R. No. 111511 (Garcia, et al. vs. COMELEC, et al., 227 SCRA 100, 121
[1993]
) that the provision on the preparatory recall assembly in Section 70 of the Local Government Code of 1991 is unconstitutional.
Our issuance of the Resolution of 3 September 2002 in G.R. No. 154683 enjoining the COMELEC from implementing its Resolution No. 5673 insofar as it fixed the recall election on 7 September 2002, and the subsequent Resolution of the COMELEC giving the candidates an additional campaign period of fifteen days from 7 September 2002 rendered moot and academic the principal issue in G.R. No. 154683. The dismissal of the petition therein is also in order.
However, I regret I cannot concur with the argument and conclusion relative to G.R. Nos. 155083-84. I respectfully submit that private respondent Edward S. Hagedorn is disqualified from running for the position of Mayor of Puerto Princesa City in the recall election in question.
Section 8 of Article X of the Constitution expressly provides:
SEC. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an Interruption In the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.
Paragraph (b), Section 43 of R.A. No. 7160 (The Local Government Code) restates this constitutional restriction, thus: SEC. 43. Term of office.
(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official was elected.
Section 8 of Article X of the Constitution was not found in the Report of the Committee on Local Governments of the Constitutional Commission of 1986. It was introduced at the plenary session by Commissioner Hilario G. Davide, Jr. Commenting thereon in his book entitled
The Intent of 1986 Constitution Writers
(1995 ed., p. 699), Commissioner Joaquin Bernas states:
This provision was not found among the Committees proposals but came as an amendment proposed by Commissioner Davide. It was readily accepted without much discussion and formally approved.
Section 8 sets the duration of a term at three years, and prohibits elective local officials from serving for more than three consecutive terms.
Pursuant to the second paragraph of Section 1 of Article XVIII (The Transitory Provision) of the Constitution, and Executive Order No. 270, as amended by R.A. No. 6636, the first local election, that is, the election for the first term under the Constitution for elective local officials, was on 18 January 1988. By express provision of Section 5 of R.A. No. 6636, in relation to Section 2 of Article XVIII of the Constitution, that term expired at noon of 30 June 1992. The second election, i.e., the election for the second term of elective local officials which expired at noon of 30 June 1995, for elective local officials, was on the second Monday of May 1992 pursuant to R.A. No. 7166 (An Act Providing for Synchronized National and Local Elections and for Electoral Reforms). The third election, i.e., for the third term which expired at noon of 30 June 1998, was on the second Monday of May 1995, pursuant to Section 2 of R.A. No. 7166. The fourth election, or for the fourth term which expired at noon of 30 June 2001, was on the second Monday of May 1998. The fifth election, i.e., for the fifth term which would expire at noon of 30 June 2004, was on the second Monday of May 2001.Conformably with Section 8 of Article X of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of R.A. No. 7160, a local official elected in the first local election of 18 January 1988 may be reelected in the synchronized elections in May 1992 and in May 1995. He could not seek another reelection in the May 1998 election because that would have been his fourth term. Similarly, a local official who was elected in the May 1992 election could be reelected in the May 1995 and May 1998 elections.
Private respondent Hagedorn was first elected as City Mayor of Puerto Princesa City in the May 1992 election. He was reelected in the May 1995 and May 1998 elections. His third term, by virtue of his election in the May 1998 election, expired on 30 June 2001. Therefore, he was constitutionally and statutorily barred from seeking reelection In the May 2001 election, which would have been his fourth term.
The term of office covered by the May 2001 election is up to 30 June 2004. Section 8 of Article X of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of R.A. No. 7160 are clear in what is prohibited, which is the fourth term. Nothing can be clearer from the wordings thereof: the term of office of elective local officials ... shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more that three consecutive terms. In short, an elective local official who has served three consecutive terms, like Hagedorn, is disqualified from seeking re-election for the succeeding fourth term. The provision bars the holding of four consecutive terms.
The ponencia is then correct when it holds that the three-term limit bars an immediate reelection for a fourth term. But I disagree when it rules that in the case of Hagedorn he did not seek an immediate reelection for a fourth term because he was not a candidate for reelection in the May 2001 election. It forgets that what would have been his fourth term by virtue of the May 2001 election was for the period from 30 June 2001 to 30 June 2004. The flaw in the ruling results from an apparent confusion between term and election, the root cause of which is the attempt to distinguish voluntary renunciation of office from involuntary severance from office and the term of office to which it relates.
Let me first discuss the matter of whether the Constitutional Commission did approve the rule of no Immediate reelection after three consecutive terms. In support of its affirmative conclusion the
ponencia
quotes the Manifestation of Commissioner Romulo as entered in the Journal of the Constitutional Commission, thus:
MANIFESTATION OF MR. ROMULO
Upon resumption of session, Mr. Romulo manifested that the Body would proceed to the consideration of two issues on the term of Representatives and local officials, namely: a) Alternative No. 1 (no further reelection after a total of three terms), and 2) Alternative No. 2 (
no immediate reelection after three successive terms
This is inaccurate. What actually happened was that the issue was originally for elective national and local officials. However, the Commission decided to consider first the term of the members of Congress; and to defer the discussion on the term of elective local officials until the Commission would consider the report of the Committee on Local Governments. On this point I quote the pertinent portions of Volume Two, pages 238-245 of the Record of the Constitutional Commission of its proceedings on 25 July 1986:
THE PRESIDENT. Maybe it will be of help we Just remind ourselves that what we have before us now is the report of the Committee on the Legislative. Therefore, maybe we should confine ourselves first to what is covered by the report which is the term of office of the Senators and the Representatives.And with respect to the local officials, let us await the report of the Committee on Local Governments as to its recommendation on this matter.
MR. RODRIGO. As a matter of fact, I will go further than that, it is my belief, as regards local officials, that we should leave this matter to the legislative.
THE PRESIDENT. So what is the pleasure now of the Acting Floor Leader or of the Chairman of the Committee on the Legislative?
MR. RODRIGO. I wonder if the two proponents, Madam President, will agree that we first talk about the term of office of the Representatives because we are now discussing the legislative department.
MR. DAVIDE. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Davide is recognized.
MR. DAVIDE. I will agree really that this matter should relate only to the term of office of the Representatives.
THE PRESIDENT. But are we agreed on these two proposals - the one of Commissioner Garcia where there is no further election after a total of three terms and the other where there is no Immediate reelection after three successive terms?
MR. OPLE. Madam President, originally if I remember right, the Commission decided to consider the synchronization of elections. And from that original commitment, we proceeded to fix the terms and decided related questions within the context of synchronization. Are we now abandoning the original task of synchronization which could only be fully settled in terms of delimitations on the proposed terms of the President and the Vice-President, the Members of Congress and the local officials, or do we want to postpone the synchronization task to a later time after we hear from the Committee on Local Governments and the other concerned committees?
THE PRESIDENT. What does the Acting Floor Leader say to this particular question of Commissioner Ople?
MR. ROMULO. In a way, Madam President, we have settled the synchronization task, because we have decided on the officials absolute terms. All we are really talking about now is whether or not they are eligible for reelection, and I think those are separable issues.
MR. OPLE. If they are separable, and we have already settled the synchronization task, then I think that is something to be thankful about. But considering the immediate business at hand, is it the wish of the Acting Floor Leader that the election of the local officials should be eliminated from the consideration of those two choices?
MR. ROMULO. Yes. I think the sense of the body now is to limit this choice to the Members of the House of Representatives.
MR. OPLE. And do the manifestations of both Commissioners Garcia and Monsod still stand after the elimination of the election of the local officials?
MR. ROMULO. Yes, I think so.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Davide is recognized.
MR. DAVIDE. Madam President, as worded, It is a personal disqualification.
MR. ROMULO. We are now ready to vote, Madam President.
SUSPENSION OF SESSION
THE PRESIDENT. We are now ready to vote by ballot. Let us distribute the ballots. Anyway the voting would take only about 10 minutes.
The session is suspended.
It was 3:40 p.m.
At this juncture, pieces of paper were distributed, and the Commissioners wrote down their votes.
RESUMPTION OF SESSION
At 3:50 p.m., the session was resumed.
THE PRESIDENT. The session is resumed.
MR. GASCON. Madam President, may I have a clarification before we count the ballots. The voting now is just for Representatives. We are not speaking of the term of office of the Senators yet. Is that correct?
THE PRESIDENT. The term of office of the Senators was disposed of this morning.
This voting now is only for Representatives.
MR. GASCON. I think the Issue of whether the Senators could run again for election after their two consecutive terms or 12 years after a lapse of a period of time has not yet been finalized.
THE PRESIDENT. I beg the Commissioners pardon.
MR. GASCON. Is this voting just for Congressmen?
THE PRESIDENT. Yes.
The Secretary-General will now please proceed to count the votes.
COUNTING OF BALLOTS
THE SECRETARY-GENERAL. Madam President, we have here 43 ballots cast. We will now start the counting.
Alternative No. 1 - no further election after a total of three terms: /////-/////-/////-//
Alternative No. 2 - no immediate reelection after three successive terms: /////-/////-/////-/////-/////-/
THE PRESIDENT. The results show 17 votes for Alternative No. 1 and 26 votes for Alternative No. 2; Alternative No. 2 is approved.
What does the Acting Floor Leader say?
MR. ROMULO. Alternative No. 2 has won, Madam President. It seems there are some doubts as to the term of office of the Senators, so I propose that we similarly vote on that to end any doubt. It was my understanding this morning that when we voted for the term of office of the Senators, they would not be perpetually disqualified.
THE PRESIDENT. From the transcripts, it appears here that with respect to Senators, 22 votes went to Scheme No. II; that is, with one reelection. This is already a majority. So, does the Acting Floor Leader propose that we vote again?
MR. ROMULO. The question is whether or not that will be perpetual, Madam President, or after resting for six years they can run again. That is the question that is not answered. I am talking of the Senators.
THE PRESIDENT. This morning, Scheme No. I, without reelection, has 3 votes; Scheme No. II, with one reelection - 22 votes; Scheme No. III, no limit on reelection - 17 votes.
MR. REGALADO. Madam President.
MR. RODRIGO. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. May we first clarify this from the Secretary-General?
MR. ROMULO. The question is whether or not in voting for the term of six years with one reelection, the Senator is perpetually disqualified, so that is a similar question to what we had posed with regard to the House of Representatives.
THE PRESIDENT. In other words, after serving with one reelection, whether or not he is perpetually disqualified after serving 12 years?
MR. ROMULO. Yes, Madam President.
MR. RODRIGO. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Yes, Commissioner Rodrigo is recognized.
MR. RODRIGO. Or, if after one reelection, he is perpetually disqualified or he can hibernate - the very word used - for six years and then run again for reelection but not consecutive, not immediate. In other words, he is entitled to one immediate reelection.
REV. RIGOS. Another point, Madam President.
MR. RODRIGO. And then, after that, if there is a gap, when he is not a Senator, then he can run for the same office.
REV. RIGOS. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Yes, Commissioner Rigos is recognized.
REV. RIGOS. In relation to that, if he will be allowed to run again as Senator after a period of hibernation, we have to clarify how long that should be. It could be three years, because in the proposed scheme, every three years we can elect the Senators.
MR. RODRIGO. Yes, Madam President, it can be three years.
SUSPENSION OF SESSION
THE PRESIDENT. I will suspend the session again so as to allow the parties to compare with the Acting Floor Leader so that we will know what we are going to vote on.
The session is suspended
It was 3:58 p.m.
RESUMPTION OF SESSION
At 4:05 p.m., the session was resumed.
THE PRESIDENT. The session is resumed.
The Acting Floor Leader is recognized.
MR. ROMULO. Madam President, we are now ready to vote on the question of the Senators, and the schemes are as follows: The first scheme is, no further election after two terms; the - second scheme is, no immediate reelection after two successive terms.
Madam President, inasmuch as the principles applicable here are the same as those for the House of Representatives, I move that we go directly to the voting and forego any further discussions.
THE PRESIDENT. Please distribute the ballots for this particular item for Senators.
Are we ready now?
The Secretary-General will please count the ballots.
COUNTING OF BALLOTS
THE SECRETARY-GENERAL. We have 43 ballots here, Madam President. We shall now begin to count.
THE PRESIDENT. Please proceed.
THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, reading:
THE PRESIDENT. The results show 12 votes for Scheme No. I and 32 votes for Scheme No. II; Scheme No. II approved.
All the results will be considered by the Committee on the Legislative in preparation of their report.
So can we leave this matter now?
The corresponding proposal on the three-term limit for elective local officials without immediate reelection was taken up by the Constitutional Commission much later or specifically on 16 August 1986. On this point, the pertinent portions of Vol. Three, pages 406-408, Record of the Constitutional Commission, read as follows:
MR. RAMA. Madam President, I ask that Commissioner Davide be recognized.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Davide is recognized.
MR. DAVIDE. Thank you, Madam President.
After Section 4, I propose to Insert a new section to be denominated later as Section 5. It provides as follows: THE TERM OF OFFICE OF ELECTIVE LOCAL OFFICIALS, EXCEPT BARANGAY OFFICIALS, WHICH SHALL BE DETERMINED BY LAW, SHALL BE THREE YEARS AND NO SUCH OFFICIAL SHALL SERVE FOR MORE THAN THREE CONSECUTIVE TERMS. VOLUNTARY RENUNCIATION OF THE OFFICE FOR ANY LENGTH OF TIME SHALL NOT BE CONSIDERED AS AN INTERRUPTION IN THE CONTINUITY OF HIS SERVICE FOR THE FULL TERM FOR WHICH HE WAS ELECTED. This is in accordance with the mandate of the Commission when we voted on the terms of officials up to local officials, excluding the term of barangay officials which was a very specific exception.
MR. NOLLEDO. One clarificatory question, Madam President. What will be the term of the office of barangay officials as provided for?
MR. DAVIDE. As may be determined by law.
MR. NOLLEDO. As provided for in the Local Government Code.
MR. DAVIDE. Yes.
MR. NOLLEDO. We accept the amendment. The Committee accepts the amendment.
THE PRESIDENT. May we have the reaction of the Committee?
MR. NOLLEDO. The Committee accepts the amendment, as amended, Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Is there any other comment?
MR. OPLE. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Ople is recognized.
MR. OPLE. May we ask the Committee to read the proposed amendment now.
MR. NOLLEDO. May we ask Commissioner Davide to read the new section.
MR. DAVIDE. THE TERM OF OFFICE OF ELECTIVE LOCAL OFFICIALS, EXCEPT BARANGAY OFFICIALS, WHICH SHALL BE DETERMINED BY LAW, SHALL BE THREE YEARS AND N SUCH OFFICIAL SHALL SERVE FOR MORE THAN THREE CONSECUTIVE TERMS. VOLUNTARY RENUNCIATION OF THE OFFICE FOR ANY LENGTH OF TIME SHALL NOT BE CONSIDERED AS AN INTERRUPTION IN THE CONTINUITY OF HIS SERVICE FOR THE FULL TERM FOR WHICH HE WAS ELECTED.
THE PRESIDENT. Then let us vote first on the Davide amendment.
Is there any objection to this new section proposed by Commissioner Davide which has been read to the body? (Silence) The Chair hears none; the proposed section is approved.
I wish to add that the Constitutional Commission debates on the issue of no immediate reelection after three consecutive terms for members of Congress clearly indicated that the no immediate reelection after the 3-term limit would equally apply to the elective local officials. This accounted for the immediate acceptance by the Committee on Local Governments of the aforementioned Amendment of Commissioner Davide, which is now Section 8 of Article X of the Constitution. These debates clearly showed the Intent of the Commission that the ban against an immediate reelection after three consecutive terms applies to the fourth term, i.e., the term immediately following the three consecutive terms, to be filled up by the regular election for such fourth term. For one to be able to run again after three consecutive terms, he has to rest for the entire immediately succeeding fourth term. On the next fifth term he can run again to start a new series of three consecutive terms. We quote these pertinent portions of the debates, recorded in Volume Two, pages 232-233 of the Record of the Constitutional Commission:
MR. ROMULO. Madam President, the following are the various alternatives:Scheme No. I is without reelection; Scheme No. II is with one reelection; and Scheme No. III is reelection without limit. This is for the Senators.
At this juncture, pieces of paper were distributed and the Commissioners wrote down their votes.
THE PRESIDENT. The Chair asks the Chairman, Commissioner Davide, to please consolidate the results of the voting for President and Vice-President.
THE SECRETARY-GENERAL. Madam President, we are ready. THE PRESIDENT. The Secretary-General will please proceed.
COUNTING OF BALLOTS
THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, reading:
Scheme No. I - ///
THE PRESIDENT. The results show 3 votes for Scheme No. I; 22 votes for Scheme No. II; and 17 votes for Scheme No. III; Scheme No. II is approved.
MR. ROMULO. Madam President, the next position is for the House of Representatives, the Congressmen. I would assume we can use the same choices. Does any one want any variation?
MR. RODRIGO. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Rodrigo is recognized.
MR. RODRIGO. For the record, I would like to ask Commissioner Romulo some questions.
MR. ROMULO. Yes.
MR. RODRIGO. Scheme No. II says the Vice-President - with one reelection.
THE PRESIDENT. No, that is for Senators.
MR. GUINGONA. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Yes, Commissioner Guenon is recognized.
MR. GUINGONA. May I suggest one more scheme - with two reelections for the Members of the House of Representatives?
THE PRESIDENT. So, we shall distribute ballots again.
MR. ROMULO. While the ballots are being distributed, may I read the following four propositions for Congressmen:
Scheme No. I, without reelection.
Scheme No. II, with one reelection.
Scheme No. III, with two reelections.
Scheme No. IV, no limit on reelection. I
MR. DE LOS REYES. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner de los Reyes is recognized.
MR. DE LOS REYES. The term of the Members of the House of Representatives will be three years, according to the first voting; the term of the Senators, if they are entitled to one reelection, will be 12 years. So, in order for a Member of the House of Representatives to have also 12 years, he must be entitled to three reelections. I propose another scheme with three reelections to make it equal.
MR. RODRIGO. Will the Gentleman maintain the number there and add that as No. V. I filled up my ballot already and if I erase, this might be disqualified as a marked ballot.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Rodrigo may change his ballot.
MR. DE CASTRO. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner de Castro Is recognized.
MR. DE CASTRO. The situation stated by Commissioner de los Reyes is apparently covered by Scheme No. II which we agreed upon earlier. The situation will not happen, because both the Senators and the Congressmen will have five (5) years on the first election. So, the possibility that the Senators will have a longer term than the Congressmen is remote.
MR. MONSOD. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Monsod is recognized.
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, it occurred to us that the three alternatives are not really mutually exclusive. Can we have only these three: without reelection, with reelection and with unlimited reelection? We are asking here for plurality only, Madam President. Can we eliminate?
THE PRESIDENT. In other words, we shall have the same schemes as those for Senators; without reelection, with one reelection and unlimited reelection.
REV. RIGOS. Madam President, besides we have already submitted our ballots.
MR. MONSOD. I withdraw my proposal, Madam President.
MR. GARCIA. Madam President, I would suggest that the two schemes with the highest votes be voted upon to get the key majority. For example, if the schemes with two reelections and no limit to election get the highest number of votes, then we vote again to get the key majority.
THE PRESIDENT. We will do that. Are all the votes in?
COUNTING OF BALLOTS
THE SECRETARY-GENERAL. Madam President, we have 43 ballots.
THE PRESIDENT. The Secretary-General will please proceed. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, reading:
Scheme No. I - 0
Scheme No. II - //
THE PRESIDENT. The results show no vote for Scheme No. I; 2 votes for Scheme No. II; 21 votes for Scheme No. III; 14 votes for Scheme No. IV; and 6 votes for Scheme No. V; Scheme No. III is approved.
MR. RODRIGO. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Rodrigo is recognized.
MR. RODRIGO.. I would like to ask a question for clarification.
THE PRESIDENT. Please proceed.
MR. RODRIGO. If the Members of the Lower House can have two reelections, does this mean two immediate reelections, or a term of nine consecutive years? Let us say that a Member of the Lower House has been reelected twice; that means he will serve for nine years. Can he let three years elapse and then run again?
THE PRESIDENT. We will ask the Chairman of the Committee on the Legislative to answer the question.
MR. DAVIDE. That is correct, Madam President, because two reelections mean two successive reelections. So he cannot serve beyond nine consecutive years.
MR. RODRIGO. Consecutively?
MR. DAVIDE. Consecutively.
MR. RODRIGO. But after nine years he can let one
MR. DAVIDE. He can rest. He can hibernate for three years.
MR. RODRIGO. And run again.
MR. DAVIDE. He can run again.
MR. RODRIGO. And again have nine years as a maximum.
MR. DAVIDE. I do not know if that is also the thinking of Commissioner Garcia who is the main proponent of this proposal on two reelections. I would seek the opinion of Commissioner Garcia for the record. (underscoring supplied for emphasis.)
The dichotomy made in the
ponencia
between voluntary renunciation of the office as used in Section 8 of Article X of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of R.A. No. 7160 and involuntary severance from office is unnecessary, if not misplaced. From the discussion in the
ponencia
, the latter is made to apply to the banned term, i.e., the fourth term immediately following three consecutive terms. Speaking now of Hagedorn, he cannot have suffered involuntary severance from office because there was nothing to be severed; he was not a holder of an office either in a
de jure
or de facto capacity. He knew he was disqualified from seeking a third reelection to office. Disqualification is, definitely, not synonymous with involuntary severance. Even if we concede that involuntary severance is an act which interrupts the continuity of a term for purposes of applying the three-term principle the rule laid down in Lonzanida vs. COMELEC (311 SCRA 609), cited in the
ponencia
, page 17, is not applicable in the case of Hagedorn. The involuntary severance referred to in that case was one that took place during any of the three terms; hence, the term during which it occurred should be excluded in the computation. In the case of Hagedorn, no such involuntary severance took place during any of his three terms brought about by his election in 1992 and reelections in 1995 and 1998.
More importantly, the voluntary renunciation referred to in Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of R.A. No. 7160 is one that takes place at any time during either the first, second, or third term of the three consecutive terms. This is very clear from the last clause of Section 8, Article X of the Constitution, which reads: shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected. The purpose of the provision is to prevent an elective local official from voluntarily resigning from office for the purpose of circumventing the rule on the belief that the term during which he resigned would be excluded in the counting of the three-term rule. In short, the provision excluded is intended to impose a penalty on one who flouts the rule or make a mockery of it by the simple act of resigning. Thus, applying it in the case of Hagedorn, even if he voluntarily resigned on his third term, he would still be barred from seeking reelection in the May 2001 election.
Hagedorn cannot likewise avail of the ruling in Adormeo vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 147927, 4 February 2002) because in that case Talaga did not win in his second reelection bid, or for a third term, in the May 1998 elections. He won in the recall election of 12 May 2000. Hagedorn, as earlier stated, fully served three successive terms.
Neither can we allow Hagedorn to take refuge under the exchange between Commissioner Suarez and Commissioner Davide found on page 592, Vol. II of the Record of the Constitutional Commission and quoted on pages 19-20 of the
ponencia
SUAREZ: For example, a special election is called for a Senator, and the Senator newly elected would have to serve the unexpired portion of the term. Would that mean that serving the unexpired portion of the term is already considered one term? So, half a term, which is actually the correct statement, plus one term would disqualify the Senator concerned from running? Is that the meaning of this provision on disqualification, Madam President?
DAVIDE: Yes, because we speak of term And if there is a special election, he will serve only for the unexpired portion of that particular term plus one more term for the Senator and two more terms for the Members of the Lower House.
On the contrary, it is clear from the views of Commissioners Suarez and Davide that the term of office of one who is elected in a special election is considered one term for purposes of determining the three consecutive terms.
A declaration that Hagedorn is qualified to seek reelection in a recall election to remove the Mayor who was elected for a term for which Hagedorn was constitutionally and statutorily disqualified to be reelected to or, to hold Is to subvert the rationale of the three-consecutive-term rule and make a mockery of it. Worse, it abets destructive endless partisan politics and unsound governance. An elective local official who is disqualified to seek a fourth term because of the three-term limit but obsessed to hold on to power would spend the first year of the fourth term campaigning for the recall of the incumbent in the second year of said term. This would not be a problem If the disqualified official has a solid following and a strong political machinery. Interestingly, in this case, as stated on page 3 of the
ponencia
, the President of the Association of Barangay Captains of Puerto Princesa City is one Mark David M. Hagedorn and he was designated by the Preparatory Recall Assembly as interim Chairman.
I therefore vote to grant the petition in G.R. Nos. 155083-84, to set aside the resolution of the COMELEC holding private respondent Edward Hagedorn a qualified candidate for the position of Mayor of Puerto Princesa City in the recall election, and to declare him DISQUALIFIED from seeking reelection for a fourth term or from being a candidate for Mayor in the recall election in question.
SEPARATE OPINION
Mendoza, J.,
concurring in the judgment:
There is no dispute in this case that respondent Edward S. Hagedorn had served for three consecutive terms as Mayor of Puerto Princesa City prior to his election to the same position in the recall election held on September 24, 2002. The question is whether his election was for a fourth consecutive term in violation of Art. X, §8 of the Constitution, which bars elective local officials, with the exception of barangay officers, from serv[ing] for more than three consecutive terms.
The majority hold that it does not because what the Constitution prohibits is an immediate reelection for a fourth term following three consecutive terms. (p. 15) They argue that ?
. . . Hagedorns recall term does not retroact to include the tenure in office of Socrates. Hagedorn can only be disqualified to run in the September 24, 2002 recall election if the recall term is made to retroact to June 30, 2001, for only then can the recall term constitute a fourth consecutive term. But to consider Hagedorns recall term as a full term of three years, retroacting to June 30, 2001, despite the fact that he won his recall term only last September 24, 2002, is to ignore reality. This Court cannot declare as consecutive or successive terms of office which historically and factually are not. (p. 22)
On the other hand, the dissenters argue that what is prohibited is [a] fourth term (p. 4) and that the only way an elective local official, who has served for three consecutive terms, may again be elected to the same position is for him to allow the fourth term to expire before doing so.
Both the majority and the dissenters are thus agreed that the term following the three consecutive terms must be counted. Their disagreement is in considering whether or not to count the term during which a recall election is held as part of the three consecutive terms preceding it. The majority consider the term as a consecutive term of the term following ? but not of the third term preceding ? which has just ended because of the interruption between the beginning of the fourth term and the date of the recall election. Thus, the majority state:
A necessary consequence of the interruption of continuity of service is the start of a new term following the interruption. An official elected in recall election serves the unexpired term of the recalled official. This unexpired term is in itself one term for purposes of counting the three-term limit. (p. 23)
In contending that the unexpired term served by the winner in a recall election is in itself one term for purposes of counting the three term limit, the majority take contradictory positions because they also argue that Hagedorns recall term does not retroact to the beginning of that term and that to consider Hagedorns recall term as a full term of three years, retroacting to June 30 2001, despite the fact that he won his recall term only last September 24, 2002, is to ignore reality. The majority are thus riding two unruly horses, contending on the one hand that the term during which a recall election takes place is a fourth term, and on the other that it is not a fourth term for purposes of determining whether an elective local official has served for more than three consecutive terms.
On the other hand, the dissenters say that the only way an elective local official can run again for the same position after serving three consecutive terms is for him to allow the succeeding full term of three years to pass before doing so. They contend:
. . . For one to be able to run again after three consecutive terms, he has to rest for the entire immediately succeeding fourth term. On the next fifth term he can run again to start a new series of three consecutive terms. (p. 11)
Hagedorn may not have rested for one full term before running in the recall election on September 24, 2002, but neither will he be serving a fourth term because a term consists of three years. Not to have rested for one full term requires that he should also serve for one full term. This is not, however, possible because, under Art. X, §8 of the Constitution, the term of office of elective officials . . . shall be three years. Less than three years is not a term.
The flaw in the theories of both the majority and the dissenters is that both agree that if there is an interruption in the continuity of service of an elective local official during the three consecutive terms, not caused by the voluntary renunciation of office, the term during which the interruption occurs should not be counted in determining the three-term limit. This is in accordance with the ruling in Lonzanida v. COMELEC
that if the election of a mayor for the third consecutive term is annulled, he can run again in the next election because the term during which his election was invalidated is not to be counted. Similarly, in Adormeo v. COMELEC,
it was held that if after serving for two consecutive terms, a mayor loses in his bid for reelection but, in a recall election subsequently held during that term, he wins he can still run in the next regular election because the term during which he lost is not to be counted for applying the three-term limit. However, the majority and the dissenters also say that if the interruption takes place in the term following three consecutive terms, the term should be counted in applying the three-term limit. For the majority, such term should be included in determining the next consecutive terms, while the dissenters say it should be considered in determining the consecutive terms preceding it. Both majority and the dissenters are thus inconsistent.
Moreover, both erroneously assume that the election in a recall election is a reelection. Both cite the records of the Constitutional Commission that what is prohibited after a service for more than three consecutive terms is not reelection per se but immediate reelection. They note that the three-term limit, originally adopted for Senators and members of the House of Representatives, was later applied to elective local officials as well.
Hence, they focus their discussion on whether a reelection is immediate.
To the majority a recall election is a reelection but it is not an immediate one because a recall election does not immediately follow the end of the third term. On the other hand, to the dissenters, such election is immediate because it takes place during the fourth term which immediately follows three consecutive terms. Consequently, the election during that term of a local elective official is prohibited if he has served in the previous three consecutive terms. To quote the dissenters:
These debates [in the Constitutional Commission] clearly show the intent of the Commission that the ban against an immediate reelection after three consecutive terms applies to the fourth term, i.e., the term immediately following the three consecutive terms, to be filled up by the regular election for such term. (p. 11)
The question is not whether an election during a recall is an immediate reelection. The question is whether it is a reelection at all. The dictionary meaning of reelect is to elect for another term.
On the other hand, as already pointed out, the Constitution provides that the term of an elective local official is three years. Therefore, the period during which one serves by virtue of a recall election is not a term because it cannot be for three years. It is only a tenure.
I submit with respect that the term during which a recall election is held should not be counted in computing the three-term limit not only when the recall election occurs within three consecutive terms, as this Court has already held,
but also when such election is held during the fourth term immediately following three consecutive terms. The reason for this is that the elective local official cannot be said to have served for more than three consecutive terms because of the break in his service. What prevents the fourth term from being counted in determining the three-term limit is the lack of continuity, or the break, in the service of the full term. I must stress that the Constitution does not say service for more than three terms but service for more than three consecutive terms.
As the discussion of the Constitutional Commission on Art. X, §8 shows, the three-term limit is aimed at preventing the monopolization or aggrandizement of political power and the perpetration of the incumbent in office. This abuse is likely to arise from a prolonged stay in power. It is not likely to arise if the service is broken, albeit it is for more than three terms. Hence, the application of the constitutional ban on the holding of elective local office for three consecutive terms requires in my view (1) election in a regular election for three consecutive terms and (2) service for the full terms, each consisting of three years, for which the official is elected. The first requirement is intended to give the electorate the freedom to reelect a candidate for a local elective position as part of their sovereign right (the right of suffrage) to choose those whom they believe can best serve them. This is the reason the framers of our Constitution rejected Scheme No. 1, which was to ban reelection after three successive terms, and adopted Scheme No. 2, which is about no immediate reelection after three successive terms. On the other hand, the second requirement is intended to prevent the accumulation of power resulting from too long a stay in office.
To repeat, the term during which a recall election is held is not a fourth term in relation to the three consecutive terms preceding it. Nor is the unexpired portion of such term a new one. Much less is the election a reelection. This can be made clear by the following example: If A is thrice elected mayor of a municipality for three consecutive terms and, during his third term, is made to face a recall election in an off-year election and is elected over his rivals, it would be absurd to contend that he cannot continue in office because his election will actually be his fourth election and the service of the remainder of the third term will actually be service for the fourth consecutive term. In this case, for lack of the second element, i.e., service for more than three consecutive terms, the three-term limit rule cannot be applied to the election of Hagedorn in the recall election of September 24, 2002.
Finally, the dissenters argue that, unless the three-term limit is applied to a recall election taking place after three consecutive terms, a popular elective local official, unable to run for a fourth term, may be tempted to plot the recall of his successor so that he can return to power in the ensuing election. I appreciate the point of the dissenters. But the danger is equally great for a vice-mayor plotting against the mayor and by succession ascending into power and from thence forward seeking three more successive terms. And yet we have held that service for the unexpired term, by reason of succession, is not to be counted.
In any event, it is familiar learning that the possibility of abuse is not an argument against the concession of power as there is no power that is not susceptible of abuse.
Thus, while I do not subscribe to the majority reasoning by which the decision in this case is justified, I reach the same result as they do in holding that Hagedorn was not disqualified because of prior service for more than three consecutive terms to run for Mayor of Puerto Princesa City in the recall election held on September 24, 2002. The result reached upholds the right of a candidate to seek a popular mandate and vindicates the sovereign judgment of the electorate of Puerto Princesa City.
FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS,
I vote to dismiss the petition in G.R. Nos. 155083-84 as well as those in G.R. Nos. 154512 and 154683 and to declare respondent Edward S. Hagedorn qualified to run in the last recall election for Mayor of Puerto Princesa City.
Const., Art. X, §8: The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.
311 SCRA 602 (1999).
G.R. No. 147927, Feb. 4, 2002.
2 RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 243-245 (Session of July 25, 1986) (hereafter referred to as Record); 3 Record 406-408 (Session of August 16, 1986).
Websters Third International Dictionary of the English Language (Unabridged) p. 731 (1993).
Adormeo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 147927, Feb. 4, 2002.
See Borja v. COMELEC, 295 SCRA 157 (1998); Arcos v. COMELEC (res.), G.R. No. 133639, Oct. 6, 1998.
Borja v. COMELEC, supra; Arcos v. COMELEC, supra.
Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139, 177 (1936); Nava v. Gatmaitan, 90 Phil. 172, 200 (1951); Vera v. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192 (1946); Aquino v. Enrile, Jr., 59 SCRA 183, 417 (1974).
CONCURRING OPINION
PUNO, J.:
The correctness of the decision so ably written by Mr. Justice Carpio speaks for itself. Nonetheless, the complex constitutional dimensions of the issue for resolution compels this humble concurring o