G.R. No. 180492 - ELPIDIO B. VALINO, VS. ALVIN P. VERGARA, TOMAS N. JOSON III, RAUL P. MENDOZA, ATTY. HAROLD A. RAMOS, ET AL.,*. RESOLUTION - Supreme Court E-Library

Ruling

Accordingly, petitioner could no longer expect any favorable ruling from the COMELEC en banc . The appropriate recourse of petitioner should have been a petition for certiorari filed before this Court within thirty (30) days from notice of Resolution No. 8212, pursuant to Sections 2 [24] and 3, [25] Rule 64 in connection with Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. However, petitioner failed to do so and, instead, filed a motion for reconsideration addressed to the COMELEC en banc through its Second Division. The failure of the petitioner to seasonably undertake the proper recourse before this Court is fatal to his cause. The filing of his Motion for Reconsideration is of no moment. Section 1(d), Rule 13 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure categorically prohibits a motion to reconsider a resolution of the COMELEC en banc except in cases involving election offenses. As held in Bautista v. COMELEC : [26] We hold that petitioner acted correctly in filing the present petition because the resolution of the COMELEC in question is not subject to reconsideration and, therefore, any party who disagreed with it only had one recourse, and that was to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 13, §1 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides: What Pleadings are Not Allowed . -- The following pleadings are not allowed: x x x x d) motion for reconsideration of an en banc ruling, resolution, order or decision except in election offense cases; x x x x As the case before the COMELEC did not involve an election offense, reconsideration of the COMELEC resolution was not possible and petitioner had no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. For him to wait until the COMELEC denied his motion would be to allow the reglementary period for filing a petition for certiorari with this Court to run and expire. [27] Time and again, we held that rules of procedure exist for a noble purpose, and to disregard such rules, in the guise of liberal construction, would be to defeat such purpose. Procedural rules are not to be disdained as mere technicalities. They may not be ignored to suit the convenience of a party. Adjective law ensures the effective enforcement of substantive rights through the orderly and speedy administration of justice. Rules are not intended to hamper litigants or complicate litigation; they help provide a vital system of justice where suitors may be heard following judicial procedure and in the correct forum. Public order and our system of justice are well served by a conscientious observance by the parties of the procedural rules. [28] We see no cogent reason why we should exempt petitioner's case from this doctrine. Based on the foregoing disquisitions, Resolution No. 8212, with respect to petitioner, had already become final and executory and, therefore, beyond the purview of this Court to act upon. [29] Ostensibly, petitioner's case before the COMELEC-Cabanatuan was a